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CAN INTERNATIONAL LAW HELP RESOLVE THE CONFLICTS OVER
UNINHABITED ISLANDS IN THE EAST CHINA SEA?
MICHAEL C. DAVIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping once famously urged that resolution of
disputes with China's neighbors over uninhabited islands be put off to a later
generation, stating: "Our generation is not wise enough to find common language
on this question. The next generation will certainly be wiser."' Such sage advice
seemed practical at the time, freeing China and its neighbors to focus on more
pressing trade and economic development efforts. The wisdom of continuing
deferral of the disputes over uninhabited islands is now in doubt, at least when
peaceful alternatives may be considered. Beyond the rapid economic development
and the consequent explosion of resource demands that has occurred since Deng
uttered these words, technological development has made these deep seabed
resources more readily accessible.2 Added to this has been China's rapid economic
development and associated military rise, encouraging China's expanded attention
to territorial sovereignty and resource claims in its periphery. 3 Increased military
confrontations over disputed islands have added to the urgency of this matter, and
an impasse has prevailed .
University of Hong Kong, Faculty of Law (mcdavis@hku.hk).
1. CHIEN-PENG CHUNG, DOMESTIC POLITICS, INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND CHINA'S
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 38 (2004); see also CHI-KIN LO, CHINA'S POLICY TOWARD TERRITORIAL
DISPUTES: THE CASE OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ISLANDS 171 (2003).
2. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EAST CHINA SEA I (Sept. 17, 2014), available at
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/eastchina-sea/east china sea.pdf (stating although the
East China Sea may have abundant oil and natural gas resources, unresolved territorial disputes
continue to hinder exploration and development in the area); Michael T. Klare, Island Grabbing in
Asia: Why the South China Seas are So Tense, FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 4, 2012),
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 38093/michael-t-klare/island-grabbing-in-asia.
3. Asia's Balance of Power: China's Military Rise, ECONOMIST, Apr. 7, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/node/21552212; Toshi Yoshihara, War By Other Means: China's Political
Uses of Seapower, DIPLOMAT (Sept. 26, 2012), http://thediplomat.com/2012/09/26/war-by-other-
means-chinas-political-uses-of-seapower; Kurt Campbell, Trouble at Sea Reveals the New Shape of
China's Foreign Policy, FIN. TIMES, July 22, 2014, http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2014/07/22/trouble-at-
sea-reveals-the-new-shape-of-chinas-foreign-policy.
4. Japan Defense Paper Warns of China's 'Dangerous Acts' in Sea, Air, TIMES INDIA, Aug. 5,
2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/Japan-defence-paper-wams-over-Chinas-
dangerous-acts-in-sea-air/articleshow/39663923.cms; Chinese Ships Advance in Waters Near Diaoyus
Defying Japan's White Paper Warning, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 6, 2014, 2:03 PM,
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1567585/defying-japans-warning-chinese-ships-advance-
waters-near-diaoyus.
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This article focuses on comparable disputes over two groups of uninhabited
islands-the Dokdo (Takeshima in Japanese) Islands and the Diaoyu (Senkaku in
Japanese) Islands-that may be pivotal to unraveling a series of volatile maritime
disputes between Japan and South Korea, on the one hand, and Japan and China,
on the other. The Dokdo/Takeshima and Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are located
respectively in the Sea of Japan (known as the East Sea in Korea) and the East
China Sea. This narrowing of the topic to these two particular island disputes and
related maritime issues is offered in the hope that these two sets of disputes may
hold some keys to the wider, more factually complex debate stretching across the
region, both north to the Yellow Sea and south to the South China Sea. 5 At the
same time, there is hope the Japan-South Korea dispute may inform options
available for the China-Japan dispute.
In the face of the current impasse, the challenge is to identify those aspects of
these island disputes that can be solved so as to ultimately facilitate more
comprehensive maritime solutions that may be achieved under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS"). 6 Toward this end, the following
six sections will discuss: first, the posture of the current disputes; second, some
international legal principles of relevance to the parties positions regarding
territorial claims to uninhabited islands and resource rights in adjoining seas; third,
the above-noted Japanese-South Korean dispute relating to the Dokdo/Takeshima
Islands; fourth, the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; fifth,
the parties' positions regarding the related resource boundary claims; and, sixth,
concluding recommendations on how best to move past the current impasse.
Paradoxically, while resource concerns triggered a lot of the recent attention to
these disputes, nationalistic concerns over sovereignty engender more passion in
the disputants. The twin concern over sovereignty and resources has become an
increasing cause of conflict in the Asian region, making settlement of resource
claims without addressing the underlying sovereignty dispute increasingly
difficult.
5. See generally Andy Yee, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: A Comparative Analysis
of the South China Sea and the East China Sea, 2 J. CURRENT CHINESE AFF. 165 (2011). Both Japan
and South Korea have other sea resource boundary disputes with China. See e.g., Euan Graham, South
Korea's Maritime Challenges: Between a Rock anda Hard Base, RSIS COMMENTARIES, No. 063/2012,
Apr. 11, 2012, available at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CO12063.pdf. The
Sino-Korean dispute over Leo Island (actually submerged rocks) has been especially contentious.
Terence Roehrig, South Korea-China Maritime Disputes: Toward a Solution, EASTAS[AFORUM.ORG,
Nov. 27, 2012, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/11/27/south-korea-china-maritime-disputes-toward-
a-solution; China Must Not Take Its Territorial Ambitions Too Far, CHOSUN ILBO, Sept. 26, 2012,
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/htmldir/2012/09/26/2012092601283.html; Scores of Chinese
Fishing Boats Invade Korean Waters, CHOSUN ILBO, May 2,
2014,http://english.chosun.com/site/data/htmldir/2014/05/02/2014050201344.html. Less relevant to
the present discussion are Japanese disputes with Russia over its northern Kuril Islands. Japan PM,
Putin Seek Progress on Islands Dispute, ABC NEWS AUSTL., Apr. 29, 2013,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-04-29/an-japan2c-russia-discuss-islands-dispute/4658814.
6. See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
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With this in mind, the final section offers a recommendation that reverses
both Deng Xiaoping's earlier sage advice and the favored international practice
under UNCLOS of interim resource settlements in the face of intractable territorial
disputes. Developing international customary law regarding claims to uninhabited
islands suggests the most effective avenue to unraveling these territorial and
maritime resource disputes is to first pay attention to peaceful resolution of the
island and related maritime sovereignty disputes. In the spirit of the gentle
removal of logs from the log-j am that characterizes these disputes, this effort might
ideally begin with third-party dispute resolution, preferably in the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ").
Careful consideration of the security and other alliances between South Korea
and Japan, as they react to China's rise and North Korea's aggression, may
encourage a process to resolve historical tensions and begin to outline relative
rights respecting these islands and the broader maritime claims. Beyond such
optimal approach, other lesser alternatives are also considered. These
recommendations recognize attempts to fully resolve the maritime resource
disputes have been held up for decades. Uncertainty over the islands' claims and
associated resource zones has spawned the back and forth posturing that inhibits
compromise over the maritime resource claims. The goal is to move the process
forward toward a solution before the more aggravated military conflict, which
many fear, ensues.
II. THE CURRENT POSTURE OF THE DISPUTES
A. Tit-for- Tat Provocations
The past couple of years have witnessed an explosion of confrontations
relating to sovereignty and jurisdiction over uninhabited islands and maritime
resource zones in the East and Southeast Asian maritime areas. The long list of
confrontations between the parties to the present discussion have included: the
Sino-Japanese dispute in late 2010 over the Japanese arrest of Chinese fishermen
accused of ramming a Japanese patrol boat near the Japanese-administered
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea; 7 the 2012 Japanese arrest and quick
release of fourteen Chinese civilians attempting to occupy Diaoyu/Senkaku, with
follow-on Japanese civilian occupation; 8 the September 2012 Japanese purchase of
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands from a private Japanese holder (characterized by
China as "nationalization"), which netted the largest anti-Japanese riots in China in
decades; 9 Chinese patrol boats frequently confronting the Japanese Coast Guard
7. Japan-China Row over Ship Seizure, AUAZEERA (Sept. 9, 2010, 9:48 AM),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2010/09/20109963630504649.html.
8. Martin Fackler, Japan Holds 14 Chinese in Island Landing, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 15, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/world/asia/japanese-ministers-visit-tokyo-shrine.html?_r-0.
9. The Chinese government appears to manage the public discontent over Japan's purchase, first
turning it on and then turning it off, perhaps fearing a backlash against their own government. Keith
Bradsher, Martin Fackler, & Andrew Jacobs, Anti-Japan Protests Erupt in China over Disputed Island,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/20/world/asia/japanese-activists-display-
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off Diaoyu/Senkaku; 1° various threats of sanctions (under WTO "security
exceptions") or even war in the Chinese official press;"' Japan's scrambling of
fighter planes in response to Chinese warplanes flying near the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands. 12
That there has been a similar list of disputes in the South China Sea signals
that the reach of this tense situation goes well beyond the immediate area to
include: maritime patrol boat confrontations between China and its neighbors over
the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea; 13 disputes in 2014 over a
Chinese drilling platform operating in waters generally thought to be in the
Vietnamese Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ"), netting confrontations at sea and
large Vietnamese street protest; 14 a dispute and then a now-failed compromise
between the Philippines and China over Scarborough Shoal and China's building
of man-made islands on reefs in the disputed Spratly Islands.' 5 While the present
essay will discuss prominent East China Sea disputes, those in the South China Sea
are equally compelling.
Any of these disputes risk conflagration across the region as various security
alignments are brought into play. Recent developments, with China employing
flag-on-disputed-island.html?hp (noting the demonstrations appeared sanctioned and chaperoned by
police). While Beijing accuses Japan of provoking China by nationalizing the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands,
it appears the Japanese purchase from private owners was designed to avoid a purchase being
orchestrated by the more nationalistic Tokyo governor. Mar Yamaguchi, Tokyo Governor Says City
will Buy Disputed Islands, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 17, 2012, http://finance.yahoo.com/news/tokyo-
govemor-says-city-buy-150303483.html. See also Ed Zhang, China Lays into Japan over Naming of
Islets, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 31, 2012, 12:00 AM),
http://www.scmp.com/article/991303/china-lays-japan-over-naming-islets.
10. Minnie Chan, PLA Puts Military Heat on Japan over Diaoyu Islands, S. CHINA MORNING
POST (Sept. 12, 2012, 7:11 PM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/anicle/1035320/pla-puts-military-
heat-japan-over-diaoyu-islands.
11. An Baisong, Consider Sanctions on Japan, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 17, 2012, 7:53 AM),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2012-09/17/content_15761435.htm (indicating a military
response should be a last choice); Jane Perlez, China Alters Its Strategy in Diplomatic Crisis with
Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/29/world/asia/china-alters-its-
strategy-in-dispute-with-japan.html?pagewanted=all& r-0.
12. Julian Ryall, Japanese Jets Ordered to Diaoyus 160 Times in Nine Months, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 26, 2013, 6:10 PM, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/ 136249/japanese-
jets-ordered-diaoyus- 160-times-nine-months.
13. lan Storey, ASEAN and the South China Sea: Movement in Lieu of Progress, CHINA BRIEF,
Apr. 26, 2012, at 10, available at
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx-ttnews /5 Btt-news / 5D=39305&tx-ttnews%5BbackPid%5 D-58
9&no cache= I #. V Frdu n FXt.
14. Edward Wong, Analysts Say China May Try to Use Manmade Islands to Bolster Bid for
Economic Development, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2014,
http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/19/analysts-say-china-may-try-to-use-manmade-islands-
to-bolster-bid-for-economic-developmentl; NGUYEN THI LAN ANH, XISHA (PARACEL) ISLANDS: A
REJOINDER (2014), available at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CO 14117.pdf.
15. Kristine Kwok & Minnie Chan, China Plans Artificial Island in Disputed Spratlys Chain in
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drones near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and declaring an Air Defense
Identification Zone ("ADIZ") to overlap the Japanese controlled islands, have
raised ominous concerns about miscalculations leading to military conflict.
16
Chinese officials and commentators have invoked World War II history to suggest
a rising tide of Japanese militarism.17 The perceived threat from a now rising
China may appear more imminent to its neighbors.
A common thread in many of these disputes is China's military rise and
consequent assertiveness. 18 There have been threatening domestic calls for China
to enhance its sea power in order to deal more forcefully with these challenges. 19
These have included what has been called a "near sea doctrine" China announced
five years ago, where China declared an aim to exercise greater control over the
East and South China Seas.20  There have in fact been several incursions by
16. Christopher Bodeen, China Warns Foreign Planes Entering Defense Zone, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Jan. 24, 2014, http://news.yahoo.com/china-wams-foreign-planes-entering-defense-zone-
064540562.html; Wendell Minnick, Fact Sheet: China's Air Defense Zone, DEFENSE NEWS, Nov. 2,
2013, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131124/DEFREG03/311240004/Fact-Sheet-China-s-Air-
Defense-Zone; US Criticizes New China Zone, Vows to Defend Japan, SPACEWAR.COM, Nov. 23, 2013,
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/US_criticizes-new China-zone vows to defend Japan 999.html;
Press Release, Ministry of Nat'l Def., PRC, Defense Spokesman Yang Yujun's Response to Questions
on the Establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (Nov. 23, 2013), available
at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/TopNews/2013-11/23/content 4476149.htm; Chris Buckley, China Claims Air
Rights over Disputed Islands, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/24/world/asia/china-wams-of-action-against-aircraft-over-disputed-
seas.html?_r-0; Former Chinese Commander Warns of War If Japan Shoots Down Drone,
BLOOMBERG News, Nov. 4, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-04/former-chinese-
commander-warns-of-war-if-japan-shoots-down-drone.html; Martin Fackler, Japan Rejects China's
Claim to Air Rights Over Islands, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/25/world/asia/japan-rejects-chinas-claim-to-air-rights-over-disputed-
islands.html?ref-international-home; Ely Ratner, China Undeterred and Unapologetic,
WARONTHEROCKS.COM, June 24, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/06/china-undeterred-and-
unapologetic/.
17. Zhang Junsai, Abe's Militarism Defies History, GLOBE AND MAIL, Jan. 9, 2014,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/abes-militarism-defies-history/articlel 6244968/.
18. Edward Wong, China Navy Reaches Far, Unsettling the Region, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/world/asia/15china.html? r-0; Asia's Balance of Power, supra
note 3; China's Maritime Ambitions Making Waves in Pacific, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Aug. 10, 2013,
3:35 AM, http://globalnation.inquirer.net/82919/chinas-maritime-ambitions-making-waves-in-pacific-
2/. China's inclusion of the islands among its "core interest" has also caused unease. China Officially
Labels Senkakus a 'Core Interest', JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 27, 2013,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/04/27/national/china-officially-labels-senkakus-a-core-
interest/#.VFOB3 nF Vo; Senkakus a 'Core Interest,' Chinese Military Scholar Tells Japan, JAPAN
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/20l3/08/20/national/politics-
diplomacy/senkakus-a-core-interest-chinese-military-scholar-tells-japan/#.VFOEO-nF-Vp; Phillip C.
Saunders, China's Juggling Act: Balancing Stability and Territorial Claims, PACNET No. 33 (Center
for Strategic & Int'l Studies), Apr. 29, 2014, at I, available at
http://csis.org/files/publication/Pacl433.pdf.
19. Hao Zhou, China Yet to be a Sea Power, GLOBALTIMES.CN, Mar. 23, 2012,
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/701700.shtml.
20. Michael J. Green, Negotiating Asia's Troubled Waters, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/24/opinion/negotiating-asias-troubled-waters.html?_r-=0.
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Chinese Coast Guard, marine surveillance ships, and aircrafts near these islands
and others in the South China Sea.2 1 A prominent Japanese retired admiral has
even argued, beyond seabed resource claims, China's real goal in seeking to
control the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea is to create a
submarine safe-zone in the South China Sea to enhance unfettered access to the
open ocean by nuclear submarines, as a deterrent against the U.S. 22 Others take the
view that China is simply in a renewal phase aimed at expanding its sovereign
territory and resurrecting its more glorious past.23 Whichever theory is correct,
China's military posturing raises risks both for the disputants and for U.S.
involvement.24 Concerns about full civilian control of China's military have
enhanced the perceived sense of risk in military encounters at sea. 25 Diplomatic
efforts to contain this risk have born very little fruit.
26
These risks have also produced escalation on the Japanese side. After years
of somewhat stagnant military budgets, Japan has announced defense budget
27increases and strategic shifts to counter Chinese incursions. It has revised its
21. China's New Coastguard Flexes Muscles near Diaoyu Islands, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July
26, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/11291292/chinese-coastguard-enters-japanese-
controlled-waters-raising-tensions; Three Chinese Vessels Enter Territorial Waters Near Senkakus,
JAPAN TIMES, Feb. 28, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/02/28/national/three-chinese-
vessels-enter-territorial-waters-near-senkakus/#.VFOfUPnF Vo; Barbara Demick, China Wages Stealth
War in Asian Waters, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/27/world/la-fg-
china-maritime-20130327; Japan PM Abe Warns China of Force Over Islands Landing, BBC NEWS,
Apr. 23, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22260140.
22. Reiji Yoshida, Bei.ing's Senkaku Goal: Sub 'Safe Haven' in South China Sea, JAPAN TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/11/07/national/beijings-senkaku-goal-sub-safe-
haven-in-south-china-sea/.
23. John Lee, China's Dream of Rebirth, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 2, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1166737/chinas-dream-rebirth?page=all; Holly
Morrow, It's Not About the Oil-It's About the Tiny Rocks, FOREIGN POL'Y, Aug. 4, 2014,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/08/04/it-s not about the oil it s about the tiny rocks_c
hina south china seajapanvietnam (arguing that these disputes are not about oil but are primarily
about sovereignty).
24. John Pomfret, Japan and China's Island Argument is a U.S. Concern, WASH. POST, Feb. 5,
2013, http ://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/j apan-and-chinas-island-argument-is-a-us-
concem/2013/02/05/fbc7ed62-6999-11e2-af53-7b2b2a7510a8_story.html; U.S. Airs Concern over
China's Radar Locking on Japanese Defense Ship, ASIA NEWS MONITOR, Feb. 7, 2013; Insight: China
Increased Belligerence after U.S. Aircraft Deployment near Senkakus, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Feb. 6, 2013,
http://ajw.asahi.con/article/asia/AJ201302060077.
25. Masahiro Matsumura, Praetorian China?, PROJECT-SYNDICATE.ORG (Apr. 26, 2013),
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-s-loss-of-civilian-control-over-the-military-by-
masahiro-matsumura.
26. Showing Off to the World, ECONOMIST, Nov. 8, 2014,
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21631107-capital-about-host-president-xi-jinpings-diplomatic-
coming-out-party-showing.
27. Yuka Hayashi, Japanese General Seeks to Reinforce Defenses, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2013,
http://onltine.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424127887324581504578238473997165346; see generally
JAPAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2013 (2013), available at
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pubt/w_paper/2013.html) (reflecting a shift in defense interest from the North
to the islands in the Southwest).
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defense strategy to focus its forces more to the south to defend against potential
Chinese attacks on its islands.28 Japan has also stepped up efforts to develop a
stealth fighter jet to match the J-20 stealth fighter recently tested by China.29 Japan
has engaged in war games and placed missiles on nearby Pacific gateway islands.30
It has also attempted to contain the problem by reaching a separate agreement with
the Republic of China ("ROC") to allow Taiwanese fishermen to fish near the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands just beyond the twelve-mile territorial sea boundary.31
Some disputants have lodged formal protests or other submissions to the
United Nations. In Southeast Asia, these complaints relate to China's allegedly
excessive resource claims and the so-called "nine dotted lines" claim to most of the
South China Sea.32 China has reacted to the most aggressive of these, relating to
the filing by the Philippines, by refusing to participate and put forth its own
arbitrator, requiring the President of the U.N. Tribunal to select a judge on behalf
of China. 33 After the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku crises, China instituted its own filing
28. See Hayashi, supra note 27.
29. David Axe, Japan's Stealth Fighter Gambit, DIPLOMAT, June 23, 2011,
http://thediplomat.com/2011/06/japans-stealth-fighter-gambit/?allpages=yes.
30. Japan putting Missiles on Pacific Gateway Islands, CHANNELNEWSASIA.COM, Nov. 7, 2013,
http://www.channeinewsasia.com/news/specialreports/mh370/news/japan-putting-missiles-
on/878190.html.
31. China Angered as Japan, Taiwan Sign Fishing Agreement, REUTERS, Apr. 10, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/10/us-china-japan-taiwan-idUSBRE93909520130410; Minnie
Chan, Taiwan Would 'Expel' Mainland Trawlers under Japan Fishing Deal, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Apr. 10, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1211568/china-angered-japan-taiwan-sign-
fishing-agreement?page=all.
32. Though China has formally opted out of compulsory jurisdiction for maritime boundaries and
military activities, as permitted under UNCLOS, the Philippines has filed a claim under UNCLOS to
Scarborough Shoal (known as Huangyan Island in China). China Rejects Manila Claims over South
China Shoal, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 18, 2012,
http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2018004165_apassouthchinasea.html. Beyond these island
disputes there are numerous issues related to China's hotly disputed claims to nearly all of the South
China Seas within the infamous "nine dotted lines", which Wang Gungwu traces to China's attempted
accession of Japanese imperial claims following World War II. Wang Gungwu, China and the Map of
Nine Dotted Lines, STRAITS TIMES, July 11, 2012, http://www.straitstimes.com/the-big-story/asia-
report/china/story/china-and-the-map-nine-dotted-lines-20120711.
33. Greg Torode, For South China Sea Claimants, a Legal Venue to Battle China, REUTERS, Feb.
12, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/13/us-china-vietnam-idUSBREAI C04R20140213.
The arbitration judicial panel was fully constituted on April 24, 2013, to include judges from Sri Lanka
(president), France, Germany, Netherlands, and Poland. See Greg Torode, Manila to Tackle Sea Row
'With or Without China' at UN, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 21, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/ 1154951/manila-tackle-sea-row-or-without-china-un; Verna
Yu, Beijing Looks Like A 'Bully' By Refusing Arbitration of South China Sea, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, May 25, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1245471/beijing-looks-bully-rejecting-
arbitration-south-china-sea-issue; Raissa Robles, Philippines Seeks UN arbitration over South China
Sea Disputes, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 11, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1234952/philippines-seeks-un-arbitration-over-south-china-sea-
disputes. The arbitration is expected to take several years, leaving further opportunity to attempt
settlement. China has refused to appear, though the tribunal is going forward. Be'ing Rejects Tribunal
Request for Plea Response, TAIPEI TIMES, June 5, 2014,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/arehives/2014/06/05/2003592024. Though not formally
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with the U.N., indicating its base points and strait baselines to claim territorial seas
and possibly associated resource zones for the disputed islands.34 China has since
proclaimed its intention to patrol claimed areas now under the administration of
other states. Such Chinese proclamations have included reported regulations on
vessels in China's territorial seas, issued by the responsible Hainan People's
Congress.36 It has been argued that enforcement of such regulations through
seizure of a foreign vessel may open China up to the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea ("ITLOS"), which has disavowed
jurisdiction in maritime delimitation disputes.37 These official Chinese actions, in
conjunction with official encouragement of anti-Japanese demonstrations, not to
mention encouragement for Chinese fishing and patrol vessels to enter the disputed
areas, surely contribute to a volatile situation.
38
appearing, China did publish a position paper objecting to jurisdiction in the dispute on
December 7, 2014. POSITION PAPER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA ON THE MATTER OF JURISDICTION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION INITIATED
BY THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (2014), available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cnmfa eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtm.
34. GOVERNMENT OF THE PRC, GOVERNMENT SUBMISSION TO THE U.N., Statement of the
Government of the PRC on the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of Diaoyu Dao and Its Affiliated Islands
(Sept. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/DEPOSIT/chn-mzn89-2012
_e.pdf; China's Statement over Diaoyu Islands, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Sept. 11, 2012,
http://english.people.com.cn/90883/7943813.html; Continental Shelf Notification, U.N. DOALOS,
Receipt of the Submission Made by the People's Republic of China to the Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf, CLCS.63.2012LOS (Dec. 14, 2012), available at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcsnew/submissionsfiles/chn63_12/clcs 63 2012.pdf. Base lines refer
to the inland boundary of the territorial sea from which all other zones are measured; when coast are
uneven or for islands strait baselines may be used under certain conditions. See J. Ashley Roach,
China's Straight Baseline Claim: Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, 17 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 1 (2013), available
at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/7/china / E2 /80 / 99s-straight-baseline-claim-senkaku-
diaoyu-islands. UNCLOS Article 5 provides, "except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the
normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as
marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State." UNCLOS Article 7 allows for
strait baselines, (1) "in localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into," and (2) "if there is
a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity." UNCLOS Article 46 allows strait
baselines for archipelagic states to outer most islands.
35. Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Dangerous Waters, Why China's Dispute with Japan is More
Dangerous than You Think, FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept. 17, 2012,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/17/dangerous waters.
36. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 776, 113th Cong. §2(27) (2013).
37. Ben Blanchard & Manuel Mogato, Chinese Police Plan to Board Vessels in Disputed Seas,
REUTERS, Nov. 29, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/29/us-china-seas-
idUSBRE8AS05E20121129. Sam Bateman argues that although China has opted out of compulsory
jurisdiction for maritime delimitation, it seizure of a vessel in contested waters claimed as territorial
waters in a seizure dispute could open the door to the boundary delimitation issues necessary to
determine the appropriateness of the seizure. Sam Bateman, China's New Maritime Regulations. Do
They Accord with International Law?, RSIS COMMENTARIES, No. 220/2012, Dec. 5, 2012, available at
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/COI 2220.pdf.
38. Minnie Chan, China Vows to Protect 2,000 Fishing Boats Heading Towards Diaoyus, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 18, 2012, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1039353/china-vows-
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The discussion of these maritime disputes in several international forums
signals enhanced likelihood of further confrontation. Discussions at the March
2012 meeting of China's National People's Congress tended to show China's
determination to press its maritime claims with even greater determination. 39 As
President Obama restated in Tokyo in April 2014, the U.S. is committed to defend
Diaoyu/Senkaku under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security. 40  This frequently stated commitment, endorsed by congressional
resolution in late 2012, no doubt contributes to the military risk associated with
this issue.41  Japan's hedging against China's volatile threats also includes
increased security alignments with other threatened states.42 While there have
protect-2000-fishing-boats-heading-towards-diaoyus. There has generally been less agitation on the
Japanese side. Julian Ryall, Japanese Unmoved by Diaoyus Row, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 18,
2012, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1039350/japanese-unmoved-diaoyus-row?page=all.
That Beijing frequently employs a people's war strategy of using ostensibly private fishing boats for
quasi-military purposes as "fisheries patrols" off Senkaku/Diaoyu poses a particular risk of military
confrontation. Will Clem, Use Fisheries Patrols to Tighten Grip on Diaoyus. Official Says, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Dec. 7, 2010, http://www.scmp.com/article/732654/use-fisheries-patrols-tighten-grip-
diaoyus-official-says; Mark McDonald, Will China Arm its Fishermen to Protect a 'Core Interest'?,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2012, http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/will-china-arm-its-
fishermen-to-protect-a-core-interest/? r-0. Beyond military tensions there have even been civilian
boycotts of Japanese goods. Ben Blanchard & Xiaoyi Shao, China Says Tensions with Japan Likely to
Hurt Trade, REUTERS, Sept. 13, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/13/us-china-japan-
idUSBRE88C04620120913; Edward Wong, China's Hard Line: 'No Room for Compromise', N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/09/world/asia/china.html.
39. Li Mingjiang, China's Rising Maritime Aspirations: Impact on Beijing's Good-Neighbour
Policy, RSIS COMMENTARIES, No. 053/2012, Mar. 28, 2012, available at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/CO 12053 .pdf.
40. Kristine Kwok, Obama Reassures Japan over Diaoyu Islands, but Warns Against Provoking
China, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 24, 2014,
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1496261 /obama-reassures-japan-over-islands-warns-against-
provoking-china?page=all.
41. HITOSHI TANAKA, POLITICIZING THE SENKAKU ISLANDS: A DANGER TO REGIONAL STABILITY
2 (2012), available at http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/EAU7-3.pdf. This defense treaty coverage was
emphasized again in early 2013. Atsushi Matsuura, Clinton Sends Warning to China over Senkakus,
YOMIURI SHIMBUN (Jan. 21, 2013, 5:51 PM), http://www.4thmedia.org/2013/0l/china-strongly-
challenges-us-comments-about-the-diaoyu-islands/. That the U.S. has also recently committed to
increased missile defense for Japan and to deploy drones over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands increases the
military significance of these commitments. Thom Shanker & Ian Johnson, US Accord with Japan over
Missile Defense Draws Criticism in China, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/world/asia/u-s-and-japan-agree-on-missile-defense-
system.html?ref global-home. J. Michael Cole, US to Deploy Drones over Diaoyutais, TAIPEI TIMES,
Aug. 8, 2012, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/08/08/2003539722; US Backing
May Prove Costly for Japan, GLOBAL TIMES, Sept. 16, 2012,
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/73345l .shtml.
42. Japan, Vietnam to Deepen Security Ties Amid China's Growing Assertiveness, MAINICHI, Jan.
18, 2013,
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been calls to prepare for war on both sides, the majority opinion is that China and
Japan will not risk an all-out war.43
Efforts to contain the dispute have also been evident. In August 2012, the
Beijing government asked that the Japanese government follow "three no's":
Japanese nationals should not land on the disputed islands, Japan should not
develop resources around the island, and Japan should not construct any buildings
on the islands.44 Internet users in China attacked the government for being weak.45
In late 2013, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, speaking before the U.N.
General Assembly, sought to cool down these intense disputes by re-invoking
Deng Xiaoping's famous dictum about the time not now being ripe to address
46these issues, though he insisted Japan at least acknowledge the dispute. In 2014
Washington, Manila, Beijing, and Tokyo backed a code of conduct to prevent
conflict at sea that has tried to reduce the discussed risks by banning radar-locking
of weaponry and setting out a reporting mechanism when naval vessels meet
unexpectedly in sea lanes.47
The danger of Sino-Japanese military miscalculation has, nevertheless,
become increasingly evident in the tit-for-tat military moves of both sides. China
viewed the Japanese arrest of fishing boat captains in Japanese-claimed waters and
the naming of the islands claimed by China as provocative. 48 China has increased
official patrols near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, enhancing the risk of
confrontation.49  On two occasions, the Chinese were reported to have locked
Tour Stresses Regional Tension, GLOBAL TIMES, Jan. 15, 2013,
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/756023.shtml.
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stakes-stand-between-japan-and-china-wont-come-war?page=all; Chi-yuk Choi, PLA Officials Say
Troops are to Prepare for War Amid Territorial Disputes with Japan, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan.
16, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/ 128164/pla-officials-say-troops-are-prepare-war-
amid-territorial-disputes-japan.
44. Bejing to Issue "Three Nos " To Japan over Diaoyutais, WANT CHINA TIMES, Aug. 30, 2012,
http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20120830000089&cid = 1101.
45. Id.
46. Atsushi Okudera, Chinese Foreign Minister Takes to Japan in U.N. Speech, ASAHI SHIMBUN,
Sept. 28, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind-news/politics/AJ201309280060.
47. Teddy Ng & Julian Ryall, Beijing Backs Code to Prevent Conflict at Sea Along with US and
Japan, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 22, 2014,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1494736/china-among-21 -nations-back-code-prevent-
unintended-conflict-sea.
48. Ed Zhang, China Lays into Japan Over Naming of Islets, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 31,
2012, http://www.scmp.com/article/991303/china-lays-japan-over-naming-islets; Teddy Ng, New
Maritime Clash Threatens Sino-Japan Ties, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 8, 2011,
http://www.scmp.com/arlicle/984181 /new-maritime-clash-threatens-sino-japan-ties; China's
Contradictory Approach to Arrest of Fishermen, CHOSUN ILBO, Nov. 10, 2011,
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/htmldir/2011/11/10/2011111001144.html.
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weapons-guiding radar on Japanese vessels, accompanied by Chinese denials.
5
There have also been reports of China using drones to defend its claims in the East
China Sea and reports of China's intentions to increase patrols even further, to
which Japan is likewise preparing defensive measures.
5 1
What started with the Japanese government reaching agreement with the
private Japanese owners to buy and nationalize the islands, to head off plans of
Japanese right-wing politicians, garnered a heated Chinese response and has
escalated into the central dispute between these two trading partners. 5 2  The
Chinese government hardly appreciated the Japanese official's motive to
undermine a purchase by the more right-wing Governor of Tokyo, who would
surely have engaged in other provocative acts on the islands.5 3 China sometimes
characterizes its claims in the South China Sea and the East China Sea as "core
national interests," suggesting non-negotiability, which has carried a menacing
tone.
54
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military.html? r=0.
51. Stephen Chen, Liaoning Sends Drones Over East China Sea, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov.
30, 2011, http://www.scmp.com/article/986333/liaoning-sends-drones-over-east-china-sea; Minnie
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POST, Sept. 16, 2012, http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1037887/papers-go-
ballistic-over-diaoyu-dispute-japan (China proclaiming the sale illegal and invalid); Shi Jingtao, Hu
Warns Japan over Planned Purchase of Diaoyu Islands, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 10, 2012,
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2012, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/Olbabbfa2a-tb2b- I lel -87ae-00144feabdc0.html.
53. Malcolm Foster, Tokyo Governor Says City Plans to Buy Disputed East China Sea Islands,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 17, 2012, available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/media-japan-govt-agrees-
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an understanding as to the need for this purchase, but ultimately to no avail. Japan, China Were Close
to Preventing Current Turmoil Over Senkaku, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Oct. 22, 2013,
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind-news/politics/AJ201310220059.
54. Chinese General Luo Yuan said, "Core interests are not for debate, not for negotiation, and not
for trade off." This may say more about China efforts to aggressively assert its claims than reality since
the Chinese have frequently negotiated over core interest issues such as Taiwan and Hong Kong. Ed
Zhang, A Hawkish General with a Dove's Heart and Mind, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 16, 2011,
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While the Japanese dispute with South Korea over Dokdo/Takashima has
been comparably less volatile, there have been tense moments and concern about
Japan-Korean defense alignments. While Japan is in possession of
Senkaku!Diaoyu, South Korea is in possession of Dokdo/Takeshima.55 The
Japanese Government took a dim view of the South Korean President paying a
personal visit to Dokdo/Takeshima.56 These South Korean initiatives have
seemingly encouraged China to seek alignment with South Korea against Japan.
57
These disputes have also reached beyond the immediate disputants, affecting
the security posture throughout the region. The U.S. defense obligations towards
Japan and South Korea along with tit-for-tat confrontations with China over U.S.
warship passage through these seas have raised the temperature. 58 Vietnam and the
Philippines have beefed up their defenses in response to perceived Chinese
provocations 59 that all parties are increasingly likely to arrest the others' fishermen
in claimed waters, which signals greater urgency across the region. 60 The risk of
hot war from continuing failure to resolve certain territorial and resource claims in
the region is evident. Numerous efforts at discussion between the disputants have
not so far produced results.
6 1
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sub-philippines-sign-shifting-balance-naval-power. See, e.g., Hidemichi Katsumata, Japan's Strategy
Against Senkaku Island Dispute, JAPAN SECURITY WATCH, (Sept. 14, 2012, 12:20 PM),
http://jsw.newpacificinstitute.org/?p=10495 (translated by Kyle Mizokami) (providing a Japanese
perspective on this escalation). The U.S. has specifically indicated that its defense commitment reaches
the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands as Japanese administered territory. Paul Eckert, Treaty with Japan Covers
Islets in China Spat: U.S. Officials, REUTERS, Sept. 21, 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/20l2/09/20/us-china-japan-usa-idUSBRE88JIHJ20120920; PLA Warns
US Over Backing Japan in Diaoy'us Row, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 13, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/ 309056/china-military-tells-us-not-encourage-japan-over-
isles.
59. China's Maritime Disputes, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-
pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/?cid=otr-marketing use-china sea InfoGuide (last visited
Dec. 30, 2014).
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Dec.13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/world/asia/chinese-fisherman-kills-south-korean-
coast-guardsman.html; Kim Tae-jong, Illegal Chinese fishing boats to face heavier fines, KOREA
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2011, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/12/117 100109.html.
61. Teddy Ng & Lawrence Chung, Beijing Visit by Japanese Envoy Gives Chance to Repair Ties,
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B. Framing the Disputes
While the general fact of China's emergence as a great power may naturally
give rise to security concerns among China's neighbors, there can be little doubt
that peace would be better served by the elimination of risky disputes over
uninhabited islands and their surrounding seas. In regard to the disputes addressed
in this article, the cost of a war-like footing or war itself among three developed or
rapidly developing nations-China, Japan, and South Korea (along with the
U.S.)-would be enormous. The intra-Chinese dispute over Taiwan, while adding
further complexity, is set aside here, assuming some shared "Chinese" interests in
and mutual assertion of Chinese territorial claims on both sides of the Taiwan
Strait.62  The three states to be discussed primarily-China, Japan, and South
Korea-are all U.N. members and parties to the 1982 UNCLOS. 63 Contributing to
this tense situation has been a tendency of all three states, especially China and
Japan, to push claims to base lines and related inland seas, territorial seas, and
resource zones that clearly go beyond those contemplated by UNCLOS. Without
clearly knowing who first started this cycle of confrontation and excess, the
strategy of all appears to be aimed at creating strong bargaining chips as a
counterweight to the other side's perceived excess claims. This brew of excess
claims and bargaining chips leads to ever-rising escalation of the disputes.
Earlier, in the spirit of Deng Xiaoping's above statement about the wisdom of
setting aside such sovereignty disputes and in the shadow of UNCLOS, it was
anticipated that temporary joint resource development zones and fisheries could be
negotiated while leaving the sensitive claims to uninhabited islands-territorial
land claims not being addressed in UNCLOS-for future resolution. This strategy
has proven largely fruitless, especially as to the vast oil and gas resources-with
visit-japanese-envoy-gives-chance-repair-ties; Japan-China 'Secret' Talks Held Over Island Row,
NATION, Oct. 16, 2013, http://nation.com.pk/intemational/16-Oct-2013/japan-china-secret-talks-held-
over-island-row; No Talks Unless Dispute Affirmed: China, JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 21, 2013,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/09/21 /national/no-talks-unless-dispute-affirmed-
china/#.VHJg7VfF9tl. After a rather belligerent year China seems to be taking up a more conciliatory
approach, as has been evident with Vietnam as well. Teddy Ng, China, Vietnam to Set Up Sea
Exploration Group, China and Vietnam to Jointly Explore Waters, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 14,
2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/I 331106/china-vietnam-set-group-explore-disputed-
south-china-sea; Okudera, supra note 46.
62. Taiwan has indeed piped in occasionally to make its concerns known. Lawrence Chung, We
Vow Not to Give In Even an Inch, Taiwanese President Ma Tells Japan, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Sept. 14, 2012, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/ 1036214/we-vow-not-give-even-inch-
taiwanese-president-ma-tells-japan.
63. When China signed and ratified UNCLOS it indicated several exceptions to its acceptance of
the treaty, including specifically that nothing in its accession should be construed to conflict in any way
with China's territorial law. Query whether this includes its claims within the nine dotted lines to the
entire South China Sea and too much of the continental shelf under the East China Sea? UNCLOS does
not include island claims. It is important to note that the U.S., though often a participant in these
disputes, is not yet a party to UNCLOS, though there has been pressure for U.S. ratification. Mark
Landler, Law of the Sea Treaty is Found on Capitol Hill, Again, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/world/americas/law-of-the-sea-treaty-is-found-on-capitol-hill-
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only moderate contingent and not fully realized progress in a couple cases. 64 The
reluctance of each party to surrender the leverage of their bargaining chips, which
ultimately include uninhabited islands and the surrounding seas, has spawned an
impasse. Added to these strategic considerations has been a strong dose of
nationalist sentiments on all sides agitating to defend the sovereign territorial
claims represented by the islands.65 The Chinese government has been especially
66tolerant (some say encouraging of) public anti-Japanese demonstrations. Perry
Link has noted that this may be a dangerous game for China; if such
demonstrations get out of hand they may backfire, turning the public wrath on
China itself.67
This situation leaves the parties with a strategic log-jam and the question
whether any logs can be gently removed from the disputes without collapsing into
a state of war. As the level of volatility has increased over time, the urgency of
this matter has increased. With some limited fishery exceptions, proposals to ease
the risk of conflict and settle the resource disputes have not yet been fruitful.68
That failure has led to the effort in this article to turn the process around and
consider avenues to addressing the more volatile island disputes first.
Absent the nationalistic passions, the claims to sovereignty over disputed
islands by all sides are coherent enough and could be easily resolved on the merits
under now-established customary international law through some third-party
dispute mechanism. Regarding Senkaku/Diaoyu, the impasse has long been the
refusal of both China and Japan to submit the dispute for third-party arbitration or
for Japan to even acknowledge there is a dispute to address. In the 2012 speech of
64. Seima Oki, China Vessels Hold Drills Near Gas Fields, YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Mar. 19, 2012,
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Undersea Gas Drilling, TOKYO TIMES (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.tokyotimes.com/japan-protests-to-
china-over-undersea-gas-drilling.
65. Song Wenzhou, Nationalists Pose a Problem for Two Nations, CAIXIN ONLINE (Dec. 6, 2013),
http://english.caixin.com/2013-12-06/100614547.html.
66. William Wan, Beo'ing Both Encourages and Reins in Anti-Japan Protests, Analysts Say,
WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/beijing-both-encourages-and-
reins-in-anti-japan-protests-analysts-say/2012/09/17/dc8c I 88e-0 188-11 e2-9367-
4elbafb958db story.html?wprss=rss asia-pacific; Jessica Weiss, Nationalism and Anti-Japan
Demonstrations in China, MONKEY CAGE (Sept. 19, 2012),
http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2012/09/19/nationalism-and-anti-japan-demonstrations-in-china/.
China's encouragement of nationalistic demonstrations has been evident in China's ability to turn on
and off such demonstrations. China Tells Citizens not to hold Anti-Japan Protests, KYODO NEWS, Sept.
19, 2012, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/UPDATEI %3A+China+tells+citizens+not+to+hold+anti-
Japan+protests.-a0303222919. Such nationalism has especially been stoked by lingering sentiment
about Japan's invasions in World War II.
67. Perry Link, Beijing's Dangerous Game, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS (Sept. 20, 2012, 11:45 PM),
hUtp://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/sep/20/beijings-dangerous-game. See also June Teufel
Dreyer, The Sino Stranglehold: How Badly Could the Chinese Protests Hurt Japan's Economy?,
FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept. 21, 2012,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/21 /the sino stranglehold.
68. Teddy Ng, Japanese Propose Plan to Avoid Maritime Conflicts, Foreign Minister Seeks
Endorsements from Wen Jiabao and Wants to Resume Talks on Gas Fields, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Nov. 24, 2011, http://www.scmp.com/article/985738/japanese-propose-plan-avoid-maritime-conflicts.
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then Japanese Prime Minister Noda before the General Assembly he invoked
international law and seemingly signaled a willingness to submit the matter for
third-party arbitration, but China's long-standing refusal may have made this no
more than a safe ploy.69 More recently, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's
invocation of the rule of law as a basis to address these disputes met with Chinese
condemnation. 70 China has never filed a general submission to the ICJ and has
especially resisted application of the ICJ or other third-party dispute mechanisms
for resolving disputes over sovereignty in similar circumstances. 71 Respecting
Dokdo/Takeshima, South Korea likewise refuses such third-party dispute
assistance, claiming sovereignty as a justification.72 Japan has indicated a
willingness to submit the matter to the ICJ.
73
Because China, Japan, and South Korea are within 400 nautical miles ("nm")
of each other, all claimed resource zones in these enclosed seas overlap and require
the parties to negotiate an "equitable solution" as is required under UNCLOS.74
The claiming of excessive strait baselines from which to measure the territorial
seas by both Japan and China does not contribute to efforts to find such a solution.
In 2012, Beijing spurred increased tension by submitting to the U.N. strait
baselines for the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. 75 Added to the impasse is the seeming
Japanese reluctance to openly accept that it cannot claim the 200nm resource zones
under UNCLOS for the uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, a limitation both
69. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda United Nations General Assembly Address, CSPAN
(Sept. 26, 2012), available at http://www.c-span.org/video/?308405-4/japanese-prime-minister-
yoshihiko-noda-united-nations-general-assembly-address; Time to Put Inferiority Complex Behind Us,
GLOBAL TIMES, Sept. 28, 2012, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/735883.shtml.
70. Japan, Philiippines Using Rule of Law Pretext: China, XINHUA, June 27, 2014,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-06/27/c_133443927.htm.
71. For example, its refusal of such third party dispute jurisdiction occurred when the Philippines
brought a similar dispute over the Scarborough Shoal in the Spratly Islands to the International Tribunal
on the Law of the Sea. See, e.g., China Says Philippines Violates International Maritime Law in
Claiming South China Shoal, Fox NEWS (Apr. 18, 2012),
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/04/18/china-claims-philippines-is-violating-niaritime-law/;
Samantha Hoffman, Sino-Philippine Tension and Trade Both Rising amid Scarborough Standoff,
CHINA BRIEF, vol. 12/9, Apr. 27, 2012, available at
http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/cb 04 27.pdf; Greg Torode, Manila Action of South China
Sea Could Risk Aggravating Disputes, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 26, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/ 1136191 /manilas-action-over-south-china-sea-could-risk-
aggravating-disputes.
72. See generally PILKYU KIM, CLAIMS TO TERRITORY BETWEEN JAPAN AND KOREA IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Xlibris, 2014).
73. J. Berkshire Miller, The ICJ and the Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute, DIPLOMAT (May 13, 2014),
http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/the-icj-and-the-dokdotakeshima-dispute/.
74. UNCLOS, supra note 6, arts. 74 and 83.
75. This move was seen as a shift away from the previous policy of setting aside the dispute and
negotiating over joint exploration for energy resources and the declaration was accompanied by
increased presents of Chinese surveillance ships in the area. Teddy Ng, Beijing Gives UN Baselines for
Diaoyu Islands, Spurring Tension with Japan, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 15, 2012,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1037254/beijing-gives-un-baselines-diaoyu-islands-spurring-
tension-japan.
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China and Taiwan have acknowledged. 76 But perhaps the biggest log in the log-
jam is China's claim to nearly all of the continental shelf between China and Japan
as part of what it claims is a natural prolongation of the continental shelf-even
though UNCLOS does not appear to allow such option in this situation of opposite
states within four hundred nautical miles of each other.7 7 China's similarly
excessive claim to nearly all of the South China Sea certainly does not encourage
hope that it would readily abandon this excessive claim in favor of a more
equitable solution. 78 Efforts have been made by all sides to negotiate cooperative
arrangements in the form of joint resource zones envisioned by UNCLOS but with
limited success in implementation.
79
The pending island disputes have left the parties with too much uncertainty to
judge the reasonableness of any proposed resource allocation under UNCLOS
guidelines. Before UNCLOS South Korea and Japan were successful at
negotiating a joint resource development zone and they have since reached a
fisheries agreement. 80  While China and Japan managed to reach a tentative
understanding, they labeled a "principled consensus," in June 2008 calling for joint
exploration and possible joint resource development in a 2700 square kilometer
area in the East China Sea, it is not clear whether this arrangement will be fully
developed and carried out-there being considerable mutual distrust.8' Japan and
China did reach a joint fisheries agreement covering a large area but excluding the
76. JON M. VAN DYKE, MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTES, SETTLEMENT PROCESSES, AND THE
LAW OF THE SEA 61-62 (2009).
77. Id. at 58. China has submitted this continental shelf prolongation to the U.N. in a submission
entitled "Partial Submission Concerning the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200nm in the
East China Sea." China Makes U.N. Appeal for Maritime Claim, UPI, Dec.17, 2012,
http://www.upi.com/TopNews/Special/2012/12/17/China-makes-UN-appeal-for-maritime-claim/UPI-
60871355720880/.
78. South China Sea, Full Unclosure?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 24, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/node/21551113/print.
79. Keyuan Zou, Sino-Japanese Joint Fishery Management in the East China Sea, 27 Marine
Pol'y 125, 132-40 (2003) (includes the translated agreement as an appendix).
80. Choon-Ho Park, Seabed Boundary Issues in the East China Sea, in Seabed Petroleum in
Northeast Asia: Conflict or Cooperation? 18, 18-22 (Selig S. Harrison ed., Woodrow Wilson Int'l. Ctr.
for Scholars, 2005), available at http://www.wiIsoncenter.org/sites/defaultlfiles/Asiapetroleum.pdf.
The Japan-Republic of Korea Agreement on Fisheries of 28 November 1998, entered into force on 22
January 1999, as revised on 17 March 1999.
81. Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Foreign
Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Remarks on the Principled Consensus Reached between China and
Japan on the East China Sea (June 18, 2008), available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa eng/xwfw 665399/s2510 _665401/2535 665405/t466675.shtml; Press
Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Joint Press Conference by Minister of Foreign Affairs
Masahiko Koumura and Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Akira Mari (June 18, 2008),
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fmpress/2008/6/0618.htm (regarding Cooperation
Between Japan and China in the East China Sea). The tentative nature of the June 18, 2008 "principled
consensus" was reflected in even the announcements of the arrangement being made in separate press
conferences and the arrangement itself leaving much open for further discussion, though it does provide
for cooperation in exploration and some joint investments.
VOL. 43:2
2015 INT'L LAW & THE UNINHABITED ISLANDS IN THE EAST CHINA SEA 135
waters below twenty-seven degrees north near the SenkakulDiaoyu Islands. 82 A
comprehensive resolution of these problems in the most sensitive areas seems to
elude the parties, as they fear surrendering critical bargaining chips, the disputed
islands being the most visible. Do current international legal principles offer a way
out of these impasses?
II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES: AN OVERVIEW
In the context of both sets of island disputes under discussion, the parties are
claiming historical title to the islands themselves and claiming rights to maritime
resources, including fisheries and oil, and gas deposits in the adjoining seas
between the claimant states8 3 Because the states in question are in close proximity
across their adjoining seas and the islands are at intermediate locations, the island
disputes have long been contingent factors for resolving the maritime disputes.
The discovery of very large oil and gas reserves-some have speculated possibly
on the scale of the Middle East or the North Sea-and disputes over the maritime
rights that attach to such small islands have created a web of competing claims.'
4
This complex web of claims has often featured the disputed islands and various
baseline claims as bargaining chips in the maze of competing resource claims,
making resolution of claims that would be relatively easy to resolve in legal terms
quite difficult. Elements of nationalism over the island claims have elevated the
political sensitivity of these disputes in ways that make political compromise hard
to achieve. The challenge has been to unravel these disputes to permit
development of sorely needed resources.
In regard to the disputes over these uninhabited islands and the associated
maritime boundary and resource claims under present discussion, two rapidly
evolving bodies of international law are implicated: territorial claims to
uninhabited islands, though not addressed by UNCLOS, are addressed by
customary international law; and, the maritime boundary and resource claims,
which are addressed rather comprehensively by UNCLOS and associated
jurisprudence. These two areas are considered in the following subsections.
A. Customary International Law Relating to Sovereignty over Uninhabited
Islands
Taking up island disputes first, it is a common characteristic of these disputes
over remote uninhabited islands in East Asia that a current occupant or claimant
vies for sovereignty with other claimants based on assertions of historical title. In
the absence of guiding international treaties, this issue has been governed by
82. Zou, supra note 79, at 133.
83. See generally VAN DYKE, supra note 76; KIM, supra note 72.
84. While some have worried that the resource claims are exaggerated, they clearly do shape and
encourage territorial claims. Cary Huang, Diaoyu Islands Dispute about Resources Not Land, S. China
Morning Post, Dec. 4, 2012, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1096774/diaoyu-islands-dispute-
about-resources-not-land. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., East China Sea (2012), available at
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/east-chinasea/east china sea.pdf; Roach, supra note 34,
at 1-5.
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customary international law. Measuring the viability of competing claims has long
involved sifting through remote historical records. As a result, the customary law
regarding territorial disputes over uninhabited islands is an area of law peculiarly
suited to resolution by the ICJ or international arbitral tribunals, although such
referral has proven especially sensitive for Asian states.
A number of guiding customary international law principles regarding
territorial claims to uninhabited islands have evolved through case law in recent
years. Such claims often implicate issues of historical discovery and effective
occupation. In the colonial period, for previously unclaimed islands (belonging to
no one, characterized as "terra nullius "), discovery and some formal official act to
perfect a claim of sovereignty were generally thought sufficient to establish a
claim. Because the pre-modern Asian international order may have lacked a
concept of territorial sovereignty, as this concept is understood today, 6 further
difficulty was added to assessing such historical claims by regimes, which may
have lacked a habit to formally assert such claims. This difficulty was made worse
by an historical lack of serious interest in such remote islands in the days when
they offered fewer accessible resources.
87
By the mid-twentieth century the colonial era principles that rewarded
Western discovery began to fade. Modem international principles that rejected
colonialism and embraced modem notions of state sovereignty tended to give little
weight to ambiguous claims of historical title based on mere discovery or
proximity." A series of judicial decisions emphasized "effective occupation,"
which required some acts of administration and control beyond discovery.89 In the
Pedra Branca case, the ICJ emphasized "effective administration" in awarding the
island to Singapore. 90  Effective administration can involve things such as
reclamations, regulation of fishing, construction and maintenance of structures, and
the investigation of accidents.
As one commentator emphasized, "active occupation and effective control
over territory supersedes ambiguous ancient title."91 In the Sovereignty Over
Pulau Ligiton and Pulau Sipadan case, a dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia
over a group of very small islands encompassing just 0.13 square kilometers, the
85. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 47-49, 61.
86. Pilkyu Kim, Reassessment of Korea-Japan Relations: Acquisition of Dokdo/Takeshima and
"Effectiveness," Address Before the International Symposium on Dokdo Island (May 7, 2009)in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INT'L DOKDO SYMPOSIUM 2009, at 40-44; Tao Cheng, The Sino-Japanese
Dispute Over the Tiao-yu-tai (Senka/c) Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition, 14 Va. J. Int'l L.
221, 242-43 (1973-1974).
87. Cheng, supra note 86, at 246.
88. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 47-49, 61.
89. See Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr./U.K.), Judgment, 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17); Sovereignty Over
Clipperton Island (Fr. v. Mex.) (1931), reprinted in 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932); Island of Palmas
(U.S. v. Neth.), II R.I.A.A. 831 (Penn. Ct. Arb. 1925).
90. Sovereignty Over Pedra Branca/Pulau BatuPuteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge
(Malay./Sing.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. 12, 11 170-72 (May 23).
91. Alexander M. Peterson, Sino-Japanese Cooperation in the East China Sea: A Lasting
Arrangement? 42 Comell Int'l L.J. 441, 451 (2009).
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ICJ held that mere discovery was not enough, that "effective occupation,"
including displays of sovereignty and administration were essential to prove
ownership.92 The ICJ further held that failure to protest another state's occupation
93is de facto acceptance. The Court found effective occupation based on a
"continued display of authority [that] involves two elements each of which must be
shown to exist: the intention and will to act as sovereign, and some actual exercise
or display of such authority.
" 94
As Greg Austin summarizes it, "[i]nternational customary law recognizes
acquisition of title to territory belonging to no-one (terra nullius) through
discovery, but this title remains inchoate and must be converted to a more
complete title through continued, peaceful and unprotested exercise of
sovereignty. " 95 Merely showing that some private nationals of the claiming state,
such as fishermen, visited the islands from time to time would be insufficient.
96
Austin notes that you can weigh the relative strength of competing historical
claims through analysis of historical, geographical, and administrative
circumstances. 97 Case law also emphasizes a "critical date," such that acts affected
after the joining of a dispute cannot have a bearing on the sovereignty claim. 98
This "critical date" aspect, for example, would limit China's ability to perfect its
claims to contested islands in the South China Sea by building platforms or other
occupation activities.
Scholars and officials in East Asia often raise an irredentist problem,
questioning whether the heightened standards of "effective occupation" should be
applied to claims that arose in an earlier historical period before the West arrived
on the Asian scene. 99 Such critics favor the application of standards contemporary
to the time the claim arose. °00 But this argument raises a policy problem for
current tribunals about whether to give effect to either colonialist or imperialist
standards that applied at the time of alleged ancient discovery. The better view
appears to require that some standards of effective occupation be applied even to
claims originating in ancient times. Ancient claims also face a problem of proof
92. Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligiton and Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J.
625 (Dec. 17).
93. Id. 1 148.
94. ld. [1134.
95. GREG AUSTIN, CHINA'S OCEAN FRONTIER, INTERNATIONAL LAW, MILITARY FORCE AND
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 36 (Canberra: Allen & Unwin, 1998). In this context terra nullius generally
refers to territory not ruled by a recognized state, which could be the consequence of no previous
discovery and claim or abandonment of a previous claim.
96. Pulau Sipadan, 2002 I.C.J. 11140.
97. AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 36-40.
98. Id. at 40. Austin notes that in the Island of Palmas Case the critical date was not when the
dispute arose but when it became "crystallized," when the parties "are no longer negotiating or
protesting, or attempting to persuade one another." Rather, they have taken up positions and are
standing on their respective rights. Id.
99. Tao Cheng, supra note 86, at 2642-43.
100. Id.
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that a modem tribunal may be reluctant to address. Claims to the uninhabited
islands addressed herein face nearly all of these challenges.
B. Maritime Resource Boundaries under UNCLOS
Though UNCLOS does not address the island sovereignty claims, it is highly
relevant in regard to the related maritime resource boundary disputes. UNCLOS
governs the allowance of territorial seas and other resource zones associated with
all coastal areas, including islands.101 With research showing major oil and gas
reserves, as well as rich fishery zones, at or near both sets of islands, UNCLOS and
its various authoritative interpretations offer very useful guidance toward resolving
these testy disputes.'° 2 UNCLOS allows states to claim four designated maritime
zones relevant to the present disputes: the inland sea, the territorial sea, the EEZ,
and the continental shelf. 0 3 Air Defense Identification Zones, as has recently been
proclaimed by China, are not covered by UNCLOS or other maritime treaties. 04
The area beyond these four zones is the high seas, where navigational freedom of
seas prevails and seabed resources are treated as part of the common heritage of
mankind. 
0 5
Where various baselines and boundaries are drawn, in the East China Sea and
the Sea of Japan, will have large implications for the major associated resource
claims involved in the disputes under consideration here. The rights to the
disputed islands and the associated resource rights will likewise implicate the
resource boundaries that emanate outward from base lines. The widely varied
consequences, in respect to various possible outcomes of the island sovereignty
disputes, explains the difficulty of reaching provisional cooperative arrangements
with regard to the maritime resource disputes: as disputants are reluctant to
embrace a tentative agreement that appears to presume a particular territorial
outcome.
Under UNCLOS, baselines are generally drawn at the low tide mark on land
and strait baselines are allowed where the coast is "deeply indented" or has a
"fringe of islands."' 1 6 Coastal areas may include islands as base points in a strait-
baseline delineation only where the resulting baselines do "not depart to any
101. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 6.
102. See VAN DYKE, supra note 76; AUSTIN, supra note 95. While all three disputants in the
present discussion have signed and ratified UNCLOS, the U.S. has only signed but not ratified the
treaty, though the U.S. long ago proclaimed it adhered to all of its provisions except those respecting
deep sea bed minerals and their management. The matter was recently again before the U.S. Senate to
consider ratification, which key Republicans have long opposed. See Mark Landler, Law of the Sea
Treaty Is Found on Capitol Hill, Again, N.Y. Times, May 23, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/world/americas/law-of-the-sea-treaty-is-found-on-capitol-hill-
again.html?_r=0. The U.S. lack of ratification no doubt weakens its leverage in pushing others to
settlement of disputes under its terms.
103. UNCLOS, supra note 6, arts. 2, 8, 55-56, 76, 86-87.
104. Peter A. Dutton, Caelum Liberum: Air Defense Identification Zones Outside Sovereign
Airspace 103 Am. J. Int'l L. 691, 694 (2009).
105. UNCLOS, supra note 6, arts. 86-87.
106. Id. art. 7(1).
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appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast."' 0 7 Archipelagic states,
which for Japan include the Ryukyu Islands archipelago to the south of Japan
encompassing most of the area opposite to China, are allowed to draw strait
baselines "joining the outermost points of outermost islands.'"'0 8
Under UNCLOS, internal waters include those sea areas inland from
baselines and the territorial sea and other zones emanate outward from the base
line.' 0 9 UNCLOS allows up to 12nm for territorial seas." l0 This applies both to
islands and continental coasts and is fully under the sovereignty of the coastal
state. States are also allowed to claim up to 200nm of EEZ from the same
baselines, where such states have exclusive rights in fisheries and other natural
resources." 2 The 200nm EEZ is likewise provided in relation to both continental
and island coasts.' 3 A continental shelf of up to 200nm and, in some cases where
the natural prolongation extends further, up to 350nm, is allowed." 4 Under this
provision, all states, regardless of the contours of their continental slope, are
entitled to at least a 200nm continental shelf, with an exception for opposite or
adjoining states with less than 400nm between them." 5
For opposite or adjoining states with potentially overlapping resource
jurisdiction, UNCLOS requires parties to reach an agreement "on the basis of
international law in order to reach an equitable solution" in delimiting resource
zone boundaries."l 6 While the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf case spoke of
natural prolongation, "17 the adoption of UNCLOS Articles 74(1) and 83(1) suggest
an agreement on "equitable" boundaries; in tandem with Article 76(1), this has
brought about the effective demise of this notion for opposite states within 400nm
of each other. ' The ICJ made this clear in the 1985 Libya v. Malta case, stating:
Since the development of the law enables a State to claim that the continental
shelf appertaining to it extends up to as far as 200 miles from its coast, whatever
the geological characteristics of the corresponding sea-bed and subsoil, there is no
reason to ascribe any role to geological or geophysical factors within that distance
either in verifying the legal title of the states concerned or in proceeding to a
delimitation as between their claims. 119
107. Id. art. 7(3).
108. Id. art. 47(1).
109. Id. art. 8.
110. Id. art. 3.
111. Id. arts. 2,4-5.
112. Id. art. 57. Islands are entitled to a territorial sea, an EEZ, and a continental shelf "in
accordance with the provisions... applicable to other land territory." Id. art. 121(2).
113. Id. arts. 57, 60-61, 74.
114. Id. art. 76.
115. Id. arts. 76(1), 74.
116. Id. arts. 74, 83.
117. North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Ger. v. Den./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
118. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 58.
119. Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 139 (June 3). The case involved a similar
situation to China and Japan, with a continental state (Libya) and an opposite offshore island state
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An equitable solution also appears to take account of proportionality in regard
to the relative length of the opposing coastlines. Jon Van Dyke points out that,
while the starting point seems to be equidistant or median lines, tribunals will
make adjustments, as they did in the Libya v. Malta case, to bring the ratio of the
relative length of coastlines more into line with the maritime space allocated. 
20
Of particular relevance to the present discussion of uninhabited islands,
UNCLOS Article 121(3) provides, "[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation
or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf," though such islands are entitled to a territorial sea. 121 A precise definition
of what would be a mere rock is not afforded, though both island groups under
present discussion potentially fall under this provision. 22 Is an island that has
grass and trees growing on it but has never been used for normal human habitation
a mere rock under this provision? There is certainly a policy argument that such
designation would greatly reduce associated disputes.
With little agreement over rights to either the uninhabited islands or the
boundaries of the maritime resource zones at issue, the earlier decision of all
parties to set aside the island territorial disputes and work on cooperative use of
resources under UNCLOS seemed practical. UNCLOS encourages "provisional
cooperative arrangements."'' 23 With continuing disagreement over such islands
and only limited often-unrealizable cooperation concerning resource areas,
especially between China and its potential partners, this approach has proven a
failure. These island disputes, along with disagreement over baselines and
respective rights in the continental shelf, have given rise to the current impasse and
related security concerns. That uninhabited islands are involved, and not merely
(Malta), A state not facing an opposite state within 400nm can sometimes justify an extended
continental shelf based on natural prolongation or appurtenant to islands, as was recognized by the U.N.
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf with respect to Japanese claims to uncontested areas
in April 2012. See UN Approves Japan's Claim on Wider Areas, YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Apr. 29, 2012,
http://news.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne+News/Asia/Story/A 1 Story20120429-342721 .html (netting
Japan 310,000 square kilometers).
120. Continental Shelf, 1985 I.C.J. 11[111, 64-65; VAN DYKE, supra note 77, at 59. See also Gulf of
Maine Area (U.S. v. Can.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12); Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the
Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 14); Delimitation and
Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 2001 I.C.J. 40, at I ll (Mar. 16). See
also Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in
the Bay of Bengal (Bangl. v. Myan.), Case No. 16, Judgment of Mar. 14, 2012, ITLOS Rep. 1, 319,
available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case no 16/1 -
C16 Judgment 14 02 2012.pdf (reflecting that St. Martin's Island got no EEZ based on such
adjustment in competition with an opposite continental land, even though the island was substantial
with 3,700 permanent residents).
121. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 121(3).
122. Sourabh Gupta has pointed out that some very small uninhabited islands have been the subject
of valid or pending claims for an EEZ and a continental shelf, including Japan's low-lying
Okinotorishima, the very small U.S. Howland and Baker Islands, and Australia's remote Heard and
McDonald Islands. Sourabh Gupta, Murky Waters Surround the Rule of Law in the South China Sea,
East Asia Forum (July 20, 2014), http://www.eastasiafomm.org/2014/07/20/murky-waters-surround-
the-rule-of-law-in-the-south-china-sea/.
123. UNCLOS, supra note 6, arts. 74, 83.
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maritime resource claims, has also encouraged nationalist passions that give
priority to sovereignty claims and make legal settlements difficult. Compromise,
even in areas where the law seems clear, has eluded the parties, as they fear
surrendering any claim that may possibly serve as a bargaining chip in dealing
with other issues. An assessment of Dokdo/Takeshima and SenkakulDiaoyu
respectively in the next two sections is followed in the third section below by an
assessment of the parties' related resource boundary claims and agreements.
IV. SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE DOKDO/TAKESHIMA ISLANDS
The competing South Korean and Japanese legal claims to the
Dokdo/Takeshima Islands share much in common with the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands dispute and the disputes over other uninhabited islands in the South China
Sea, even while the historical narrative and present-day tangle of claims for each
set of islands remain distinct. As such, any third-party dispute resolution process
that may be agreed offers tremendous opportunity to establish local legal precedent
in East Asia that may be helpful in resolving other similar disputes, especially
relating to the sufficiency of ancient discovery, the more common-place historical
indicia of effective occupation, and the associated maritime resource boundary
claims.
Dokdo/Takeshima is located in the Sea of Japan (what South Korea calls the
East Sea) and consists of two very small rocky islands and approximately thirty-
two smaller outcroppings with a total area of only 0.18 square kilometers,
approximately 47nm from South Korea's occupied and inhabited Island of
Ullungdo and 86nm from Japan's occupied and inhabited Oki Island. 124 The
islands are currently, and have for decades been, occupied by South Korea. 
125
While the dominant view in case law and the literature has generally been
favorable to the South Korean territorial claim to the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands,
submitting the island dispute to the ICJ or another arbitration process, as was long
ago offered by Japan, 126 may be more useful to Japan than simply reaching a
negotiated settlement. A definitive answer on the merits can only be offered by a
tribunal with proper jurisdiction. 27 Such a tribunal can help to establish important
legal principles. Such a process would allow the parties to test the water on
various legal issues that surround this and other similar East Asian island disputes.
Such test could facilitate gentle removal of a log from the above-noted log-jam.
As with many uninhabited islands, the historical record to measure the
required "effective occupation" of Dokdo/Takashima is thin, In the face of such
thinness, South Korea, the current occupant of several decades standing would
124. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 46.
125. The Korean Government's Basic Position on Dokdo, Ministry of Foreign Aft. Republic of
Korea, http://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/eng/dokdo/govemmentposition.jsp (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
126. Miller, supra note 73.
127. The concern is to submit the matter to a tribunal with proper jurisdiction which, for the ICJ,
would require consent to jurisdiction either in the case or generally to compulsory jurisdiction. See
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 [hereinafter ICJ
Statute].
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certainly enjoy an advantage. Japan bases its claim to the Dokdo/Takeshima
Islands on the theory that the islands were terra nullius on February 22, 1905,
when Japan first claimed them-under Korean protest-by occupation through a
cabinet decision and proclamation by the Governor of Japan's Shimane
Prefecture.128 After such proclamation, on June 5, 1906, the Japanese government
formally issued a fishing license to one Yozaburo Nakai. 129 Before 1905, Japan
could only claim connection through the private acts of Japanese fisherman, with
official Japanese permission, visiting the islands as early as 1618; this largely
ended in 1696 when Ulleungdo (not specifically Dokdo, which was merely a
stopover on the way) was acknowledged by the Japanese Shogunate as under
Korean sovereignty, resulting in Japanese being denied permission from their
government to visit the area of either set of islands.' 30 Japan does raise the issue of
Korean "withdrawal" from the islands from the 15th to the 19th centuries, during
the period when the region was dominated by the Mongol empire, but South Korea
highlights a substantial level of visits and contacts during this period and its
official re-colonization policy from 1881 to justify the maintenance of its claims
and a lack of abandonment. '
3
'
South Korea claims title to Dokdo based on ancient discovery in 512 followed
up by claimed "effective occupation" in the years since. 132 The Korean position is
further bolstered by the claim that Japan was bound to surrender the islands to
Korea at the end of World War II, both under Japan's 1945 Instrument of
Surrender and the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty.133 The relative proximity of
the islands to Korean territory and South Korea's current occupation since
asserting its claim in 1952 and building a guarded lighthouse in 1954-even
though protested by Japan every year-would seem to further bolster the Korean
claim in any close case. 13 4 Though the Korean historical title claims are thin, as is
common for remote uninhabited islands, they appear more substantial than Japan's
claims.
As discussed by the late Professor Pilkyu Kim, South Korea cites a number of
classical Korean texts, such as the Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms, to support
the following chronology in support of the Korean case: first, the islands were first
discovered-creating an inchoate title-along with Ulleungdo in 512 by the Silla
Kingdom, as inferred from the Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms; "3 second,
disputes over the islands relating to fisheries were reportedly settled with Japan
128. Pilkyu Kim, supra note 86, at 39-98, 40-44.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 58-60.
132. Id. at 45-50.
133. Treaty of Peace with Japan art. 2, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 136 U.N.T.S. 45. Korea was
not a party to the 1951 peace treaty.
134. While any occupation after the critical date that the dispute arises would presumably have no
effect on the underlying claims, it would seem to at least establish continued occupation and non-
abandonment to the present. See Peterson, supra note 91; AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 40.
135. Pilkyu Kim, supra note 86, at 45-50.
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recognizing Korea's sovereign rights in 1696; 136 third, two prosecutions, one by
the Royal Court of Korea in 1716 and one by Japan (for smuggling from Japan to a
foreign island (Dokdo)) in 1837 tend to demonstrate a shared belief in Korean
sovereignty; 137 fourth, a number of edicts relating to the islands in the late 19th
century in the lead up to the Japanese occupation demonstrate continued Korean
occupation;' fifth, South Korean seizure of the islands in 1954 further indicates
such claim;' 39 and sixth, continuing South Korean control--over Japanese
protest-sustains that claim up to the present.' 40 Kim notes that Japan never
protested Korean actions until 1905-perhaps the critical date. 4 1 He notes that a
number of Korean official maps over the centuries, which have shown Dokdo as
Korean territory, have not been challenged.1
42
This dispute has been made more difficult by the failure of World War II and
post-war declarations and treaties to resolve the issue or specifically mention these
remote islands. In particular, the San Francisco Peace Treaty between Japan and
most allied powers, for which Korea was merely a beneficiary but not a party,1
43
failed to expressly include the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands among the listed
territories to be surrendered by Japan.144 South Korea emphasizes that it should
have been included because the San Francisco Peace Treaty incorporated the Cairo
Declaration of 1943, which called for the forfeiture of all Japanese territory taken
"by violence or greed."' 145 Likewise, the 1945 Potsdam Declaration stated that,
"[t]he Terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and the Japanese
sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku
and other minor islands as we determine."'
146
Not being a party to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, South Korea claims it
recovered its territory by virtue of the September 2, 1945 Instrument of Surrender,
by which Japan agreed to both declarations, resulting in the establishment of the
Republic of Korea on August 15, 1945 and its recognition by the U.N. on
December 8, 1948.147 While the failure of the San Francisco Peace Treaty to






141. Id. at 49, 75-76.
142. Id. The author mentions that even a couple Japanese maps have excluded Dokdo/Takeshima
Island from Japanese territory.
143. Minoru Yanagihashi, The Territorial Questions in East Asia and San Francisco Peace Treaty:
Historical Perspective, Paper Presented at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies
in Honolulu, Hawaii (Apr. 2011).
144. Id.
145. Press Release, U.S. State Dep't, Cairo Declaration (Dec. 3, 1943), available at
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/002_46/002_46_0011.html.
146. Potsdam Declaration: Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender (July 26, 1945), in
2 MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF.: NIHON GAIKO NENPYO NARABINI SHUYO BUNSHO: 1840-1945 (1966),
available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/ete/c06.html.
147. Pilkyu Kim, supra note 86, at 69-71.
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connection of the Japanese claim to its expansionist policies in 1905, including the
conquest of Korea, favor the South Korean claim. South Korea's subsequent acts
to seize back the islands from 1952-1954, soon after World War II and its own
Korean War, would further argue in South Korea's favor.1
48
An important related issue, further discussed below, is the likelihood that
South Korea would not attempt to claim any resource zones under UNCLOS,
beyond the territorial sea, thus, making Dokdo/Takeshima irrelevant to delineating
resource zone boundaries. 49 Jon Van Dyke notes the near futility of either party
claiming resource zones for these barren rocks, though the Japanese have been
reluctant to explicitly so state out of fear this may affect other island claims Japan
seeks to maintain. 150 South Korea may be less constrained and may move forward
to address related resource boundary issues if it acknowledges that
Dokdo/Takeshima will not have an impact on median boundary lines. These
"rocks" clearly cannot independently sustain life and such limitation would be the
likely outcome of any dispute resolution process before the ICJ or otherwise. With
greater proximity to South Korea, the islands would be on the South Korean side
of any equidistant or median line that may someday be realistically adopted to
delineate resource zone boundaries between the South Korean Island of Ullongdo
and the Japanese Island of Oki.
With much less nationalism at play on the Japanese side for this particular
island dispute (in comparison to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute discussed below),
there appears little incentive for Japan to insist on its claim to the island if any
advantage may be achieved by conceding to a dispute resolution process. Indeed,
Japan first proposed submission of the matter to the ICJ in 1954 and again in
1962."' Rather than surrender its claim, Japan would seemingly be more
interested in engaging a process that may set a favorable precedent in regard to its
other island and maritime disputes. For South Korea, nationalistic sentiments are
much more deeply felt in relation to these islands and have seemingly stood in the
way of its willingness to embrace such ICJ resolution. South Korea has argued
that this is a matter of sovereignty and should not be subject to ICJ resolution as a
mere territorial dispute. 1 2  Any distinction between territory and sovereignty
appears weak and has never been a reason for declining ICJ assistance. 5 3 Most
territorial disputes involve sovereignty.
The natural resource claims at stake in the surrounding sea areas, as discussed
below, have lent a degree of urgency to this and other related disputes. This will
148. Id.
149. See Jon M. Van Dyke, Addressing and Resolving the Dokdo Matter, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INT'L DOKDO SYMPOSIUM, supra note 86, at 137-58.
150. Id. at 152-53.
151. Ralf Emmers, Japan-Korea Relations and the Tokdo/Takashima Dispute: The Interplay of
Nationalism and Natural Resources 12 (S. Rajaratnam Sch. of Int'l Studies Sing. (RSIS), Working
Paper No. 212, 2010).
152. Id.
153. Brian Taylor Sumner, Note, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, 53
DUKE LJ. 1779, 1779 (2004). See also Island of Palmas, supra note 89, at 8.
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hopefully encourage further consideration of the merits of a dispute resolution
process that may bring clarity to the respective rights of the claimants and enable
private companies from both sides and around the world to move forward on
extraction of resources increasingly needed in the region. The post-war political
climate appeared to be improving until the past couple years, as China's failure to
address South Korean concerns in respect to military confrontations with North
Korea and increasingly tense Sino-Japanese relations had brought South Korea and
Japan much closer in their existing security alliance, despite continuing tensions
over Japan's World War II legacy.'
54
The past couple years has seen a shift back toward greater hostility on which
China has sought to capitalize. Of concern to Japan's shared primary security
partner, the U.S., nationalistic sentiment on both sides threatens to undermine their
historical security arrangement. On the South Korean side, such nationalism was
on display in August 2012 when then President Lee Myung-bak made the first ever
presidential visit to the Dokdo Islands and again when South Korea formally
renamed peaks on the islands.' 55 The recent emergence of a more nationalistic
Japanese leadership under the Liberal Democratic Party has squandered a great
deal of good will in the past year, as Korean wounds from World War 1I have been
exposed. 156 One would hope this situation is salvageable and level heads will
prevail.
V. SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS
The SenkakulDiaoyu Island claims pose a greater challenge than the
Dokdo/Takeshima dispute discussed above, with high levels of nationalism at play
on both sides in Japan and China, and an even more contentious relationship
between the parties. 157 Despite efforts to avoid confrontation over this issue a
number of disputes arose over recent years before things heated up to the tense
154. Both South Korea and Japan have had shared security arrangements with the United States
since the end of the Korean War and World War 11, respectively, and both host U.S. military bases,
producing a need for cooperation. See Sang-hun Choe, South Korea to Sign Military Pact with Japan,
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/world/asia/south-korea-to-sign-
historic-military-pact-with-japan.html?_r-O.
155. South Korea Renames Disputed Islands, ABC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2012, 12:57 AM),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-10-28/an-sth-korea-renames-disputed-islands/4338020.
156. South Korean President Unimpressed by Japanese PM's Attempt to Speak Korean, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Mar. 26, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/ 1457844/seoul-unmoved-
japan-hails-bridge-building-summitpage=all; Alastair Gale, How Bad Will South Korea-Japan
Relations Get?, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/06/24/how-bad-
will-south-korea-japan-relations-get/.
157. See CHIEN-PENG CHUNG, DOMESTIC POLITICS INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND CHINA'S
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, ch. 3 (Routledge 2004) (dealing with the nationalist politics behind the
Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute). As China has developed and gained greater power over the past decade there
has appeared a heightened sense of Chinese nationalism over these island disputes. See Erica Strecker
Downs & Phillip C. Saunders, Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu
Islands, in THE RISE OF CHINA 41,42-43, 73 (Michael E. Brown et al. eds., 2000).
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situation that prevails today. 158 Recent efforts to even sit down and discuss this
dispute have been fraught with obstacles from nationalistic sovereignty claims. 159
As with Dokdo/Takeshima, the vast store of natural resources of gas and oil
thought to be in the area, not to mention fisheries, lends great urgency to resolving
the disputes. While the former Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Genba
appeared to signal, in a commentary in the International Herald Tribune, that Japan
might accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ, to which Japan has acceded generally,
China has long refused to accept ICJ dispute resolution.' 60 Genba emphasized that
since Japan now holds the islands and has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of
the ICJ it would be open to China to bring its challenge before the court.' 61
Professor Jerome Cohen has argued that such a route would offer several
advantages to both sides, including a cooling off period and, during the long years
when the matter was before the court, a context in which a settlement would be
encouraged. 
62
Short of such an optimal path, there is wiggle room to diminish if not resolve
this island dispute in several respects: first, as discussed above, a number of ICJ
and other decisions in recent years have clarified the law, pointing to the likely
outcome of an international legal decision on the merits;163 second, progress
suggested above for resolving the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute may offer even
greater clarity on the international legal standards applicable to the
158. Han-yi Shaw offers an overview of the past developments and the respective claims to the
islands and discusses crises that arose in 1970, 1978, 1990, and 1996. Han-yi Shaw, The
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C.,
R.O.C., and Japan 13-21 (Univ. of Md., Occasional Papers/Reprint Series, No. 3 (152), 1999).
159. Early 2013 proposals for discussions made to China's new leaders by the new leadership in
Japan were met with an improved tone but also with caution. Nothing ever materialized. Teddy Ng, Xi
Jinping to Consider Summit with Japan over Diaoyu, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 26, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/I 136327/xi-jinping-consider-summit-japan-over-diaoyu-
islands; Jane Perlez, Chinese Leader Takes Conciliatory Tone in Meeting with Japanese Lawmaker,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/world/asia/chinese-leader-eases-tone-
in-meeting-with-japan-envoy.html.
160. Koichiro Genba, Japan-China Relations at a Crossroads, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/21/opinion/koichiro-genba-japan-china-relations-at-a-
crossroads.html? r-0.
161. Id. China has so far not met that challenge. While Beijing has never agreed to ICJ jurisdiction
generally or specifically over such matters, there has been some speculation that its September 2012
attempt to assert sea boundary base lines to the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands may signal efforts to
lay the foundation for such litigation. Teddy Ng, Beiing may seek Legal Solution to Diaoyus Row with
Japan, Analysts say, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 15, 2012, 12:00 AM). It should be further noted
that when Japan acceded to the ICJ in 1958 it attached two reservations: (1) that any compulsory
jurisdiction was subject to the other disputant having accepted compulsory jurisdiction and (2) that the
subject under dispute be limited to situations or facts after 1958. Han-yi Shaw, supra note 158, at 128.
Even if China accepted compulsory jurisdiction the second reservation would be sufficient for Japan to
avoid jurisdiction in this case if desired. An effort to agree on such would seemingly have to be initiated
by the PRC.
162. Jerome Cohen, How Dangerous Are Sino-Japanese Tensions?, CHINA FILE (Aug. 1, 2013),
http://www.chinafile.com/how-dangerous-are-sino-japanese-tensions.
163. See supra Part liA.
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Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute; third, China's rapid development and insatiable resource
needs have brought more urgency to the matter, as has Japan's almost total reliance
on imported energy, now increased as a result of diminished use of nuclear power;
and, fourth, any future Japanese willingness to agree with the position already
taken by the People's Republic of China ("PRC") and Taiwan that the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, as "rocks" under UNCLOS Article 121(3), are entitled
only to a twelve mile territorial sea and not any resource zones-continental shelf
or EEZ-would surely go a long way to reducing the importance of the dispute.
In regard to the latter point, as will be discussed in the next section below, any
Chinese willingness to revise its own baselines vis a vis off-shore islands may
facilitate such a Japanese move-as these various claims are likely viewed as
bargaining chips in the overall dispute. By the same token, any Chinese perception
that settlements in the East China Sea may positively impact its position in the
South China Sea may encourage a more responsible effort to abandon some of its
more extreme claims in favor of compromise.
On the merits, customary international law regarding such uninhabited island
claims offers good potential to resolve the sovereignty part of the Senkaku/Diaoyu
dispute. It seems likely, based on the various ICJ decisions noted above,' 64 that the
outcome would favor Japan, though this is not certain and only a proper tribunal
could give a definitive answer. The historical title record is much thinner than that
evident for Dokdo/Takeshima. As with Dokdo/Takeshima, the Japanese
occupation and formal claim to the islands date to the turn of the 20th century and
is based on occupation after its determination that the islands were then terra
nullius.165 Japan claims to have acquired title following a series of surveys
between 1885 and 1895 during which the Japanese deemed there were no signs of
Chinese control; they formally took control by a cabinet decision issued on January
14, 1895, by which they incorporated the islands into Japanese territory months
before Taiwan was conceded under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. 166  This was
followed by the granting of concessions to and patrolling of the islands from that
date forward. 1
67
Japan takes the view that either China had no historical title for lack of
effective occupation or that any claim they had was abandoned. 168 A recent
Japanese media report has turned up a 1950 document from the Chinese Foreign
Ministry archive that acknowledged the island as Japanese territory, a document
Japan alleges has spawned closure of relevant parts of the archive for vetting.' 
69
164. See supra Part IlIA.
165. AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 113.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Situation of the Senkaku Islands, JAPAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. (Apr. 4, 2014),
http://www.mofa.go.jp/a o/c-m l/senkaku/page I we_000010.html.
169. Julian Ryall, Beijing Cuts Access to Documents 'that Support Japan's Claim to Diaoyus', S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 2, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/I 141425/beijing-cuts-
access-documents-support-japans-claim-diaoyus; Curtailed Access to China's Diplomatic Archives
Fuels Senkaku Conjecture, JAPAN TIMES, Feb. 1, 2013,
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Japan notes further that a 1953 article in the official People's Daily, five years
after the founding of the PRC, described the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) as
including the Senkaku Islands, which they feel concedes a lack of Chinese
claim. 70
The PRC position is that these islands are historical Chinese territory dating at
least from the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) when they were a navigational point in
the coastal defense system of China and instrumental in its historical tributary
relationship with the ancient Ryukyu kingdom in present day Okinawa., 71 Their
claim is essentially based on discovery plus effective occupation. But only two
acts of actual Chinese occupation before 1895 are cited by various sources: the
islands' use in the 16th century as a navigational point in the coastal defense
system and a one-off grant of ownership to a private party by Chinese imperial
edict in 1893.72 Austin argues that inclusion in a coastal defense system to
contain piracy proves nothing since even high sea locations can be used for this
navigational purpose; while he accepts that a grant of ownership is an official act,
he doubts that this seeming one-off arrangement is sufficient to prove effective
occupation.173 A Japanese researcher has also cited a Ming Dynasty document in
the official annals of the Ming Dynasty (Huangming Shilu) conceding that Chinese
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/20 13/02/01 /national/history/curtaiiled-access-to-chinas-diplomatic-
archives-fuels-senkaku-conjecture/#. VFcOGPTF xo.
170. The People's Daily article cited by the Japanese Foreign Ministry is entitled "the battle of
people in the Ryukyu Islands against U.S. occupation." Press Conference, Assistant Press Secretary,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Oct. 2, 2012), available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2012/lO/lO02Ol.html; see also Old China Maps have no
Mention of Diaoyu, Only after 1971 did Charts Lay Claim to Japan's Senkaku Islets, JAPAN TIMES,
Dec. 30, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/12/30/national/old-china-maps-have-no-
mention-of-diaoyu/#.UsGhvyfRDcx. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ("MOFA") of Japan frequently
updates its analysis. See Situation of the Senkaku Islands, supra note 168.
171. China's official position is laid out in its 2012 White Paper on Diaoyu Dao. STATE COUNCIL
INFO. OFFICE OF CHINA, DIAOYU DAO, AN INHERENT TERRITORY OF CHINA (2012), available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/25/c_131872152.htm. The White Paper especially
emphasize missions to the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) during the Ming Dynasty to confer titles and
accept tribute involved passage past Diaoyu Dao, as reflected in the mission records, the role of Diaoyu
Dao in China's coastal defense, its inclusion on coastal maps, and the centuries of use by Chinese
fishermen. Because of these tribute missions, Chinese nationalist commentators have gone so far as to
challenge Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa. China should 'reconsider' who owns Okinawa:
academics, Bus. STANDARD (May 8, 2013), http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/china-
should-reconsider-who-owns-okinawa-academics- 113050800900 1.html; Jane Perlez, Calls Grow in
China to Press Claim for Okinawa, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/20 13/06/14/world/asia/sentiment-builds-in-china-to-press-claim-for-
okinawa.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. But China so far has merely allowed publication of such claims
in the official press and has not made an official claim. China not Disputing Japan Sovereignty over
Okinawa, REUTERS, June 2, 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/06/02/uk-security-asia-okinawa-
idUKBRE95 101 R20130602.
172. AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 164.
173. Id. at 165.
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territorial claims did not reach beyond the Matsu Islands, and thus not as far off
shore as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 1
74
Chinese writer Han-yi Shaw attacks the Japanese claim that the islands were
terra nullius, citing Japanese contemporary references to Chinese media reports of
objections to Japanese surveys beginning in 1885 prior to perfecting the Japanese
claimed annexation in 1895.175 Such media reportage, however, would likely not
be sufficient to establish title, and the cited instances of reaction to such surveys
may tend to demonstrate the truthfulness of Japanese claims to perfect their title
before their military occupation of Taiwan.' 76 There are certainly a variety of
historical claims on both sides that would best be sorted out and evaluated by the
ICJ or another agreed arbitral tribunal empowered to resolve the dispute. There is
also objection that the 1895 Japanese annexation was not publicized until very
recently. 1
77
The Chinese agree that the Japanese acquired full sovereignty of the islands in
1895, but argue this was part of the cession of Taiwan in the Treaty of
Shimonoseki, which would give rise to the Japanese obligation to return the islands
to China after World War 1I along with the return of Taiwan under the terms of the
Japanese Instrument of Surrender and the San Francisco Peace Treaty.' 78 Chinese
ownership would first have to have existed for this obligation to arise.
Taiwanese scholar Tao Cheng has sought to bolster the Chinese historical title
claim by an irredentist argument that the then contemporary standard of discovery
and claim and not the more recent higher standard of "effective occupation" should
apply, especially in the context of uninhabited territory. 179 The policy weakness in
this argument is that it goes against the likely anti-colonialist foundation of the
"effective occupation" principle,' 80 that great powers not be able to travel the
globe, "discover" territory and lay claim with little engagement. A slightly
stronger Chinese policy argument, supported by Jon Van Dyke, is that Japan was
essentially in its expansionary conquest phase when it claimed the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands, that the Japanese cabinet decision, even if earlier than the treaty, was
essentially part of the same expansionist activity culminating in the Treaty of
Shimonoseki, and that such activity should not be recognized as separate and
174. Chinese Document Contradicts Beijing's Claim to Senkakus, YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Jan. 23,
2013, http://www.asianewsnet.net/Chinese-document-contradicts-Beijings-claim-to-Sen-41822.html.
Transcriptions of these records are reportedly available in the National Archives of Japan.
175. Han-yi Shaw, The Inconvenient Truth Behind the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 2012, http://kfistof.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/the-inconvenient-truth-behind-the-
diaoyusenkaku-islands/?smid--tw-share.
176. See generally Han-yi Shaw, supra note 158.
177. Id.
178. Id.; Cheng, supra note 86, at 259-60.
179. See Cheng, supra note 86, at 224-26. Unryu Suganuma has expressed sympathy for this
irredentist argument in respect of claims from the Asian millennia of Par Sinica, but suggests that
Chinese abandonment after their ancient discovery and claim is an open question. See UNRYU
SUGANUMA, SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND TERRITORIAL SPACE IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS:
IRREDENTISM AND THE DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS 101-115 (Joshua A. Fogel ed., 2000).
180. See generally Cheng, supra note 86.
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distinct.' 18 If accepted, this would strengthen the case that the islands should have
been restored to the ROC (Taiwan) after the war. The difficulty is that this claim
may simply be counterfactual, if China lacked a valid historical title and the
Japanese can prove a sufficient explanation for the 1895 cabinet decision.
Japan disputes both the claim that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were covered
by the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the post-war obligation to restore the islands to
China. Japanese officials argue that the Japanese cabinet decision annexing the
islands occurred three months ahead of the Treaty of Shimonoseki and was
unrelated thereto. 8 2  They point out that there was no reference to the islands
either in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki or the San Francisco Peace Treaty
provisions respecting restoration of Taiwan.183 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are also at
some distance from Taiwan, arguing against any presumption of inclusion.
84
Accordingly, Japan argues that Senkaku/Diaoyu is not included in the reference
from the Cairo Declaration incorporated in the San Francisco Peace Treaty
requiring that "all territories Japan has stolen ... be restored to the Republic of
China."' 85
By Article 3 of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan further agreed to
temporary "exercise of all powers of administration, legislating and jurisdiction"
by the United States for the Ryukyu Islands south of twenty-nine degrees north,
under which the U.S. took possession of Okinawa and the remaining Ryukyu
Islands, as well as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands."' The U.S. did not return these
islands to Japan until 1972 under the Okinawa Reversion Agreement. 18 7 China did
not protest the failure to "return" these islands to China along with Taiwan
(returned right after World War II) until 1970-after a 1969 U.N. study reported
possibly large oil deposits "'-this may be most damning to the Chinese
181. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 60-62. Jerome Cohen and Jon Van Dyke have emphasized that
Japan fully knew of the Chinese historic claim when they began to take an interest in the islets in 1885,
noting Japanese acknowledgments during the time and the stealth of its cabinet decision, which was not
made public until after World War 11. Jerome A. Cohen & Jon M. Van Dyke, Lines of Latitude, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Nov.10, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/japan/lines-latitude/p23364. They also
express concern about Japan's exaggerated EEZ claim. Id.
182. AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 168-70.
183. Id.
184. 355 kilometers. Distance from Senkaku Islands from Taiwan, GOOGLE MAPS (follow "Get
Directions" hyperlink; then search "A" for Taiwan and search "B" for "Senkaku Islands"; then follow
"Get Directions" hyperlink).
185. AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 170. After the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the ROC on Taiwan
entered a peace treaty with Japan that largely reaffirms the provisions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty
and expressly nullifies pre-1941 treaties, including the Treaty of Shimonoseki. See Treaty of Peace
Between the Republic of China and Japan, China-Japan, Apr. 28, 1952, 139 U.N.T.S. 3. This ROC-
Japan Peace Treaty makes no mention of Senkaku/Diaoyu. See id. It was promptly renounced by the
PRC.
186. Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 133, art 3.
187. See Agreement between the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu
Islands and the Daito Islands, U.S.-Japan, June 17, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 447.
188. AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 163.
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position.' 89 After such oil discovery, and just as the islands were slated for return
to Japan, China finally filed its protest in 1970.190 Both the ROC and PRC
likewise objected to the Okinawa Reversion Agreement in 1971 before the
reversion was completed. 191 The first formal point of protest was in 1970; it is
when the legal dispute finally crystallized, and would thus likely be viewed as the
critical date.192 As such, Japan's continuous occupation, including the placement
by Japanese citizens of some lighthouse structures, and frequent patrols since that
date would not prove ownership. 193 Likewise, the Japanese government's recent
decision to purchase three of the islands from a private title-holder should not have
any effect on the merits and would not seem to warrant the sharp response it
received.1
94
As is frequently true of remote uninhabited islands, the historical title claims
are somewhat murky, though this seems to favor Japan with both the most recent
concrete claim and current occupation. The weak link in Japan's claim, as
discussed in the next section, is its failure to proclaim that it will not claim
resource zones or strait base lines to the islands under UNCLOS. As an
archipelagic state under UNCLOS Article 47(1), Japan may typically seek to draw
strait baselines to the outer point of its outer islands. 195 On the other hand, if this is
merely an uninhabited rock, as specified in UNCLOS Article 121(3), then the
islands should not be entitled to an EEZ or continental shelf.196 That the PRC (and
Taiwan) traditionally proclaimed that Senkaku!Diaoyu was not entitled to such
resource zones may be some indication of Beijing's assessment of the strength of
their claim, given that the PRC has not been shy about making extreme maritime
claims in the South China Sea.' 97 Such acknowledgement by the PRC also opens
the door for Japan to climb down on the issue. Since the PRC is unlikely to agree
to a dispute resolution process or formally surrender its claim, without a clear
indication from Japan on the resource boundary issue the Senkaku/Diaoyu
sovereignty and related resource boundary issues seem likely to remain mired in
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 15 PEKING
REV. 12, 12 (1972).
192. See AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 40.
193. Id. at 9, 40-41; see also Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), II R.I.A.A. 831 (Penn. Ct. Arb.
1925).
194. Japan to Bring Senkaku Islands Under State Control, HOUSE OF JAPAN (Sept. 5, 2012),
http://www.houseofjapan.com/local/j apan-to-bring-senkaku-islands-under-state-control.
195. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 47, 1 1.
196. Id. art. 121, 3. Bernard Oxman argues this may not be relevant when the rock in question is
already within an EEZ, essentially reducing the rock's resource zone implications to it role under the
rules on baselines or archipelagic lines. Bernard H. Oxman, On Rocks and Maritime Delimitation, in
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW N HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN
(Mahnoush Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010).
197. Recent attempts in September 2012 by the PRC to draw strait baselines around the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were roundly criticized by the U.S. U.S. Defense Department criticizes
China's claims to Senkaku islands, JAPAN NEWS, May 8, 2013, http://sinocism.us5.list-
manage I .com/track/click?u-fl 8121 c5942896d3a87491249&id=cedO683cl f&e-654fcbfcc5.
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dispute. If that constraint was removed there may be room for forward movement
regarding the broader maritime sovereignty and resource claims.
If the resources at stake were reduced by virtue of a Japanese climb-down (to
claim only territorial waters) on the resource issue, China may want to reconsider
the value of some form of arbitration. When asked to explain the mention of
international law and dispute resolution in the September 2012 speech to the U.N.
General Assembly by the then Japanese Prime Minister, Japanese officials
suggested that, unlike Dokdo/Takeshima, Japan is in full possession of the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, such that they have no reason to approach the ICJ. 198
This statement appears to suggest that if China were to take the case to the ICJ
Japan may agree to appear, though this is not expressly said.
As with the above suggestions regarding Japan's possible handling of
Dokdo/Takeshima, China may want to consider the value of positive precedent in
regard to its relatively stronger claim to the Paracel Islands and parts of the
Spratlys in the South China Sea.' 99 A proper dispute resolution process may also
allow both governments time to climb down from the nationalistic pressure they
now experience over this dispute. A third option would be to designate the island a
special international resource protection area without resolving the sovereignty
issue. Japanese New Komeito Party leader Natsuo Yamaguchi, during a 2013
official visit to Beijing, offered the more limited proposal of a no-fly zone around
the islands.
20 0
VI. ASSOCIATED RESOURCE DISPUTES IN THE SEA OF JAPAN AND THE EAST CHINA
SEA
Without question, the tension that pervades these disputes over remote
uninhabited islands is fueled by the competition for associated resources, though
nationalistic sentiments about sovereignty may drive civil society pressures. While
not all the resource boundary disputes in the relevant sea areas under discussion
bear a direct relationship to the uninhabited island disputes now under discussion,
it is undoubted that some seemingly indirect extraordinary claims regarding
baselines or the continental shelf may serve as bargaining chips that make
settlement of both the island disputes and the maritime resource boundary disputes
difficult.
While the spirit of recent years has been to set aside the island sovereignty
disputes and attempt to agree on joint resource development zones, this has proven
difficult on several levels: first, many resource rights in surrounding seas are
198. Press Conference, supra note 170, 1 6.
199. In his comprehensive study Greg Austin favored the Chinese position on the Paracel Islands,
and part of the Spratlys. AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 98-158. China has to date essentially refused to
entertain discussions on the Paracel Islands. See Greg Torode & Minnie Chan, China Refuses to Yield
on Paracels, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 12, 2010, http://www.scmp.com/article/733189/china-
refuses-yield-paracels.
200. See Teddy Ng, Japanese Politician Calls for Disputed Islands no-fly Zone, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 22, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1133325/japanese-politician-
calls-disputed-islands-no-fly-zone.
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thought to directly depend on the territorial sovereignty rights to the uninhabited
islands; second, at the same time, recent precedent before the UNCLOS
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf raises doubts about resource
claims for such uninhabited islands; 20 1 third, perhaps of greater importance, parties
may seek to leverage these island claims against the more extreme claims of their
resource competitor respecting base lines or the continental shelf; and, fourth, a
background of security concerns and nationalism may make compromise on such
territorial sovereignty disputes especially difficult.
202
A. Japan-Republic of Korea Maritime Disputes
In the resource area, the Japan-South Korea relationship again offers the most
promise for moving forward. Though saddled with a difficult post-colonial and
post-war legacy of distrust, robust trade and shared security arrangements in recent
decades have fashioned a trade and security partnership less saddled with the tense
competition evident in the Sino-Japanese case. Except for some recent flare-ups of
tension over Japan's war-time record, shared interest and alignments have
historically fostered a degree of moderation over resource claims. Both parties
have not appeared to openly attach EEZ or continental shelf resource claims to
their Dokdo/Takeshima territorial claims-though this is not absolutely clear,
given Japan's tendency to attach such resource zone claims to nearly all small
islands in its possession. 2° 3 The recent UNCLOS Commission Recommendation,
rejecting a Japanese claim to an EEZ for an unoccupied island to the East of Japan,
would weaken further any effort to claim an EEZ in such context.20 4 South Korea
has also sought to match the Chinese natural prolongation argument when it comes
to the continental shelf toward Japan, but one may question how serious South
Korea can ultimately be about this in the face of the contrary UNCLOS
jurisprudence noted above.
With a somewhat less tense relationship over past years, the parties have
reached a number of agreements. They were able in 1974 (which came into force
in 1978, well before UNCLOS) to reach two agreements concerning the
continental shelf. one is the only boundary agreement ever reached in Northeast
201. COMM'N ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF IN REGARD TO THE SUBMISSION MADE
BY JAPAN ON 12 NOVEMBER 2008, para. 20 (2012), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs-new/submissions files/jpnO8/com-sumrecjpn fin.pdf [hereinafler
Commission Recommendation]. Regarding the uninhabited island of Okinotorishima the Commission,
in the face of Chinese and South Korean objection to Japan's resource claims, refused to make a
recommendation. While this set no precedent on the substantive issue, which presumably would have
to be submitted to a proper tribunal, it did offer a UN based statement of skepticism regarding such
claims. See UN Approves Japan's Claim on Wider Seas, YOMIURI SHIMBUN/ASIA NEWS NETWORK,
Apr. 29, 2012, http://www.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne%2BNews/Asia/Story/A1Story20120429-
342721 .html.
202. South Korea has resource boundary disputes with China and even more difficult and volatile
maritime boundary issues with North Korea, which are beyond the scope of the present essay.
203. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 51-52.
204. See Commission Recommendation, supra note 201.
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Asia, delimiting a median line continental shelf boundary in the northern part of
the Korea Strait (named the "Tsushima Strait" in Japan); 20 5 the other is the 1974
(came into effect in 1978) joint development agreement for areas of the East China
Sea south of Cheju Island bounded by the outer limits of their overlapping
claims.20 6  China has objected that the resultant joint development zone
overreaches into Chinese areas and it remains for the two partners to reach
agreement with China. 20 7 The Joint Development Zone agreement provides for
joint development of resources from the continental shelf in an approximately
24,000 square nautical mile area where the parties' continental shelf claims overlap
in the East China Sea below Cheju Island and has a mandatory period of fifty
208years.
The resultant Joint Development Zone is mostly on the Japanese side of the
median because Japan is claiming up to the median line and South Korea is
claiming natural prolongation beyond the median line. This generous pre-
UNCLOS Japanese agreement may have inspired China to demand similar
concessions in its resource dispute with Japan, even though UNCLOS now offers
no support in this context for China's natural prolongation argument. With the
respective continental shelf boundaries between Japan and South Korea not yet
resolved this seeming unfairness may require future adjustment in the joint
development zone if a boundary settlement is ultimately reached around the
median line approach now favored under UNCLOS. North of the Korea Strait,
below any area where North Korean maritime claims are implicated, equidistant
lines should adequately deal with the resource boundary disputes in the Sea of
Japan, once the Dokdo/Takeshima issue is resolved.
In 1998, Japan and South Korea also reached a fisheries agreement, which
seeks to set aside boundary disputes and accommodate differences over
Dokdo/Takeshima. °9  The agreement is a "provisional agreement" under
UNCLOS Article 74(3) pending final determination of maritime boundaries and
should have little effect on the territorial or maritime disputes now pending. Since
UNCLOS would favor fisheries access agreements to properly maintain fishing
stock in EEZs, 210 fishery agreements are more easily achieved and may be
sustainable even after resolution of boundary issues. Japan's excessive use of
205. Choon-Ho Park, Seabed Boundary Issues in the East China Sea, in SEABED PETROLEUM IN
NORTHEAST ASIA: CONFLICT OR COOPERATION 19, 19-22 (Selig S. Harrison ed., 2005).
206. Id. at 19-20.
207. Id. at 21.
208. Id. at 20.
209. Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Korean Concerning Fisheries, Japan-S. Kor.,
Nov. 28, 1998, 1-48295. See Pilkyu Kim, supra note 86, at 28-30.
210. See Marcos A. Orellana, EEZ Fisheries Access Arrangements and the WTO Subsidies
Agreement, in PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND POLICY
FRAMEWORK TO COMBAT ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED FISHING (Mary Ann Palma et al.
eds., 2010); U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, UNEP IN 2007 6 (2007), available at
http://www.unep.org/PDF/AnnuaReport/2007/AnnuaReport2007 en web.pdf.
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strait baselines continues to pose some difficulty in Japan-South Korean
discussions in this regard.2 '
B. China-Japan Maritime Disputes
The Sino-Japanese maritime resource boundary discussions are far more
difficult and clearly implicate the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Japan has long
unilaterally designated a median line in the East China Sea between China and
Japan as the appropriate boundary for both the EEZ and the continental shelf
resources zones. 11 The most difficult obstacle to any effort to reach an equitable
solution has been the Chinese claim to nearly all of the continental shelf between
China and the Japanese islands on the basis of natural prolongation. 213  As
discussed above, recent case law in the ICJ clearly makes such an extreme claim
214untenable for opposite states within 400nm of each other.
Another major obstacle to mutual accommodation is the tendency of both
China and Japan to make excessive use of strait baselines. Before the parties can
start discussion around an initial median line, there must be some consensus on the
base lines from which the median line would be drawn. Since Japan's baselines to
the south will be those typical of an archipelago, along the Ryukyu Islands, Japan
is expected to use strait baselines to the outermost points of the outermost island.21 5
Such lines should generally not exceed 100nm and "should not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."' 1 6 This
would seemingly render any attempt to draw a strait baseline from the Japanese
Ryukyu Islands to the uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands inappropriate.
The most egregious current Chinese baseline claim should also be dropped:
China's strait baselines to the uninhabited high tide elevation called Dongdao
Island some seventy miles offshore from Shanghai. 1 7 It is possible that such an
extraordinary baseline claim is envisioned as a bargaining chip. Perhaps China
may be persuaded to drop this baseline claim if Japan disavowed any claim to any
211. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 44-45.
212. See Peterson, supra note 92; Kosuke Takahashi, Gas and Oil Rivalry in the East China Sea,
ASIA TIMES ONLINE (July 27, 2004), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FG27Dh03.html.
213. The Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi stated, "On the East China Sea delimitation, China
has never and will not recognize the so-called 'median line' as advocated by Japan. China upholds the
principle of natural prolongation to solve the delimitation issue of the East China Sea continental shelf."
Chinese Agency, Tentative Translation of FM's Answers on East China Sea Issue, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, June 24, 2008, quoted in Peterson, supra note 91, at 454, n.137. China has submitted this
continental shelf prolongation to the U.N. in a submission entitled "Partial Submission Concerning the
Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200nm in the East China Sea." China Makes U.N. Appeal
for Maritime Claim, UPI, Dec. 18, 2012, http://www.upi.com/TopNews/SpeciaU2012/12/17/China-
makes-UN-appeal-for-maritime-claim/UPI-60871355720880/.
214. See VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 58; Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, at 35,
39 (June 3).
215. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 47, 11.
216. Id. art. 47, 2-3.
217. See BUREAU OF OCEAN AND INT'L ENVTL. AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
PUB. NO. 117, STRAIGHT BASELINE CLAIM: CHINA (1996).
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extended baselines from the Ryukyu Islands to Senkaku!Diaoyu, as well as claim
to any resource zones around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Both claims would
appear untenable under UNCLOS as currently interpreted. If proper baselines
were agreed upon and the parties could identify an initial equidistant or median
line, they would still be left with the question of proportionality.2"8 This is
important, because the larger hydrocarbon reserves are thought to be on the
Japanese side of the median line.
219
As discussed above, a tribunal trying to resolve the Sino-Japanese maritime
boundary dispute would likely begin with equidistant or median lines and then
adjust such lines to achieve proportionality between the relative length of the two
opposing coastlines and the resource zone allocated. 220 The actual Chinese coast is
clearly much longer than the Japanese coastal areas along the Ryukyu Island chain,
which covers most of the area opposite China's coast. Using its natural
prolongation claim, China has sought to claim all the continental shelf to the
Eastern side of the deep Okinawa Trough that borders the Ryukyu Islands.
221
China is thought to be motivated in this regard because the petroleum deposits in
the Okinawa Trough are reportedly the richest in the East China Sea. 222 Using the
appropriate equitable solution and proportionality standards, one suspects the
boundary line would still fall on the Western side of the Okinawa Trough toward
China, though a proportionality analysis would bring more resources on to the
Chinese side of the boundary than a simple median line.223
In spite of these interconnected difficulties, China and Japan in 1997 reached
a fisheries agreement, covering areas above twenty-seven degrees north, from a
point about one hundred kilometers north of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 22 4 This
fisheries agreement is rather comprehensive, identifying four fishing zones,
including undisputed territorial seas, exclusive fishing zones within EEZs, shared
zones in EEZs straddling median lines, and high seas; there is also provision for
mutual access to EEZs, fishing quotas, a Joint Fisheries Commission and
conservation measures. 225  The exclusion of the Senkaku/Diaoyu area from
coverage has left a big gap to generate troubled disputes, such as was evident in
2010 over Japanese arrest of Chinese fishermen for ramming the Japanese patrol
boat near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and again in the arrest of 13 occupiers in
2012.226
218. See Continental Shelf, 1985 I.C.J. 13.
219. Choon-Ho Park, supra note 205, at 5-6.
220. Continental Shelf, 1985 I.C.J. 13.
221. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 58-60.
222. Choon-Ho Park, supra note 205, at 6.
223. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 58-60.
224. See Zou, supra note 79, at 132-40; Nobukatsu Kanehara & Arima Yutaka, Japan's New
Agreement on Fisheries with the Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China, 42 JAPANESE
ANN. OF INT'L L. 1, 1-31 (1999); ZHIGUO GAO & JILU Wu, KEY ISSUES IN THE EAST CHINA SEA: A
STATUS REPORT AND RECOMMENDED APPROACHES 5, available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ZhiguoGao and Jilu Wu.pdf.
225. Zou, supra note 79, at 132-40.
226. See Tanaka Sakai, Rekindling China-Japan Conflict: The Senkakul
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Agreement over the valuable petroleum deposits has proven much more
difficult due to the value of the resources involved and the troubled boundary
delimitation disputes noted above. China had generally sought to have any joint
development zones located entirely on the Japanese side of Japan's proposed
median line, arguing that the continental shelf on the East side of the line is the
only part in dispute-tracking more or less the pre-UNCLOS resource zone as was
agreed between Japan and South Korea.227 Moderate progress was achieved when
China and Japan announced on June 18, 2008, in separate press conferences, a
"principled consensus" to jointly explore and develop natural resources in a 2,700
square kilometer area in the East China Sea that straddles Japan's proposed median
line well to the north of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.2 28 The arrangement also appears
to authorize Japanese corporations to invest in the existing Chinese-operated
Chunxiao oil and gas field bordering the median line on the Chinese side.22 9 The
stated objectives of this "principled consensus" have not been implemented, and
Japan continues to protest that the Chinese drilling near the median line will siphon
off petroleum from the Japanese side. 230 Given the peculiarities of the separate
announcement and continued discussions over full implementation, there is good
reason to doubt that the "principled consensus" rises to the level of an actual
agreement. As indicated in the Japanese press statement, the parties appear to
view it as a principled consensus to work toward realizing an enforceable
231
agreement . It seemingly envisions joint resource exploration and possible,
though yet unrealized, shared production. 232 In fact, continued discussions broke
down during the 2010 dispute over the Japanese arrest of Chinese fishermen near
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
233
Though the process has been too opaque for a clear reading, it appears the
chief obstacles to further agreement have been the problematic baselines, China's
excessive natural prolongation claim regarding the continental shelf and the
dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyu, especially Japan's failure to formally acknowledge
Diaoyutai Islands Clash, ASIA-PACIFIC J.: JAPAN Focus (Sept. 27, 2010), http://japanfocus.orgl-
Tanaka-Sakai/3418.
227. See SUSUMU YARITA, TOWARD COOPERATION IN THE EAST CHINA SEA 2 (2005), available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/SusumuYarita.pdf (discussing how the pre-1982 Japan-
South Korean agreement plays a part in China's attempt to advance such seemingly unjustified claim).
228. Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, China and Japan
Reach Principled Consensus on East China Sea Issue (June 18, 2008), available at http://nz.china-
embassy.org/eng/xw/t466729.htm [hereinafter Japan Press Release]; Joint Press Conference, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Minister of Foreign Affairs Masahiko Koumura and Minister of Economy,
Trade and Industry Akira Mar, Regarding Cooperation Between Japan and China in the East China
Sea (June 18, 2008, 6:25 PM), available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm press/2008/6/0618.html.
229. Japan Press Release, supra note 228.
230. See Choon-Ho Park, supra note 205, at 3-5; Mari Yamaguchi, Japan Protests to China over
Undersea Gas Drilling, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 1, 2012, http://news.yahoo.com/japan-protests-china-
over-undersea-gas-drilling-022110278.html.
231. Japan Press Release, supra note 228. See Peterson, supra note 91, at 465-70.
232. Japanese Press Release, supra note 228.
233. Fackler, supra note 8.
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that it would not be entitled to resource zones and extended baselines. Agreement
on baselines should be generally achievable through give and take with reference
to UNCLOS. On the continental shelf claims, China has historically argued that
any provisional cooperative agreement for joint development under UNCLOS
should only apply to the Japanese side of the median line since that is the only
disputed area. 234  This is extraordinary in that China is using an excessive
indefensible claim against the relatively moderate Japanese continental shelf claim
to effectively say, what is mine is mine and what is yours is ours. That the rather
limited "principled consensus" to date involves resource areas on both sides of the
median line perhaps reveals that the Chinese understand how untenable their more
extreme natural prolongation claim to the entire continental shelf is.
On Senkaku/Diaoyu resource claims, China has already acknowledged that
the islands do not warrant resource zones, though it seemingly has not conceded
the strait baseline point should it prevail in its claim to the islands. If there is any
room for movement it would seem that Japan might be persuaded to abandon
resource and baseline claims over Senkaku!Diaoyu if China were to drop its
excessive baseline claim for Dungdao Island or other behind-the-scenes
"bargaining chips." The above noted UNCLOS Commission Recommendation
rejecting a similar claim for an extended continental shelf would seem to make this
shift tenable.235
In general, similar strait baseline excesses on both sides could be modified in
any deal to achieve equity. In doing so, both sides would not realistically be
giving up anything and would simply be following established international law, as
required by UNCLOS. If the parties could then quietly begin discussions of
resource boundaries based on the established UNCLOS rules regarding
equidistance and proportionality, it would seem that an equitable solution would be
within reach over the entire East China Sea. Japan's dropping of any resource
zone claims for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands might be the proverbial log to be
gently pulled out to relax the impasse. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands should only
be entitled to a territorial sea of 12nm or less.
C. Security Concerns
The seas as a resource also include the maritime role in security and the
question of military passage. 236 In the coastal resource zones, the coastal state
usually has complete control over living and nonliving resources and can limit
marine scientific research, but other states otherwise retain normal rights
237
associated with the high seas and air passage over international waters. In this
regard, UNCLOS protects freedom of navigation for military and commercial
passage by ships of other countries through such zones, an issue about which
234. YARITA, supra note 227.
235. See Commission Recommendation, supra note 201.
236. Id. at 26; Y.H. Song, China and the Military Use of the Ocean, 21 OCEAN DEV. AND INT'L L.
221, 226 (1990).
237. UNCLOS, supra note 6, arts. 56, 58.
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China has some objections.' 38  Associated military surveillance activities are
usually thought to be protected activity, as it is allowed on the high seas more
generally.
China has especially objected to U.S. military activities in the area,39
including hydrographic surveys by U.S. military ships in China's EEZ, surveys
that the U.S. argues are in furtherance of submarine navigation. 240  China
characterizes such passage and seabed surveys as marine scientific research, which
would require China's permission under UNCLOS.24 1 While participating in the
Rim of the Pacific ("RIMPAC") maritime exercise, China was reported to be
spying on the so-called "Rim Pac" exercises off Hawaii in the U.S. EEZ, which
raises the question whether China will continue to object to surveillance activity in
its EEZ.242  China's recent proclamation of an ADIZ across much of the area
between China and Japan beyond China's EEZ is thought to have dual purpose of
seizing control over the air above disputed islands and also constraining
surveillance flights through the area.243 The U.S. argues the naval sea and air
hydrographic and military surveys are permitted under in the UNCLOS convention
and that the surveillance flights above international waters are unrestricted.244 On
that basis, the U.S. likewise did not object to the Chinese ship surveillance in the
U.S. EEZ during RIMPAC.
This question of military passage and surveillance has caused confrontation
between the U.S. and China several times in recent years.245 Such incidents have
included a Chinese air crash and the forced landing of a U.S. plane on Hainan
238. Id. § 3.
239. Mark Valencia, China and US must agree on rules for waters in exclusive economic zone, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 31, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-
opinion/article/1300695/china-and-us-must-agree-rules-waters-exclusive-economic-zone ("[Tihe
deployment and use of any type of scientific research equipment in any area of the marine environment
shall be subject to the same conditions ... for the conduct of marine scientific research in any such
area.").
240. Id.
241. Id.; UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 21.
242. China defends dispatch of spy ship to monitor US-led naval drills off Hawaii, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 21, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1556956/chinese-spy-ship-
monitors-us-led-naval-drills-hawaii; Andrew Erickson & Emily de La Bruyere, Crashing Its Own
Party: China's Unusual Decision to Spy on Joint Naval Exercises, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2014,
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/07/19/crashing-its-own-party-chinas-unusual-decision-to-spy-
on-joint-naval-exercises/?mod=chinablog; Kristine Kwok, China hostility to surveillance may lessen as
it becomes a maritime power, S. CHINA MORNING POST , Jan. 6, 2014,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1398413/china-hostility-surveillance-may-lessen-it-becomes-
maritime-power.
243. See Jun Osawa, China's ADIZ over the East China Sea: A "Great Wall in the Sky"?,
BROOKINGS (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/17-china-air-
defense-identification-zone-osawa.
244. Valencia, supra note 239.
245. Li Jing, United States and Chinese Warships nearly Collide in South China Sea, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 17, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1380830/united-states-and-
chinese-warships-nearly-collide-south-china-sea.
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Island in 2001,246 Chinese damage to sonar equipment on the U.S.S. Impeccable
engaged in monitoring of Chinese submarines in the EEZ off Hainan Island in
2009,247 and the controversy over joint US-South Korean exercises in the Yellow
Sea in 2010, where the Chinese objected to the presence of U.S. warships. 24' That
the U.S. has defense agreements with nearly all countries surrounding
Senkaku/Diaoyu Island and that it has reiterated the inclusion of these islands as
part of its commitment to defend Japanese administered territory emphasizes the
connection of disputes over the islands and resources to the U.S. perception of
overall security volatility in the area.
249
The combination of the U.S. "pivot" toward Asia, China's increased
projection of power in the region, and the expanded military buildup by Japan and
the Philippines predicts continued volatility over these security issues."5  U.S.
involvement may serve to check Chinese military aggression but it also adds
increased risk of miscalculation. 2 1  That China engages in increased military
activity offshore from Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, and is sometimes
suspected of using poorly identified fishing boats in security roles, adds to the
volatility of its various island disputes.
252
Some analysts believe China's heightened belligerence, especially with Japan,
may reflect the leadership's aim to create a more confrontational environment in
which to whip China's largely untested PLA into shape.253 Japanese Admiral
Fumio Ota sees Chinese military intrusion into Japanese EEZs, in combination
with the lack of transparency concerning China's military build-up and activities,
as having the highest risk of occurrence among Sino-Japanese conflict risks.
2 54
246. Elizabeth Rosenthal, US Plane in China After it Collides with Chinese Jet, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
2, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/02/world/us-plane-in-china-after-it-collides-with-chinese-
jet.html.
247. Jane Perlez, American and Chinese Navy Ships Nearly Collided in South China Sea, N,Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/1 5/world/asia/chinese-and-american-ships-
nearly-collide-in-south-china-sea.html.
248. Jerome A Cohen & Jon M. Van Dyke, Limits of Tolerance, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 7,
2010, http://www.cfr.org/china/limits-tolerance/p23593. In December 2002 China even passed a law
requiring Chinese approval of mapping and surveying activities in its EEZ. Id.
249. Cary Huang, Why China is wary of US stepping in over Diaoyus, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Nov. 1, 2010, http://www.scmp.com/article/729128/why-china-wary-us-stepping-over-diaoyus; Greg
Torode, US Naval Chief Warns of 'Winds of Change', S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 13, 2010,
http://www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/Winds of Change.htm.
250. Stephen M. Walt, Explaining Obamas Asia policy, FOREIGN POL'Y, Nov. 18, 2011,
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/20 11/11/18/explainingobamas-asiapolicy.
251. Chi-Chi Zang, China Objects to US Offer Over Disputed Islands, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 3,
2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contenl/article/2010/1l1/02/AR2010110200908.html;
Cheng Guangjin, Beiing Rejects US Offer to Host Diaoyu Talks, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 3, 2010,
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/2010-11/03/content-I 1495897.htm.
252. Edward Wong, Chinese Civilian Boats Roil Disputed Waters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/world/asia/06beijing.html? r-0.
253. John Gamaut, Leader's Ploy More than Naval Gazing, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Apr. 27,
2013, http://www.smh.com.au/world/leaders-ploy-more-than-naval-gazing-20130426-2ijxx.html.
254. Fumio Ota, Conflict Prevention and Confidence Building Measures Between Japan and
China, INT'L ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY CTR. (Jan. 5, 2009),
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Query whether this lends support to Japanese suspicions about greater Chinese
ambitions beyond the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa),
which China treated as a tributary kingdom for five hundred years before the
Japanese annexation in 1879?255
VII. CONCLUSION
The above overview has exposed the two sets of island disputes as a cause
that has soured relations between the three protagonists (along with the ROC on
Taiwan and the United States) for the last half-century. This article has sought to
show that a series of contingent relationships between various island and resource
claims have led the parties to cling to various claims as bargaining chips in a
dispute process defined by bluster and excess. As long as the parties were content
to defer resolution of these disputes for another time as they set about the process
of trade and development this standoff or log-jam may have been optimal. But
with increasing resource scarcity brought on by rapid economic development in the
region and increasing security ambitions by a rapidly developing China, this
standoff has become untenable and a serious security risk. If one adds to this mix
the nationalistic passions that these contests over sovereignty have caused the
danger of miscalculation leading to military confrontation becomes even more
evident.
The good news is that these problems are solvable far short of military
confrontation. Since the parties engaged these issues in the early 1970s,
considerable international legal principles have developed either through treaty law
or international case precedent in the ICJ. Such legal principles offer the parties
substantial guidance on nearly all of the contentious issues, including: appropriate
baseline delineation, 256 the use of the equidistant principles,
257 proportionality, 258
equitable boundaries for maritime resources, 259 the standards for territorial disputes
and historical title in the context of disputes over uninhabited islands,26° and the
http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.192/pub detail.asp. Ota identifies three conflict
scenarios, including possible Taiwan Strait conflict (which he rates as high intensity, low probability);
potential conflict over Senkaku/Diaoyu (middle intensity, middle probability) and Chinese surveillance
activity in the Japanese EEZ (low intensity, high probability). Id.; Lifeng Jiang, Some Advice for
Japan, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 4, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-
11/04/contentI 1500095.htm. Admiral Ota suggests better crisis management strategies. Chinese
scholar Lifeng Jiang appears to concur in the need for improved Sino-Japanese crisis management
strategies. Id.
255. Chinese Nationalists Covet Japan's Okinawa, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 14, 2012,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1057756/chinese-nationalists-covet-japans-okinawa. Chinese
state-owned media have in fact raised question regarding the legitimacy of Japanese sovereignty over
Okinawa. Id.
256. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 7.
257. Id. arts. 74, 83.
258. Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13 (June 3); VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 59.
259. UNCLOS, supra note 6, arts. 74, 76, 83.
260. See VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 47-49, 61 (citing a series of cases); AUSTIN, supra note 96,
at 36-40.
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allocation of resource zones around such uninhabitable islands. 26 1 Given that the
past practice of ignoring the island disputes and trying to reach resource
agreements has not worked, this article offers a contrarian view that the island
disputes may be the proverbial logs jamming up the process and recommends that
attention to these issues be prioritized.
Both the island disputes can be taken off the table, either by complete
resolution, as seems tenable in the case of Dokdo/Takeshima, or by abandoning
resource zone claims, as is clearly called for in respect of Senkaku/Diaoyu. An
even better, though unlikely, solution to the latter would be for China to take up
Japan's somewhat ambiguous invitation to present the matter to the ICJ.
Presumably, none of the parties would want to be seen by their nationals to simply
surrender the islands they claim. In the case of Dokdo/Takeshima, the somewhat
lesser nationalistic sentiments on this particular claim on the Japanese side has
allowed Japan to propose referral to the ICJ. South Korea should take advantage
of this opening. The South Korean argument that this is a matter of sovereignty
that cannot be submitted to the ICJ is indefensible. The many territorial disputes
that make up the bulk of ICJ cases in this area cited herein are all sovereignty
disputes. As has been evident in past compromises over fisheries and joint
development zones, compromise is something both Japan and South Korea are
capable of.
With the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute out of the way and a reasonable
willingness to adhere to the UNCLOS requirements to apply established
international legal standards towards agreeing on equitable solutions-including
baselines and proportional resource allocation-chances are good that all such
issues between South Korea and Japan could be solved. It would then be up to the
parties, as a matter of prudence, to favor either cooperative arrangements or
resource boundary delineation and separate development. It could then be hoped
that the approach taken and the standards set may have some effect on the parties'
ability to reach compromise with China on other island and resource issues.
Cooperative resource development should be about economic development and
efficiency and not simply a way of avoiding the equitable solutions specified by
UNCLOS. Having needed resources available for commercial harvesting in the
region may be more important than who owns the underlying right.
It has to be acknowledged that it may be more difficult to reach final
resolution of the Senkaku/Diaoyu sovereignty dispute. It appears civil society on
both sides have displayed an enhanced level of nationalism over this issue, making
compromise on sovereignty difficult. At the same time, China has long been
reluctant to agree to arbitration for matters of this sort. What may be more realistic
is to find a way to trim back the resource issues that are implicated. This is the log
that can be gently removed from the log-jam if the parties can honestly understand
the bargaining chips they have deployed. The most obvious bargain would be
Japanese acknowledgment that the islands are entitled under UNCLOS neither to
resource zones nor strait baseline inclusion in the Ryukyu Islands. At the same
261. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 121(3).
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time the Chinese side must appreciate that Dongdao Island is likewise not entitled
to strait baseline inclusion. Beyond these two cases, there are other baseline issues
offering room for equitable tradeoffs. While solving the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute
fully as suggested for Dokdo/Takeshima may be an optimal first choice, trimming
back the island dispute to acknowledge resource irrelevance is a good second-best
alternative that would be consistent with the parties' international legal obligations.
Perhaps then designating the islands a joint special resource conservation zone
may diminish the nationalistic sensitivities.
262
International legal obligations, when it comes to delineating continental shelf
rights, likewise clearly require agreement on an equitable solution based on a mix
of equidistant lines and proportionality. The relevant baselines from which these
principles would be applied have also been made relatively clear by UNCLOS
jurisprudence. While both sides would likely have to surrender some of the
resources they would hope for, the resolution of these disputes would surely pay
great dividends in allowing nearby undersea resources to be commercially
developed. The parties would need to decide whether to go the joint development
or boundary delineation route. One would hope the recent improved relations
between Taiwan and the mainland of China would allow appropriate sharing of
whatever benefit was achieved from the Sino-Japanese progress on these sensitive
issues. If trimmed back for resource purposes, perhaps the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands could simply be designated as a joint bird sanctuary with jointly managed
fishing rights in conjunction with agreements concerning adjoining areas, as seems
appropriate for friendly neighboring countries.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that moving forward in Northeast Asia
may provide a more coherent standard for moving forward on the island disputes
in the South China Sea. Some leading scholarly opinion favors China on parts of
the Paracel Islands and multiple claimants on the Spratlys. If underlying
international legal standards are teased out first between South Korea and Japan,
and then between China and Japan, such resolution may provide precedent for a
more fruitful effort to resolve similar disputes in the South China Sea. Pulling
various logs from the log-jam may make further progress in its removal possible.
At a minimum, any party that refuses to follow the clearly emerging international
legal standards, who clings to excessive bargaining chips, would be exposed and
have to bear the diplomatic cost.
262. lan Story, ASEAN and the South China Sea: Movement in Lieu of Progress, 12 CHINA BRIEF
10, 10 (2012), available at
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx ttnews[tt news]=39305#.VGD8_8mRM5c. It is interesting to
note that the Philippine government has suggested something similar regarding disputed islands in the
South China Sea, or what the Philippines calls the West Philippine Sea, suggesting they be designated a
"Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation," with accompanying de-militarization and a
joint agency to manage seabed resources and fisheries. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the century, the doctrine of universal jurisdiction-together
with the newly established International Criminal Court ("ICC")-was supposed to
have become the bedrock of a multilateral endeavor to create a global system of
criminal justice. In the eyes of many, this project was one of the pinnacles of the
post-Cold War era, a milestone achievement of modern international law, denoting
the Kantian vision of a borderless world unified by neo-liberal ideas of humanism
and the rule of law.' However, a few commentators were skeptical. These few
regarded the possibility of national jurisdictions prosecuting foreign perpetrators
for the extraterritorial commission of international crimes to be premature and
unrealistic, politically as well as jurisprudentially.2 Despite the expression of such
skepticism being unpopular at the time, it was nevertheless plainly heard by
several prominent jurists.
Among these skeptics were then-President of the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ") Judge Gilbert Guillaume and Law Lord Nicolas Browne-
Wilkinson, who presided over the bench 3 of the House of Lords in the Pinochet
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1. See, e.g., ROBERT COOPER, THE BREAKING OF NATIONS: ORDER AND CHAOS IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 31 (2003). Cooper regards the ICC as a striking example of the postmodem
breakdown of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs, reflecting the vision of a world that
is governed by law rather than by force, in which those who break the law will be treated as criminals.
In this postmodem world, raison d'etat is replaced by a moral consciousness that applies to
international relations as well as to domestic affairs. The quest for the establishment of international
judicial institutions therefore, although being established by conventional treaties between sovereign
states, results in "a growing web of institutions that go beyond the traditional norms of international
diplomacy." See also Maximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The Political
Branches and the Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes, 105 Am. J. Int'l L. 1, 3-4 (2011).
2. See, e.g., Henry Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July-
Aug. 2001; Chandra Lekha Sriram, Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past Abuses, 19
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 301, 311-12, 356-58, 367-74, 427-28 (2004); Chandra Lekha Sriram, New
Mechanisms, Old Problems? Recent Books on Universal Jurisdictions and Mixed Tribunals, 80 INT'L
AFFAIRS 971, 972, 974-75 (2004).
3. See Michael Byers, The Law and Politics of the Pinochet Case, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
415, 428 (2000).
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case. 4 The latter was the only scholar not to have joined in the adoption of the
2001 Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction -the most significant
academic attempt to date-to propose model principles on universal jurisdiction.
Explaining his reasons for dissenting from the project, Lord Browne-Wilkinson
stated:
I am strongly in favor of universal jurisdiction ... if, by those words, one means
the exercise by an international court or by the courts of one state of jurisdiction
over the nationals of another state with the prior consent of that latter state....
But the Princeton Principles propose that individual national courts should
exercise such jurisdiction against nationals of a state which has not agreed to such
jurisdiction. Moreover the principles do not recognize any form of sovereign
immunity .... If the law were to be so established, states antipathetic to Western
powers would be likely to seize both active and retired officials and military
personnel of such Western powers and stage a show trial for alleged international
crimes. Conversely, zealots in Western States might launch prosecutions against,
for example, Islamic extremists for their terrorist activities. It is natve to think
that, in such cases, the national state of the accused would stand by and watch the
trail proceed: resort to force would be more probable. In any event the fear of such
legal actions would inhibit ... the free interchange of diplomatic personnel. 6
Judge Guillaume, in his Separate Opinion in the Arrest Warrant case, 7 also
noted:
International criminal law has . . . undergone considerable development and
constitutes today an impressive legal corpus. . . . But at no time has it been
envisaged that jurisdiction should be conferred upon the courts of every State in
the world to prosecute such crimes, whoever their authors and victims and
irrespective of the place where the offender is to be found. To do this would,
moreover, risk creating total judicial chaos. It would also be to encourage the
arbitrary for the benefit of the powerful, purportedly acting as agent for an ill-
defined "international community." Contrary to what is advocated by certain
publicists, such a development would present not an advance in the law but a step
backward. 8
These dark prophecies were set aside easily, due to the intellectual
atmosphere that ruled at the time. Nevertheless, a decade later, they have
essentially foretold the course of developments. Interest groups have consistently
manipulated universal jurisdiction, as demonstrated in this paper within the context
4. Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex pane Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), (1999) 2
W.L.R. 827 (U.K.).
5. PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001), available at
http://lapa.princeton.edulhosteddocs/univejur.pdf.
6. Id. at 49 n.20.
7. Arrest Warrant of Il April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 35 (Feb. 14).
8. Id. at 35, 1 15 (Separate Opinion of President Guillaume).
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of the ongoing Middle-East conflict and the "war on terror." 9  Consequently,
leading jurisdictions that had initially adopted ambitious versions of universal
jurisdiction-based proceedings were compelled to pass far-reaching modifications
to their laws.
This paper traces the way in which the concept of universal jurisdiction has
been abused since the late 1990s as part of the so-called "lawfare" against Israel.'°
The following section, Part 11, will review briefly the significance of the universal
jurisdiction doctrine, and the main complexities involved in its application within
the framework of the multilateral endeavor to establish an overall system of
international criminal justice. More specifically, Part III will discuss the inherent
potential for manipulation and abuse involved in the exercise of universal
jurisdiction by national courts. Parts IV-VI will review the various universal
jurisdiction-based proceedings initiated against Israeli officials in the legal systems
of Belgium, Spain, and the United Kingdom respectively, pointing to the dangers
of unrestrained application of the doctrine, as well as the lack of consensus
surrounding its implementation. The last part will demonstrate how the intensive
manipulation of universal jurisdiction has resulted in a counter-reaction that has, in
fact, set back the cause of international global justice, while revealing the risks
involved in the application of a largely unsettled legal doctrine. Altogether, this
has been a historical milestone that will undoubtedly change the way universal
jurisdiction is viewed and dealt with by jurists and politicians alike.
9. See also Luc Reydams, The Rise and Fall of Universal Jurisdiction 24-27 (Leuven Ctr. for
Global Governance Studies, Working Paper No. 37, 2010), available at
https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/workingpapers/newseries/wp31-40/wp37.pdf.
10. Originally, "lawfare" was a neutral term, popularized in a 2001 speech at Harvard University
by Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap, who defined it as "a strategy of using-or misusing-law as a substitute
for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective." Today, although some argue that
"lawfare" involves the positive use of law and legal institutions to achieve strategic objectives without
the use of military force, the more common use of the term in popular discourse has a distinctly
negative connotation, suggesting abuse, misuse, and exploitation of the law. Thus, the term is used
mostly as a label to criticize those who use international law and legal proceedings against the state,
especially in areas related to national security, to achieve strategic military or political ends. In any
case, it is acknowledged that "lawfare" is "a powerful term that reflects the importance of law in the
conflicts of the twenty-first century," and that the "legitimate application of international law against
participants in an armed conflict should not be labeled "lawfare" (although there is no agreement on a
definition of "legitimate application"). See Is Lawfare Worth Defining? Report of the Cleveland
Experts Meeting Sept. 11, 2010, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 11, 12-13, 18, 20-21 (2010). "The
Lawfare Project"-a New York-based organization devoted to exposing alleged abuses of the
international legal system-cites as examples of"lawfare" the case brought to the ICJ on the legality of
Israel's security barrier; human rights cases sponsored by pro-Palestinian organizations; and litigation
in support of terrorist detainees. See id. at 12 n.3. In recent years "lawfare" has been associated with the
spread of universal jurisdiction, particularly in the case of Israeli officials. See Reydams, supra note 9,
at 26 n.75.
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I!. THE COMPLEX VISION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The last two decades witnessed an unprecedented and rapid development in
the field of international criminal law. I" With the end of the stagnancy and
pessimism that characterized the Cold War era, the path opened for a new "post-
modern" era, underlined by the notions of globalization, de-territorialization, and
interconnectedness, as well as the upholding of the human interest, which
supposedly supersedes national interests. 12 Against this background, the quest for
the establishment of a global system of international justice was enthusiastically
heard within the diplomatic, academic, and civil-society circles.' 3 This intellectual
and political atmosphere facilitated the establishment of several ad hoc
international criminal tribunals, 14 as well as the adoption of the Rome Statute and
the formation of the ICC-a long-awaited major achievement.i This atmosphere
also encouraged renewed interest in the concept of universal jurisdiction, expected
to become a cornerstone of a multilateral endeavor motivated by the vision to
create a comprehensive system to ensure that perpetrators of the "most serious
crimes of international concern"'16 would not find a safe haven, and to deter
potential perpetrators-mostly leaders, high-ranking officials, and commanders-
from materializing their atrocious schemes. 17
Universal jurisdiction is by no means a new concept. Nevertheless, despite
recurring attempts by various forums to outline the doctrine,19 it is still difficult to
11. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 4 (2d. ed. 2008); MALCOLM N.
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 398,402-03 (6th ed. 2008).
12. See, e.g., COOPER, supra note I, at 50-51, 76 (explaining that in the so-called postmodem
international order, as the state itself becomes less dominating, "state interest becomes less of a
determining factor in foreign policy: the media, popular emotion, the interests of particular groups or
regions (including transnational groups) all come into play." Consequently, the "postmodem state"
values above all the individual, and society as a whole becomes more skeptical of state power, less
nationalistic. For the "postmodem state" success therefore supposedly means openness and
transnational cooperation.). For further discussion of the notions of globalization and de-
territorialization in the context of a postmodem normative discourse, see REPHAEL H. BEN-ARt, THE
NORMATIVE POSITION OF INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW-AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 181-221 (2012).
13. See, e.g., Reydams, supra note 9, at 4-6.
14. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY] (establishing the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov.
8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR] (establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda); as well as
mixed/hybrid tribunals such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon. See generally SHAW, supra note 11, at 417-18.
15. Considered by some authors to be the most important institutional innovation since the
founding of the United Nations. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT X (4th Ed. 2011).
16. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, art. 1, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183
(July 17, 1998).
17. For a discussion of the objectives of international criminal law, see ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 22-39 (2010).
18. See LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 28-42 (2003); Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J.
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find a broadly accepted definition that describes the legal notion of the principle of
universal jurisdiction.20 Clearly, this is one of the main reasons for the substantial
confusion surrounding this usage. The 2009 African Union-European Union
("AU-EU") Joint Expert Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction suggests
that:
[U]niversal criminal jurisdiction is the assertion by one state of its jurisdiction
over crimes allegedly committed in the territory of another state, by nationals of
another state, against nationals of another state, where the crime alleged poses no
direct threat to the vital interests of the state asserting jurisdiction.21
In other words, universal jurisdiction amounts to an exceptional
extraterritorial claim by a state to prosecute crimes in circumstances where none of
the traditional criminal jurisdictional links that rely on a territorial or national
nexus 22 exists at the time of the commission of the alleged offence.23 It is the
heinousness and gravity of the alleged offence-indeed an international crime 24 -
that theoretically justifies the assertion of jurisdiction by national judges,
121, 130 (2007); M ugambi Jouet, Spain's Expanded Universal Jurisdiction to Prosecute Human Rights
Abuses in Latin America, China, andBeyond, 35 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 495,499 (2007).
19. See, e.g., Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Rep. of the Int'l
Law Comm'n, 48th Sess., May 6-July 26, 1996, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.522 and Corr.1, at 15-56,
reprinted in [1996] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.I; INT'L LAW ASS'N
COMM. ON INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW & PRACTICE, FINAL REPORT ON THE EXERCISE OF UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION IN RESPECT OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFENCES, REP. OF THE 69TH CONFERENCE
(2000); PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 5; see also INT'L COUNCIL ON
HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, HARD CASES: BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO JUSTICE ABROAD-
A GUIDE TO UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (1999), available at
http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/5/201 report en.pdf.
20. See Jouet, supra note 18, at 498-99. See, e.g., Press Release, General Assembly, Principle of
'Universal Jurisdiction' Again Divides Assembly's Legal Committee; Further Guidance Sought from
International Law Commission, U.N. Press Release, GA/L/3415 (Oct. 12, 2011) (statement of Mr.
Vieria, Brazil) (calling to "find an acceptable definition of universal jurisdiction").
21. See A U-EU Technical Ad hoc Expert Rep. on the Principles of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 8,
Council of the Eur. Union 8672/1/09 Rev I (Apr. 16 2009), available at http://www.africa-eu-
partnership.org/pdf/rapport-expert ua ue competence universelle en.pdf.
22. That is, the principles of territoriality, nationality, passive personality, or the protective
principle, ordinarily necessary under international law in order to assert jurisdiction by national
authorities.
23. See A U-EU Technical Ad hoc Expert Rep., supra note 21, 1 8.
24. The modem category of "international crimes," unlike "transnational crimes" (such as illicit
trafficking in narcotic drugs, unlawful arms trade, money laundering, etc.), includes breaches of
international rules, intended to protect values considered important by the international community and
consequently binding all states and individuals. The heinousness and gravity of the crimes-or in the
words of the Rome Statute, the recognition that such grave crimes, being "the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole," threaten "the peace, security and well-being of the
world"-underline the universal interest in their repression, and entails the personal criminal liability of
the perpetrators. See CASSESE, supra note 11, at 11-12; SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 89-90; NEIL
BOLSTER, AN INTRODUCTION TO TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3-4, 18-19 (2012); Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, supra note 16, at Preamble & arts. 5-8; Draft Code of Crimes against
the Peace and Security of Mankind, supra note 19, arts. 1-2, 16-20.
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supposedly acting on behalf of the interests of the "international community as a
whole."
25
Universal jurisdiction is not the only international legal doctrine that enables
states to assert jurisdiction over foreign nationals with regard to crimes that have
not been committed on their soil. Numerous international treaties oblige signatory
states to exercise their criminal jurisdiction over crimes defined in those treaties2 6
or to extradite the alleged offender to states that will prosecute them; this
obligation materializes when the suspect is present in the territory of the forum
state. 27  Unlike this form of treaty-based extraterritorial jurisdiction, universal
jurisdiction is regulated by customary international law. States thus largely accept
that customary law permits them to exercise their criminal jurisdiction over
certain categories of international crimes (such as genocide, crimes against
humanity, certain war crimes, piracy, etc.). 29  However, national legislation,
jurisprudence, and practice are far from being conclusive regarding the definition
of categories of international crimes justifying the assertion of universal
jurisdiction. 30  Furthermore, it is unclear whether a state can exercise universal
jurisdiction in absentia, without the accused being in the custody of the forum
state. 3' Another controversial question, which remains open, is the scope of
25. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 16, Preamble; see also
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
Preamble, Aug. 8, 1945, U.S.-Fr.-U.K.-U.S.S.R available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtchart.asp ("acting in the interests of all the United Nations").
26. Such treaty crimes include grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the crime of
torture as defined in the Convention against Torture 1984, the crime of enforced disappearance as
defined in the Convention against Enforced Disappearance 2006, as well as certain crimes defined in
the so-called set of anti-terrorism conventions.
27. The so-called principle of Aut Dedere Aut Judicare ("extradite or sentence"), which is
frequently confused with the principle of universal jurisdiction. See also Questions Relating to
Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Bel. v. Sen.), 2012 I.C.J. 422, Jill 68, 89-91, 94-95, 99-100 (July
20, 2012); Zdzislaw Galickki, Special Rapporteur, Third Report on the Obligation to Extradite or
Prosecute (aut Dedere aut Judicare), Int'l L. Comm'n, 60th Sess., May 5-June 6, July 7-Aug. 8, 2008,
UN Doc. A/CN.4/603, 1I1 24-25, 30, 40, 42, 45-48, 83, 87, 98, 101-02, 105-06, 116, 123-25, 127 (June
10, 2008).
28. There is no duty under customary international law to prosecute all serious human rights
abuses under universal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A
Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 888, 895 (2003); Colangelo, supra note 18, at 130.
29. See, e.g., Colangelo, supra note 18, at 130.
30. See discussion in Arrest Warrant of II April 2000, supra note 7, at 36 (Separate Opinion of
President Guillaume), 63 (Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal); see
also Roger O'Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 735,
735-60 (2004).
31. An echo to this controversy can be found in the Joint Separate Opinions of Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans and Buergenthal, and the Separate Opinion of President Guillaume. Arrest Warrant of 11
April 2000, supra note 7, at 35-46, 63-91. See also Jouet, supra note 18, at 498-99 (distinguishing
between countries (such as Austria, France, and Switzerland) that uphold a so-called doctrine of
conditional universal jurisdiction, that requires custody of the accused in order to initiate proceedings
(including investigation), and countries (such as Belgium and Spain, prior to the passage of
amendments to their universal jurisdiction laws) that support the absolute universal jurisdiction
VOL. 43:2
2015 UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: CHRONICLE OF A DEATH FORETOLD? 171
universal jurisdiction vis-6-vis the immunity recognized for certain high-ranking
officials under international law.
32
III. THE INHERENT PORTENTIAL FOR MANIPULATION AND ABUSE
The ICC and ad hoc criminal tribunals are international institutions that act on
the basis of broad consensus reflected in constituent international treaties and
binding resolutions of the U.N. Security Council. 33  These documents outline a
rather comprehensive scheme of jurisdictional checks and balances. Universal
jurisdiction, on the other hand, is implemented by national authorities. Its
application and interpretation is therefore subjected to the discretion of national
prosecution and judicial authorities as well as the conceptions of politicians
regarding the interests of the international community. 
34
In view of the above, although the modern idea of universal jurisdiction was
often discussed after the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials35 and the judgment of the
Israel Supreme Court in the Eichmann case, 36 until two decades ago states were
doctrine, allowing to prosecute a defendant regardless of whether he or she is in custody); see also
O'Keefe, supra note 30, at 747.
32. The ICJ determined, under customary international law, certain holders of high-ranking office
in a state, such as the Head-of-State, Head-of-Government, and Minister of Foreign Affairs (as well as
diplomatic and consular agents) are entitled, while in office, to an absolute (procedural) personal state
immunity from jurisdiction in other states. The Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 7, 51.
The list of high-ranking government officials entitled to such immunity is not exclusive, and depends
on the function of the state official concerned. See also Application for Arrest Warrant against General
Shaul Mofaz, Bow St. Mag. Ct. (unreported), il 10-15 (Feb. 12, 2004), http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/RULAC/pdf state/Application- for-Arrest-Warrant-Against-Gencral-Shaul-Mofaz.pdf,
Anatolevich Kolodkin, Special Rapporteur, Preliminary Report on Immunity of State Officials from
Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, Int'l L. Comm'n., 60th Sess., May 5-June 6, July 7-Aug. 8, 2008, UN
Doe. A/CN.4/601, 111 30-34, 39, 41, 61-63, 66-67, 109, 117-121 (May 29, 2008).
33. See also Sriram, supra note 2, at 311-312. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, supra note 16; ICTY, supra note 14; ICTR, supra note 14.
34. Kontorovich notes that while all nations are in effect joint owners of a right to prosecute under
universal jurisdiction, and may share a common interest in universal jurisdiction offences, they
manifestly differ in the valuations they assign to this interest. Eugene Kontorovich, The Inefficiency of
Universal Jurisdiction, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 405 (2008). See also Sriram, supra note 2, at 309
(noting that national judges have taken radically different approaches to the exercise of universal
jurisdiction).
35. See Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War
Criminals, Nuremberg, T.S. No. 27 (Sept. 30 - Oct. 1, 1946); Judgment of the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East, (U.S. v. Araki), (12 Nov. 1948).
36. Israel was one of the first states to enact legislation based on the doctrine of universal
jurisdiction for war crimes, crimes against the Jewish people and crimes against humanity. Nazis and
Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law, 5710-1950, SH No. 57. The law was the legal basis for the
Eichmann case, decided by the District Court of Jerusalem and the Supreme Court of Israel in 1961/2.
CrimC (Jer.) 40/61 Attorney General v. Eichmann, (1961); CA 336/61 Eichmann v. Attorney General
[1962]. As such, the case is considered the starting point in so far as universal jurisdiction as
manifested in domestic courts is concerned. See SHAW, supra note 11, at 671. Although, as the judges
in the Eichmann case made clear, due to the unique circumstances, the jurisdiction of Israel was also
based on the principle of passive personality, due to the fact that the victims were Jewish and were
therefore represented by the State of Israel, which was the Jewish state. CA 336/61 Eichmann v.
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reluctant to implement it. The high political costs and the risks of infringing upon
the sovereignty of other states deterred national authorities from legislating and
applying this vague customary doctrine. 37 Nevertheless, in the late 1990s, several
countries-mostly Western-European, led by Belgium and Spain, which were
probably motivated by the adoption of the Rome Statute and heated discussions
about the future of the international rule of law in view of dreadful events such as
in Kosovo, Rwanda, and Congo-began to adopt laws enabling their courts to hear
claims based on the principle of universal jurisdiction. 38 Such claims, submitted
by foreign individuals, mostly victims of atrocities, and various international non-
governmental organizations ("INGOs"), on the basis of national legislation that
broadly interpreted the principle of universal jurisdiction, brought about a massive
number of claims that practically turned certain European capitals into self-
appointed international criminal courts. 3 9  Eventually, only very few of these
claims matured into convictions. 40 However, this has not prevented numerous
claimants and interested parties to issue complaints against top foreign officials
and political leaders, having discovered the possibility of abusing universal
jurisdiction-based proceedings as a powerful tool for the promotion of political
agendas.
The record of pro-Palestinian groups in this regard has been highly
significant. The intensive manipulation of universal jurisdiction in the past few
years, within the framework of their so-called "lawfare" campaign against Israel, 41
takes much credit for the fact that within less than a decade, most of the leading
countries that recognized an unqualified national version of universal criminal
jurisdiction had to modify their legislation to limit the ability of foreign interest
groups and individuals to initiate proceedings that abused their courts.42
The potential for abuse and politicization of the universality principle is
signifiant. It was mainly for this reason that universal jurisdiction was sharply
described by one commentator as a "waking giant" that might brutally threaten to
smash the already fragile web of interstate relations.43 As interest groups soon
discovered, the costs of initiating a claim were relatively low, while the potential
Attorney General [1962], 1116, 9-12. See also Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 7, at 40-43 11
12 (considering Israel's legislation and jurisprudence to constitute "a very special case").
37. See Byers, supra note 3, at 420-21.
38. See Jouet, supra note 18, at 501; Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal
Jurisdiction with Democratic Principles, 92 GEO L.J. 1057, 1059-60 (2004).
39. In fact, the jurisdiction of the ICC is considerably narrower than that which was claimed by
some states under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. See SCHABAS, supra note 15, at xi-xii, 63-67;
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 16, art. 12.
40. See Reydams, supra note 9, at 22; Michele Hirsch & Natalie Kumps, The Belgian Law of
Universal Jurisdiction Put to the Test, 35 JUSTICE 21 (2003).
41. See, e.g., Edwin Bennatan, The Use and Abuse of Universal Jurisdiction, Point/Counterpoint
blog, JERUSALEM POST (Nov. 28, 2010 5:53 PM), http://www.jpost.com/Blogs/Point-Counterpoint/The-
use-and-abuse-of-Universal-Jurisdiction-368079.
42. See infra Parts IV-VI.
43. See Yaffa Zilbershats, Universal Jurisdiction: The Waking Giant, 35 JUSTICE 15 (2003).
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for political and media gains were enormous. 44 Since universal jurisdiction-based
proceedings were the exclusive domain of national, rather than international,
judicial authorities, in most cases it was sufficient for interest groups or individuals
to find a low-level, like-minded judge who was willing to begin an investigation
into a case, or worse, to issue an arrest warrant against some senior foreign
official.45 Regardless of the fact that in most cases such a warrant was revoked and
the complaint was withdrawn, 46 the harassment caused to the official, the headlines
that such an investigation produced, and the political embarrassment that followed
had an immediate impact on international public opinion. It also impacted the
bilateral relations between the forum state and that of the suspected official. If the
latter retaliated, the two governments could very soon find themselves in the eye of
an international political storm that could easily get out of hand. For these reasons,
bringing suspected perpetrators of international crimes to justice has turned, at
best, into a secondary goal; the golden opportunity to interfere in the normal course
of interstate relations has become a prominent incentive to filing complaints
against foreign officials in third states.
In the following sections, I will review the proceedings initiated against
Israeli officials in Belgium, Spain, and the United Kingdom from 2001 to 2010.
Lawsuits against Israeli officials were also initiated in other countries.47 However,
44. See, e.g., Chibli Mallat, Special Dossier on the "Sabra and Shatila" Case in Belgium:
Introduction: New Lights on the Sharon Case, in THE PALESTINE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
VOL. XII (2002-2003) 183, 183 (Camille Mansour, ed., 2004) (admitting that he, as the counsel for the
Sabra and Shatila victims in the Sharon and Yaron case in Belgium, could not imagine that the case
"would develop into the most serious crisis between Tel-Aviv and a European capital since the
establishment of the State of Israel; and that both the U.S. Secretary of State and his defense counterpart
would weigh in personality against the law on which the case was based.").
45. See, e.g., Bennatan, supra note 41.
46. See, e.g., Recent Legislation. International Law - Universal Jurisdiction - United Kingdom
Adds Barrier to Private Prosecution of Universal Jurisdiction Crimes-Police Reform and Social
Responsibility Act, 2011, c. 13 (U.K.), 125 HARV. L. REV. 1554 (regarding the arrest warrants issued in
the cases of Maj. Gen. Doron Almog (Sep. 2005), and former Foreign Affairs Minister Tzipi Livni
(Dec. 2009) in the U.K.). See also Reydams, supra note 9, at 22 (distinguishing the features of the few
so-called universal jurisdiction "hard cases" that did result in trial and conviction). Nicolaou-Garcia
also acknowledges that since politics plays a pivotal role in high-profile universal jurisdiction cases,
judicial investigations are normally halted and parliaments change their universal jurisdiction law. See
SILVIA NICOLAou GARCIA, MIDDLE EAST MONITOR (MEMO, LONDON), EUROPEAN EFFORTS TO
APPLY THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AGAINST ISRAELI OFFICIALS, (2009), available at
http://www.middleeastmonitor.com/reports/by-silvia-nicolaou-garcia/. Prosor notes that "campaigners
targeting Israeli officials know they have no chance of getting a prosecution, let alone a conviction.
Instead they are seeking a media circus and PR victory." Ron Prosor, A Loophole that Must Be
Repaired, JUSTICE, Winter 2011, at 36.
47. In Switzerland (against Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, former Minister of Defense, and others); in
New Zealand, 2005 (against Moshe Ya'alon, former Chief-of-Staff of the IDF); in the United States,
2005 (against Moshe Ya'alon); in the United States, 2005 (against Avi Dichter, former Director of the
General Security Service); in Holland, 2008 (against Ami Ayalon, former Director of the General
Security Service); in Norway, 2009 (against Ehud Olmert, former Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, former
Minister of Defense, Tzipi Livni, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, and others); in Turkey, 2009
(against Shimon Peres, former Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, Ehud Olmert, Tzipi Livni, Ehud
Barak, and Gabi Ashkenazi, former Chief-of-Staff). The list is not conclusive. JERUSALEM CENTER
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abuse of universal jurisdiction proceedings in these particular states was the most
far-reaching and thus exemplify the high costs involved in "universal jurisdiction
campaigns."
IV. THE PROCEEDINGS IN BELGIUM
The pilot case brought by pro-Palestinian plaintiffs under national universal
jurisdiction legislation was the Sharon Case. 48 Although this case did not result in
a conviction, the public, political, and legal turmoil it caused, which lasted for
several years, motivated pro-Palestinian groups to initiate many additional
proceedings in various countries in Europe.49
In June 2001, twenty-four individuals of Palestinian or Lebanese origin filed a
complaint in Belgium against the then Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon, and
the Director-General of the Ministry of Defense, Amos Yaron, for genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes. 50 The two top government officials were
accused of being responsible for the Sabra and Shatila massacres in 1982.51
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS, PALESTINIAN MANIPULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 40 n.30 (Alan
Baker ed., 2014), available at http://jcpa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/PalestinianManipulation.pdf. See also Overview of Lawfare Cases Involving
Israel, NGO MONITOR (last visited Aug. 30, 2013), available at http://www.ngo-
monitor.org/article/ngolawfare.
48. H.S.A et al. v. S.A. et al., Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], Feb. 12, 2003, No.
P.02.1139. F/I (BeIg.), 42 1.L.M. 596 (2003).
49. See Mallat, supra note 44, at 183. The unique and complex set of circumstances in the Sharon
and Yaron affair-the fact that Sharon was an acting Prime Minister entailed to procedural immunity
under international law; that Sharon and Yaron were not present in Belgium; that the Sabra and Shatila
massacres were already investigated in Israel by a special investigation commission (the Kahan
Commission) that was authorized to recommend disciplinary or criminal proceedings; and that the
Lebanese authorities had granted a general amnesty to the perpetrators of the massacres-probably
made potential claimants believe that under a different, less complicated and contentious set of
circumstances, an action against Israeli officials could be successful. See, e.g., Arwa Arburawa, WAR
CRIMES IN GAZA 9, 49-51 (Rajnaara Akhtar, ed., Sept., 2009), available at
http://issuu.com/friendsofalaqsa/docs/gazareport-web?viewMode=magazine.
50. The complaint was the initiative of Chibli Mallat, Professor in European Law in St. Joseph's
University in Beirut, together with two Belgian lawyers, Michael Verhaeghe and Luc Walleyn. It was
the outcome of months of intensive research in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon aimed at
identifying the immediate relatives of victims of the massacres, held by Sana Hussein and Dr.
Rosemary Sayegh, "friend of the Palestinian cause," dealing with Palestinians in Lebanon. See Mallat,
supra note 44, at 183, 185. The criminal procedure under the Belgian law was based on the system of
constitution de parlie civile ("plaintiff-prosecutors" system), by which the victims initiate cases before
an investigating judge. See Ratner, supra note 28, at 890.
51. The massacres of 700-800 Palestinians occurred in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps
between 16-18 Sep. 1982, during the Lebanon War, by Christian Phalanges in revenge for previous
massacres and the assassination of their leader Bashir Jumayil. Following the massacres, the Israeli
government appointed an inquiry commission chaired by Justice Kahan to investigate the events and
Israel's role in them. The commission did not find any of the relevant Israeli office holders directly
responsible, although it criticized several of them for not being sufficiently aware of the possible
implications of the Phalanges' advance into the camps; Sharon was required to resign from his post.
For a historical account of the events in Lebanon, see Yoav Gelber, The Lawsuit Submitted against
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Clearly, the claimants were encouraged by the November 1998 and March
1999 landmark rulings of the House of Lords in ex parte Pinochet 2 that allowed,
for the first time, the extradition of a former head of state, the Chilean dictator
Augusto Pinochet, from Britain to Spain, following a request made by a Spanish
investigating judge on the basis of the Spanish universal jurisdiction law.53 The
very supportive public and academic atmosphere that surrounded the Pinochet
proceedings gave the impression that legal history was being made and that victims
would finally find redress under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. 54 It gave the
claimants reason to believe that similar proceedings in other countries against
acting top officials could be highly successful and attract extensive public
attention. Belgium was a strong possibility as a venue for such claims: it was one
of the countries which, in addition to Spain, had an arrest warrant outstanding
against Pinochet, and it was the only government that joined human rights
organizations in challenging the decision by the U.K. Home Secretary not to
release the report that led to Pinochet's eventual release on medical grounds.
55
A. Malicious Forum Shopping
The claimants chose the Belgian forum after careful examination of the
various options within a number of western systems. 56 The 1993 Belgian law (as
amended in 1999) established the universal jurisdiction of the Belgian courts,
which related to the prosecution of gross violations of international humanitarian
law, genocide, and crimes against humanity.5 7 The law had already been applied
once, which in June 2001-just a few days before the complaint against Sharon
and Yaron was filed 58-led to the conviction of four Rwandan defendants who
resided in Belgium and were found guilty of participating in the 1994 Rwandan
Ariel Sharon in Belgium: Historical Background, 35 JUSTICE 25-28 (2003), available at
http://www.intjewishlawyers.org/main/files/Justice%2ONo.35%20Spring%202003.pdf . Sharon was
the Israeli Defense Minister in 1982, and Yaron was the general in charge of the Beirut sector. For a
detailed chronology of the proceedings in Belgium, see Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 20-24. See
also Ratner, supra note 28 at 889-92.
52. Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 1), (1999) 2
W.L.R. 827 (U.K.); Regina v. Bow St. Metro. (No. 3), at 147. Eventually, despite an executive decision
(October 1999) to allow the extradition of Pinochet to Spain, he was found unfit medically to stand trial.
The extradition was called off and Pinochet was released and sent back to Chile. See Byers, supra note
3, at 437-38.
53. See Mallat, supra note 44, at 183.
54. See Jouet, supra note 18, at 502; id. at 187, 189; see generally Byers, supra note 3, at 418-22.
55. See Byers, supra note 3, at 438; Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 21. Belgium's challenge
was successful and the medical report was released.
56. See Mallat, supra note 44, at 186. Recall that although the majority in Pinochet IH upheld the
decision in Pinochet I to deny former Head-of-State immunity, the ruling was not based on customary
international law, but relied primarily on the Torture Convention and the Criminal Justice Act 1988,
thus limiting the denial of immunity to those instances where universal jurisdiction had specifically
been accepted by way of treaty and statute. See Byers, supra note 3, at 434. Therefore, despite the
Pinochet precedent in the United Kingdom, it was preferable to go to Belgium.
57. See Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 20. See generally Langer, supra note 1, at 26-32.
58. The filing of the complaint on behalf of the Sabra and Shatila victims immediately after the
conviction in the "Rwandan trial" was carefully calculated. See Mallat, supra note 44, at 184.
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genocide. 59 The "Rwandan trial" led to a stream of complaints filed in Belgium 60
against high-ranking foreign government officials. 61 Some of these complaints,
however, did not have any link whatsoever to Belgium. 62  Eventually, this led
some Belgian politicians and jurists to call for amendments to the law that would
limit its unqualified application. 63 The Palestinian complaint filed in the midst of
this domestic debate regarding the Belgian law politicized the dispute by
provoking NGOs and politicians-who were lobbied intensively-to take a
harsher public stance in favor of an extension of Belgian jurisdiction. 64
The political nature of the complaint in the Sharon case was obvious: none of
the complainants resided in Belgium.65 More significantly, the complaint failed to
mention any of the Lebanese citizens who were directly responsible for the
66 6massacres. The complaint highlighted the crime of genocide,67 giving the
impression that the defendants were involved in a comprehensive genocidal
scheme and bearing the potential for further allegations against other officials
involved in the Lebanon War. The claimants strategically timed the filing of the
complaint, tailoring it to fit the delicate political circumstances: it was three
months after Prime Minister Sharon was elected (March 2001) and right before
Belgium was to assume the Presidency of the European Union (July-December
2001).
B. A Universal Jurisdiction Campaign
The filing of the complaint was accompanied by a well-orchestrated press
campaign. On the eve of filing the complaint, BBC aired its Panorama program
The Accused, investigating the role of Sharon in the Sabra and Shatila massacres,
of which counsels for the victims had been informed two weeks in advance
59. On the significance of the "Rwandan trial" and its possible consequences as a leading
universal jurisdiction precedent see Ratner, supra note 28, at 892; Jouet, supra note 18, at 528-29.
60. Which turned Belgium into the uncrowned "world capital of universal jurisdiction." See
Jouet, supra note 18, 501 (quoting Orentlicher, supra note 38).
61. See Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 21; Langer, supra note 1, at 30.
62. In the beginning, either the suspect or the victims were living in Belgium. In a later stage,
complaints did not even possess such links. See Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 21.
63. Although Belgium's law was not the world's first domestic statute on universal jurisdiction, it
was certainly the broadest in terms of the crimes it covered and the lack of any required link to
Belgium. See Ratner, supra note 28, at 889. Evidently, the original law was passed without taking into
account the various serious issues entailed by the enactment of such law and its application. See Hirsch,
supra note 40, at 21. See generally Adrien Masset, The Supreme Court of Belgium Puts an End to the
Prosecution of Sharon, 35 JUSTICE 29-30 (2003), available at
http://www.intjewishlawyers.org/main/files/Justice%2ONo.35%20Spring%202003.pdf.
64. See Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 21, 23. A group of six NGOs was established to
participate in the drafting process, in an effort to ensure the adoption of an interpretative legislation that
extended the scope of the universal jurisdiction law.
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through an Amnesty International friend.68 Counsel for the claimants distributed
the lengthy text of the complaint at a press conference held immediately after it
had been formally filed; the text was later posted on the Internet and translated into
six languages. 69 A special website dedicated exclusively to the case launched the
"International Campaign for the Victims of Sabra and Shatila,"7° while supportive
"Sabra and Shatila committees" sprang up across the world. 7 All of this attracted
massive media attention as well as the active involvement of academics and
human-rights activists.72 Massive financial support and the backing of leading
INGOs, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Avocats Sans
Fronti~res, were assured in advance, 73 coloring the proceedings as a battle, pitting
Israel against universal jurisdiction and the global "fight against impunity."
74
Belgian politicians were also motivated to get involved in the proceedings. A
group of Belgian senators intervened several times before the Prosecution
Chamber.7 5  A delegation of senators, headed by J. Dubi6, Head of the Justice
Commission at the Belgian Senate, along with leading journalists, even flew to
Lebanon to meet with Elias Hobeika, the leader of the Phalangist forces who had
been accused of directing the massacre in the camps. 76 A meeting with victims of
the massacres, who were flown to Belgium, was organized at the Belgian Senate
following a hearing before the Prosecution Chamber. 77  During the hearing,
invitations to journalists to attend a press conference at the Senate were
distributed.78
C. Legal Turmoil and Political Embarrassment
From the moment that the Belgian prosecution invited the investigating
magistrate to begin the examining procedure and the State of Israel got involved in
the proceedings, challenging the legality of the unqualified Belgian law under
68. Mallat, supra note 44, at 185-86. See also The Accused (BBC Television broadcast Jun. 17,
2001), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/panorama/1381328.stm.
69. See Mallat, supra note 44, at 185.
70. The International Campaign was coordinated by the leading pro-Palestinian activist, Dr.
Laurie King-Irani, who later co-founded the 'Electronic Intifada.' See Laurie King-Irani, UNIV.
COLLEGE CORK PALESTINE SOLIDARITY CAMPAIGN,
http://cosmos.ucc.ie/csl064/jabowen/IPSC/php/authors.php?auid=842 (last visited Nov. 25, 2014); see
also Mallat, supra note 44, at 184.
71. Mallat, supra note 44, at 184.
72. Mallat acknowledges in particular the active support of Yale Law School Human Rights
Clinic, under the direction of Deena Hurwitz and Jim Silk, as well as of Leah Tsemel and Raef
Verstraeten. Id.
73. See id.; see also Hirsch & Kumps,supra note 40, at 22.
74. Mallat, supra note 44, at 186.
75. Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 23.
76. See id.; see also Mallat, supra note 44, at 186-88. Hobeika, former Lebanese MP, was
assassinated the morning after his meeting with the Belgian delegation, near his home in a Beirut
suburb. Clearly, Hobeika, who was encouraged by the counsels for the victims to take part in the
proceedings, saw a golden opportunity to clear his name as the perpetrator of the massacres. Id. at 186.
77. See Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 23.
78. Id.
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international law, 79 the "Sharon affair" evolved rapidly, encompassing many twists
and turns. The critical issues about whether the presence of the accused was a
precondition for the application of universal jurisdiction by national judges-and
whether an incumbent Prime Minister was entitled to procedural immunity under
international law °-were reviewed by the full chain of Belgian courts as well as
the most senior prosecution officials, reaching the Supreme Court in 2003
following an appeal by the plaintiffs. 8' Much of the sting of the case was removed
once the ICJ ruled in the Arrest Warrant case 82 in 2002 that a Prime Minister,
while in office, was entitled to procedural-personal (ratione personae) immunity
from any criminal proceedings under customary international law.8 3  Later,
although the Appeals Court ruled that the presence of the accused in Belgium was
required in order to allow the proceedings, the Cour de Cassation overruled the
decision, allowing the proceedings against Amos Yaron to proceed, rejecting the
position of Israel, and upholding the position that the application of the Belgian
universal jurisdiction law was indeed unlimited.8 4 In light of this development,
and after intensive legal and diplomatic efforts, Israel recalled its ambassador from
Brussels.85
It was not until a complaint was filed against former President of the United
States George H.W. Bush and other high-ranking American officials by several
Iraqi families preceding the second war against Iraq,86 and the American
administration threatened to take far-reaching political steps in response-
including the closure of the NATO headquarters in Brussels-that the Belgian
authorities were finally "convinced" to introduce significant amendments to their
law on universal jurisdiction, limiting its scope and proceedings.8 7 The amended
79. See id. at 22; see also Masset, supra note 63, at 29-30.
80. Another question was the application of the non bis in idem principle, regarding the absence of
criminal proceedings in Israel following the publication of the Kahan Commission report and the
amnesty granted by the Lebanese authorities to the perpetrators of the massacres in Sabra and Shatila.
Masset, supra note 63, at 35.
81. A full review of the legal proceedings in Belgium, and the arguments of the State of Israel, is
beyond the scope of this paper. See generally Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 22-24; see also
Masset, supra note 63, at 29-30.
82. In 2000, the Democratic Republic of Congo contested before the ICJ the legality of an arrest
warrant issued by a Belgian judge against Yerodia Ndombasi, the Foreign Minister at the time of the
warrant. In 2002 the ICJ found the warrant to be inconsistent with the procedural immunity to which an
acting minister of foreign affairs is entitled under customary international law. Case Concerning the
Arrest Warrant, supra note 7.
83. See supra note 32.
84. Ratner, supra note 28, at 890.
85. The culmination of what was described by the counsel for the Sabra and Shatila victims as
"the most serious crisis between Tel-Aviv and a European capital since the establishment of the state of
Israel." Mallat, supra note 44, at 183; see also Ratner, supra note 28, at 890.
86. Vice President D. Cheney, Secretary of State C. Powell, and former general N. Schwartzkopf.
87. Orentlicher, supra note 38, at 1062. In view of the American wamings that Belgium was
risking its status as a diplomatic capital, G. Verhofstadt-the Belgian Prime Minister leading a pro-
human-rights coalition of Liberals, Socialists, and Greens-who during the Sharon trial expressed
support for the unqualified application of the law, immediately proposed the amendments to limit its
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law essentially required a link between the victim or the accused to Belgium and
invested the Federal Prosecutor with wide authority to oversee the proceedings,
thus effectively barring foreign individuals and interest groups from filing abusive
complaints. 88 Israel's main argument before the Belgian courts-that the initial
unqualified version of the law was designed to grant Belgium "virtual and
surrealistic jurisdiction over all offences against international humanitarian law in
the world,"8 9 thus diverting from the scope of universal jurisdiction under
customary law and allowing manifestly political claims to proceed-was finally
resolved.
Thus, the "Sharon saga" showed the international community that:
Universal jurisdiction does not operate in a vacuum. The process. . . raises
interstate tensions in ways that even the most vociferous criticism by one state of
another's human rights practices does not... [W]hen justice becomes personal, so
does foreign policy. And when private prosecutors are part of the mix, the match
can get very ugly.
90
Unfortunately, although the Sharon case could serve as a laboratory for the
future of universal jurisdiction by highlighting the myriad of international actors
who had a direct interest in these laws and the steps they would take to advance
their claims,91 some states had yet to learn the lesson.
V. THE PROCEEDINGS IN SPAIN
The Belgian experience, while failing to reach the stage of a court trial,
proved to be very fruitful in terms of its political and propaganda impact. Once the
Belgian door closed, it was, therefore, a matter of time before more plaintiffs
initiated proceedings in countries that still allowed their legislation to be
manipulated by foreign complainants. Indeed, as a report issued by the U.K. -based
Friends ofAl-Aqsa revealed, filing lawsuits against Israeli officials was a very high
priority for Palestinian activists:
The momentum is growing and resistance is mounting. Each of us who
participates in the Palestinian cause is part of that resistance. Thus far, thousands
of us have risen up and taken action. We are working to file arrest warrants for
war crimes and crimes against humanity against Israeli military personnel in every
jurisdiction around the world that allows it.92
application in order to prevent "manifestly abusive political use of this law." Ratner, supra note 28, at
890-91; Langer, supra note 1, at 26.
88. The law also acknowledged the immunities of senior officials recognized under customary
law; for a review and analysis of the amendments to the Belgian law, see Ratner, supra note 28, at 890-
92. See also Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 24.
89. Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 24.
90. Ratner, supra note 28, at 893-94.
91. Id. at 889. See also Jouet, supra note 18, at 528.
92. Ismail Patel, Forward, in WAR CRIMES IN GAZA, supra note 49, at 9.
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Spain, the leading country at the time in terms of promoting the notion of an
unlimited universal jurisdiction,9 3 was an obvious option. 94
A. The Tyranny of Interested Judges and Activists' Groups
Although the Spanish law on universal jurisdiction, first enacted in 1985, was
not as broad as the initial Belgian law,95 courts still interpreted it as allowing
investigations against foreign defendants to be held in absentia96 without any link
to Spain.97 This gave the investigating judges of the Audiencia Nacional
("National Audience")98 expansive jurisdictional power to hear complaints brought
by various human rights organizations and private litigants against foreign officials
and to open criminal investigations accordingly. Such was the case with the
Pinochet affair, which brought world fame to the Spanish investigating judge.
Baltasar Garz6n, who in 1998 demanded the extradition from Britain of the former
dictator, within his investigations into the mass atrocities that took place in Chile.
99
Clearly, Garz6n set an example for other judges of the Audiencia, who were
encouraged by various INGOs and human rights purists to continue their "crusade
to vindicate gross human rights violations" in Spanish courts. °00 Nevertheless,
much like the case in Belgium, and despite the success of the Pinochet case, the
zealous atmosphere and the fact that several states whose citizens were being
prosecuted protested vehemently against the violation of their sovereignty,'
10
provoked a public debate in Spain. Pragmatists warned against the adoption of a
"radical form of universal jurisdiction devoid of strong procedural footing that
could violate international customary law and harm diplomatic relations."102 This
debate was followed by a clash between Spain's two high courts-the Supreme
Court and the Constitutional Tribunal-over the correct interpretation of the
Spanish law regarding universal jurisdiction. 103 In 2005, the Constitutional Court
93. Jouet, supra note 18, at 501.
94. As was predicted by some commentators. See id. at 531.
95. See id. at 499, 512, 522. See generally Langer, supra note 1, at 32-41.
96. Jouet, supra note 18, at 512 (The Belgian law originally allowed trials in absentia, not only
investigations).
97. Id. at 497, 510.
98. Id. at 504 (This is the Spanish trial court responsible for matters of international and national
interest, including international crimes and terrorism).
99. The same set of investigations, dealing with the junta reign in Argentina, led in 2004 to the
arrest in Spain of Adolfo Schilingo, an Argentine navy officer charged with mass-murdering during
Argentina's Dirty War. This was one of the very few and probably the most famous case brought under
a universal jurisdiction law that ended in a conviction after passing a complete series of appeals. See
generally id. at 502, 505
100. Id. at 501; Soeren Kern, Spain, Israel and War Crimes, GATESTONE INSTITUTE (Apr. 8, 2009,
6:30 AM), http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/455/spain-isreal-and-war-crimes.
101. Jouet, supra note 18, at 502-03.
102. Id. at 503.
103. See id. at 505-07 (The Supreme Court in 2004 interpreted the law as requiring a link to
national interests, clarifying that the Spanish courts could only exert a narrow form of universal
jurisdiction. The court explained that a broader form of universal jurisdiction would be unreasonable
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eventually overruled the decision of the Supreme Court, thus upholding the
unqualified version of the Spanish law. 10 4 This effectively provided the judges of
the Audiencia a carte blanche to initiate unrestrained investigations in absentia,
without having to wait for an alleged culprit to enter Spain's territory. 105
As in Belgium, the pro-Palestinian lawyers took advantage of the loud,
ongoing public debate over the scope of universal jurisdiction in Spain to bring in a
controversial complaint against former Israeli officials. In June 2008, the
Palestinian Center for Human Rights ("PCHR") 10 6 filed a complaint before
Audiencia Judge Fernando Andreu Merelles against seven high-ranking officials
for suspected "crimes against humanity" for their involvement in the July 2002
targeted killing of Salah Shehadeh, the commander of the military wing of Hamas
in Gaza. 0 7 The PCHR, acting on behalf of some of the families of civilian
casualties, hoped that "universal jurisdiction would become a real avenue for
Palestinians to seek redress for Israeli crimes" following this case. 108 To this end,
the PCHR hired the services of the Spanish lawyer Gonzalo Boy-a Marxist
and would violate the principle of non-intervention in another state's affairs as enshrined in Art. 2(7) of
the U.N. Charter).
104. Id. at 508.
105. The Constitutional Tribunal essentially held that a procedural link to national interests was not
required since universal jurisdiction was exclusively based on the substantive nature of grave crimes
affecting the entire international community. See id. at 508-10, 512.
106. The PCHR was founded in 1995 by a group of Palestinian human rights lawyers. It mainly
operates from Gaza. According to the center's definition, its work includes the documentation and
investigation of human rights violations. The center was behind most of the lawsuits against senior
Israeli officials abroad: Shaul Mofaz (U.K., 2002); Doron Almog (U.K., 2005); Avi Dichter (U.S.,
2005); Moshe Ya'alon (New Zealand, 2006); Binyamin Ben-Eliezer and others (Spain, 2008); Ami
Ayalon (Holland, 2008). According to the center's 2008 report, and the reports of the organizations that
support it, the main donors to the PCHR are: the Welfare Association (financed by the World Bank,
among others); the NGO Development Center (financed by the World Bank, among others); the Open
Society Institute (U.S.); Grassroots International (U.S.); the Ford Foundation (U.S.); as well as the
E.U. and several European governments. See KELA RESEARCH & STRATEGY, THE FINANCING OF
WELFARE ASSOCIATION (WA) AND NGO DEVELOPMENT CENTER (NDC) BY THE US GOVERNMENT VIA
THE WORLD BANK 18-19 (on file with the author); see also THE MEIR AMIT INTELLIGENCE AND
TERRORISM INFORMATION CENTER, THE PALESTINIAN CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS PLAYS A LEADING
ROLE IN ANTI-ISRAELI WARFARE AND Is PLANNING TO EXPLOIT OPERATION PILLAR OF DEFENSE TO
SUE SENIOR ISRAELI FIGURES 6-8 (2013); Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR), NGO
MONITOR, http://www.ngo-monitor.org/article/palestiniancenter for human rightspchr (last visited
July 2, 2012).
107. See WAR CRIMES IN GAZA, supra note 49 at 50. For a brief history of the proceedings in
Israel, see Ido Rosenzweig & Yuval Shany, Universal Jurisdiction: Spanish Court Initiates an Inquiry
of the Targeted Killing of Salah Shehadeh in Gaza, TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY NEWSLETTER, no. 3,
Mar. 2009 (Salah Shehadeh was a member of the Hamas. He masterminded numerous terror attacks
against Israeli civilians and soldiers in the Gaza strip and within Israel; he was involved in the
production of Qassam rockets fired against Israeli civilian targets, and in the smuggling of arms into the
Gaza strip. As the leader of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades military wing of the Hamas in Gaza, he
was responsible for suicide attacks that caused the death of hundreds of Israeli civilians. On July 22,
2002, Israel executed a targeted killing operation directed at Shehadeh. An IDF aircraft dropped a one-
ton bomb on Shehadeh's house, killing him and 14 other people, and injuring many civilians. The
attack was widely criticized by governments and human rights organizations, including in Israel.).
108. See WAR CRIMES IN GAZA, supra note 49 at 50.
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revolutionary who had served a ten-year sentence in Spanish prison for
collaborating with the Basque terrorist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna ("ETA") and
was involved in most of the universal jurisdiction lawsuits filed in Spain, including
those against U.S. officials.'0 9 By the end of January 2009, following Boy6's
petition, the Spanish magistrate, Andreu, who identified an opportunity to follow
his colleague Garz6n"n0 and to gain international publicity, issued a decision to
open a criminal investigation against Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, former Minister of
Defense; Dan Halutz, former Commander of the Israeli Air-Force; Moshe Ya'alon,
former Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defence Force ("IDF"); Avraham Dichter,
former Director of the General Security Service; Doron Almog, former General of
the Southern Command of the IDF; Giora Eiland, former Chairman of the National
Security Council and National Security Advisor; and Michael Hertzog, former
Military Secretary of the Israel Minister of Defense."' Andreu determined that
"the events may and must [emphasis added] be investigated by the Spanish courts"
as the evidence suggested that Israel had engaged in a "disproportionate attack,"
based on the Spanish law of universal jurisdiction as interpreted by the
Constitutional Tribunal to provide absolute jurisdiction. '1 2
B. A War on the "War on Terror"
As in Belgium, the complainants carefully calculated the timing of the filing
of this particular lawsuit, leaving no doubt as to its political nature: Operation Cast
Lead, the IDF ground invasion of the Gaza Strip (December 2008-January 2009),
ended a few days before Judge Andreu released his decision to open an
investigation into the case.'' 3 World attention was focused on the Gaza Strip.
1 14
Israel was desperately "trying to fend off foreign censure over the civilian death
toll" during that operation." 15 The U.N. Human Rights Council called for an
international fact-finding mission to investigate the conduct of Israel,"16 while a
network of European lawyers and pro-Palestinian activists prepared a list with the
names and personal data of some two hundred Israeli soldiers, which was made
109. See Gregory Gordon, Spanish UJ - From Pinochet to Purgatory?, OPINIO JURIS (Jul. 24,
2009, 1:26 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2009/07/24/spanish-uj-from-pinochet-to-purgatory/; see also
Kern, supra note 100.
110. See Kern, supra note 100.
I 11. See Rosenzweig & Shany, supra note 107.
112. Id.
113. Preliminary Proceedings 157/2008, Central Magistrates' Court Number Four of the High
Court in Madrid (Jan. 29, 2009); Kern, supra note 100.
114. PALESTINIAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (PCHR), THE PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE OF
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: PCHR'S WORK IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY 7 (2010).
115. Kern, supra note 100.
116. Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories:
Report of the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 1 1975, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48, (Sept.
25, 2009) [hereinafter Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict] (The
Report of the U.N. Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (the so-called "Goldstone Report")
indeed recommended states parties to the Geneva Conventions to "start criminal investigations in
national courts, using universal jurisdiction." (italics added)).
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available on a special website called Israeli war criminals.117 A complaint dealing
with an alleged war crime amounting to a "crime against humanity" that would
lead to a foreign criminal investigation into the conduct of the IDF in the Gaza
Strip in the past was a perfect legal ambush; it could set a significant precedent and
focus maximum international attention that would put Israel under heavy public
and diplomatic pressure at home and abroad.1 8 Furthermore, unlike the complaint
against Sharon and Yaron in Belgium, the specific context of the current complaint
was meant to showcase the role of international criminal law in reviewing the
legality of counter-terrorism measures employed by states involved in the "War on
Terror" led by the United States and Israel. 1 9 The application of universal
jurisdiction as a "weapon" to review counter-terrorism strategies 12 was meant to
attract the sympathy and support of human-rights activists and INGOs as part of an
"anti-western globalism [movement that used] international law to eat away at
national sovereignty."' 121 In this respect, an unfolding investigation would send a
clear message that a state's response to terrorist attacks represented "a more
serious violation of international law than the original act of terrorism." 122
C. Delegitimizing Domestic Proceedings
Most importantly, plaintiffs filed the complaint in Spain while proceedings in
Israel regarding the Shehadeh affair were still pending. The Israeli High Court of
Justice ("HCJ"), which had determined that targeted killing operations were not
forbidden as such, 123 nevertheless had recommended the establishment of a special,
independent examination committee with a mandate to examine the collateral
damage caused by the killing of Shehadeh and its possible implications. 24 The
committee, which was authorized to recommend disciplinary or criminal
proceedings, had yet to conclude its investigation when the complaint in Spain was
filed.125 In fact, just a few days before the submission of the lawsuit by the PCHR
117. Anshel Pfeffer, Lawyers in EU draw up list of alleged IDF war criminals, HAARETZ (Oct. 27,
2009, 1:36 AM), hup://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/lawyers-in-eu-draw-up-list-of-alleged-idf-
war-criminals- 1.5386.
118. See Kern, supra note 100.
119. See Rosenzweig & Shany, supra note 107.
120. For a discussion of the risks of such strategy and its legal implications, see id., at
"Conclusions."
121. Kern, supra notel00.
122. Rosenzweig & Shany, supra note 107, at "Conclusions."
123. The HCJ further determined that every case that involved civilian casualties had to be
examined by a special committee. See HCJ 769/2 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov't of
Israel (2) PD 459, 511 [2006] (Isr.).
124. The legality of the Shehadeh operation has been discussed in several cases before the HCJ, but
was challenged directly in HCJ 8794/03 Yoav Hess et al. v. Judge Advocate General et al. [2008] (lsr.).
Pursuant to the Court's recommendation, the Israel Prime Minister established the Special Examination
Committee, headed by Z. Inbar, the former Judge Advocate General and the Knesset Legal Advisor.
125. The Committee started its work in January 2008, and presented its final conclusions in
February 2011. The Committee's Chairman, Z. Inbar, passed away during the Committee's work, and
was replaced by former Supreme Court Judge T. Strasberg-Cohen. For the conclusions of the special
examination committee on the targeted killing of Shehadeh, see A Summary Report of the Special
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in Madrid, the HCJ rejected a petition calling for a criminal investigation of the
Shehadeh affair due to the fact that the examination committee was still
investigating the matter. 26 Obviously, the PCHR was trying to bypass the Israeli
legal system by inviting an unprecedented foreign scrutiny of, and possible
intervention in, its proceedings. Aside from establishing a dangerous precedent, a
court trial in Spain would have implied that Israeli authorities were "unable or
genuinely unwilling"'127 to handle the matter, while at the same time focusing
public attention on the examination committee and exerting considerable pressure
on its members.
As one could have expected, once Judge Andreu decided to take on the
investigation, matters unfolded rapidly, attracting a great deal of international
attention and causing political turbulence in and outside of Spain. The day after
Andreu's preliminary decision, Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos,
being aware of the far-reaching implications of the decision against U.S. officials,
was quick to declare that the Spanish government would consider a proposal to
amend the law on universal jurisdiction. 128 Andreu, backed by other prominent
politicians who upheld Spanish judiciary's absolute independence, 129 was
determined, however, to continue the official investigation in the case. 130 Israeli
politicians protested in strong language against what they considered a
conspicuous intervention by the Spanish court in the ongoing legal proceedings in
Israel. 131 They were outraged further by the "ridicule and absurdity" of accusing a
"democracy legitimately protecting itself against terrorists and war criminals,"
instead of going after the terrorists themselves.' 32 In addition, they were incensed
by the possibility that Andreu could decide to issue international arrest warrants for
Committee to examine the action of prevention-focused Salah Shehadeh, PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE
(Feb. 27, 2011), http://www.pm.gov.il/PMO/Archive/Spokesman/2011/02/spokeshchade27021 I.htm.
126. See HCJ 8794/03, supra note 124.
127. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 16 at art. 17(l)(a) & (b)
(following the wording of the article). Recall in this regard that, although the "Goldstone Report" had
initially raised "serious doubts about the willingness of Israel to carry out genuine investigations as
required by international law" (see Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza
Conflict, supra note 116, at 1961), in an April 2011 Washington Post Op-Ed, Goldstone admitted, "If
I had known then what I know now, the Goldstone Report would have been a different document."
Furthermore, Goldstone determined that Israel had fulfilled "to a significant degree" its responsibility to
investigate "transparently and in good faith the incidents referred to in our report," while the "Hamas
ha[d] done nothing." Richard Goldstone, Reconsidering the Goldstone Report on Israel and War
Crimes, WASHINGTON POST, (Apr. 1, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-04-
0 I/opinions/35207016 ldrone-image-goldstone-report-israeli-evidence.
128. Kern, supra note 100; Ido Rosenzweig & Yuval Shany, Update-Universal Jurisdiction:
Spanish Court's Inquiry of the Targeted Killing of Salah Shehadeh, TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY
NEWSLETTER, no. 5, May 2009 [hereinafter Rosenzweig & Shany, Spanish Court's Inquiry]; Langer,
supra note I at 38.
129. Kern, supra note 100 (such as Deputy Prime Minister Maria-Teresa Fernandez de la Vega).
130. See Rosenzweig & Shany, Spanish Court's Inquiry, supra note 128.
131. See Nicolaou Garcia, supra note 46 (quoting Ehud Barak, then Israel Defense Minister, "he
would do anything to annul the decision").
132. Kern, supra note 100 (quoting incoming Prime Minister Netanyahu).
VOL. 43:2
2015 UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: CHRONICLE OF A DEATH FORETOLD? 185
any of the Israeli senior officials and military officers, who could then be detained
upon arrival in any E.U. member state.1
33
In April 2009, the Spanish prosecution requested that the Madrid Court
dismiss the investigation, due to the ongoing, parallel investigation in Israel.
134
Judge Andreau refused, declaring that Israel was not conducting a criminal
investigation and that Spanish law provided for simultaneous jurisdiction to
investigate "war crimes."' 35 The prosecution immediately appealed the decision to
the Spanish Court of Appeals, which decided to revoke the investigation due to
lack of universal jurisdiction over the matter in June.' 36 Backing the position of
the prosecution, the Court determined that a substantial, minimal link or national
interest was required in order to implement universal jurisdiction that was
otherwise incompatible with the fundamental principle of non-intervention in other
states' affairs.' 37 The court further concluded that Israel had jurisdictional priority
in this case and that a genuine investigation that was subject to a judicial review
was already underway.' 
38
D. Dji Vu...
During this time, in March 2009, just before the Spanish prosecution
requested that Judge Andreu halt his investigation, a group of human rights
lawyers filed a lawsuit with Judge Garz6n of the Audiencia, against six senior U.S.
Bush-administration officials, including the former U.S. Attorney General, Alberto
Gonzales.' 39 The complaint charged the so-called "Bush Six" with giving legal
cover for the torture of terror suspects at Guantanamo Bay.' 40 The case, which was
one of several legal actions taken against U.S. administration officials overseas but
the first to go to court thus far, exerted tremendous pressure on the Spanish
political and legal systems. 141 In conjunction with the lawsuit against the Israeli
officials, it threatened to turn Spain's national court into a "global court,"'
142
serving as a plaything for competing political interests. 14' Finding itself in the very
133. See id.
134. Rosenzweig & Shany, Spanish Court's Inquiry, supra note 128.
135. Id.
136. Ido Rosenzweig & Yuval Shany, Update on Universal Jurisdiction: Spanish Court ofAppeals
Decides to Close the Inquiry into the Targeted Killing of Salah Shehadeh, TERRORISM AND
DEMOCRACY NEWSLETTER, no. 8, July 2009 [hereinafter Rosenzweig & Shany, Spanish Court Closes
Inquiry].
137. Id.
138. See id. (reviewing the minority opinion).
139. See Paul Haven, Spain: No Torture Probe of US Officials, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 17,
2009),
http://www.realclearworld.com/news/ap/intemationaU2009/Apr/17/spain no torture probe of us off
icials.html. Another judge of the Audiencia was already investigating whether secret CIA flights to or
from Guantanamo entered Spanish airspace or landed at Spanish airports.
140. Id.
141. Gordon, supra note 109.
142. Id.
143. See Haven, supra note 139 (using the words of Candido Conde-Pumpido, Spain's top law-
enforcement official).
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awkward position of the Belgian authorities just a few years earlier and risking its
role as a player on the international stage, 144 the Spanish government proposed new
legislation in May 2009, intended to limit the law on universal jurisdiction.' 45
Despite all of the above, the PCHR had yet to give in, zealously deciding to
appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Spanish Supreme Court. 46
Backed by INGOs, such as Human Rights Watch, that were witnessing the
beginning of the fall of Madrid as the capital of global justice, 147 in the beginning
of 2010, the PCHR published a report entitled The Principle and Practice of
Universal Jurisdiction.148  This report outlined the "inadequacies of the Israeli
judicial system" that "does not meet necessary international standards with respect
to the effective administration of justice.' ' 149  It concluded that "universal
jurisdiction constitutes an essential, long established component of international
law" and "it does [not] represent an attempt to interfere with the legitimate affairs
of the State; it is enacted as a last resort" and "is the only available legal
mechanism capable of ensuring Palestinian victims right to an effective judicial
remedy. In the broader context, universal jurisdiction is also an essential tool in
the fight against impunity. . . . [It] is a stepping stone on the road to universal
justice."' 0 However, the PCHR's argument did not convince the Spanish Supreme
Court, and in April 2010 the Spanish Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals to dismiss Judge Andreu's investigation. '5' A further appeal to
the Constitutional Court, although possible, was useless, particularly in view of the
Spanish parliament passing a bill in November 2009, presenting far-reaching
amendments to Spain's law that practically barred private litigants wishing to file
politically sensitive lawsuits.' 52
The Spanish saga was instrumental-evidently more than the Belgian one-in
demonstrating the high risks and costs involved in allowing individual magistrates
144. Gordon, supra note 109.
145. Rosenzweig & Shany, Spanish Court's Inquiry, supra note 128; WAR CRIMES IN GAZA, supra
note 49 at 50.
146. Rosenzweig & Shany, Spanish Court Closes Inquiry, supra note 136.
147. Gordon, supra note 109.
148. Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, supra note 114.
149. Id. at 8.
150. Id. at 9- 10. See also Langer, supra note 1, at 4.
151. See Tribunal Supremo Sala de lo Penal, AUTO 550/2010 (Mar. 4, 2010),
http://estaticos.elmundo.es/documentos/2010/04/13/auto-gaza.pdf; Ido Rosenzweig & Yuval Shany,
Update on Universal Jurisdiction: Spanish Supreme Court Affirms Decision to Close Inquiry into
Targeted Killing of Salah Shehadeh in Gaza, TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY NEWSLETTER no. 17, Apr.
2010 [hereinafter Rosenzweig & Shany, Spanish Supreme Court Affirms Decision] (the Court pointed
out, inter alia, that the fact the appellants had initially filed their complaint before the Israeli courts
inferred that they accepted the genuineness of the Israeli proceedings).
152. The reform to the Spanish law included three non-cumulative requirements for the application
of universal jurisdiction: presence of the accused on Spanish territory; Spanish nationality of the
victims; or other relevant connection to Spain. See Carlos Esp6sito, Shrinking Universal Jurisdiction,
ESIL NEWSLETTER, Feb. 2010, at 2, available at http://www.esil-
sedi.eu/sites/default/files/ESIL_SEDINEWSLETTER Feb 2010.pdf.
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to selectively decide on the application of universal jurisdiction proceedings, 153
particularly in complex contexts such as the global fight against terrorism and
ongoing political and military conflicts. 154 The combination of activist judges,
hungry for publicity, with the lack of legal safety valves proved to offer a very
futile soil for the breeding of manipulative lawsuits by politically motivated
interest groups and individuals. The powerlessness of the executive to review or to
prevent malicious forum-shopping by alleged victims further emphasized the
responsibility of states to exercise procedural rigor in enforcing their laws as well
as the need to create appropriate mechanisms to resolve competing jurisdictional
claims.' 55 The next state to learn these lessons the hard way-that is, through
manipulation of its legal system and ensuing diplomatic pressures-was the United
Kingdom.
VI. THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
The law allowing universal jurisdiction proceedings to be initiated in the
United Kingdom was considerably narrower than the Belgian or the Spanish laws,
requiring the presence of the accused on British soil before proceedings could
effectively commence.' 56 In any case, under the system of "private prosecution,"
the law allowed any individual to initiate a criminal proceeding, even without
having any connection to the alleged offence, before a magistrate who could then
issue a summons or an arrest warrant to a visiting foreign official; all that was
required was mere prima facie evidence.'57 Practically, such arrangements could
hardly lead to actual court trials against Israeli officials within the United
Kingdom. 158 Nevertheless, pro-Palestinian groups realized the great potential of
manipulating the British legislation in an endeavor to disrupt the diplomatic
relations with Israel. Harassing Israeli officials and top generals thus became part
of the "well organized, well resourced and concerted attempt" that was "taking
place in Britain to demonize, criminalize, and delegitimize Israel in every area of
public life,"'159 and it was publicly supported by British politicians, 160 as well as by
judges.'6 '
153. Some commentators pointed out that the Audiencia judges had never sought to prosecute any
Hamas or Fatah terrorists, or crimes against humanity committed in Chechnya or Darfur, for example,
or any suspected Nazi war criminals who had sought refuge in Spain after WWII. See Kem, supra note
100.
154. See, e.g., Jouet, supra note 18, at 528, 531.
155. Id. at 513-14, 526, 531,535.
156. See Recent Legislation, supra note 46, at 1554-55; see generally Langer, supra note 1, at 15-
19.
157. Recent Legislation, supra note 46, at 1555.
158. WAR CRIMES IN GAZA, supra note 49, at 50; Prosor, supra note 46, at 36.
159. Prosor, supra note 46, at 36, 46.
160. WAR CRIMES IN GAZA, supra note 49, at 5-8.
161. Prosor, supra note 46, at 36.
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A. Challenging Customary International Law
In early 2004, an application for an arrest warrant against then Israeli Defense
Minister Shaul Mofaz was submitted to the Bow Street Magistrates' Court.162 The
application was based on a complaint initiated by the PCHR, on behalf of families
who had been affected by what was described as "'[t]he assassination policy of
Israel' or the 'Policy of Shooting with Impunity'," accusing Mofaz of committing
"grave breaches" of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 163 Mofaz was believed to be
visiting the United Kingdom at the time. 64 Clearly, the PCHR meant for the
complaint to challenge the decision of the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case, which
did not explicitly mention an incumbent Minister of Defense among the high-
ranking officials enjoying absolute state immunity under customary international
law. 165 Eventually, the magistrate concluded that Mofaz, as a Defense Minister,
was also entitled to immunity, based on an analogy to the position of Minister of
Foreign Affairs and the logic of the ICJ's decision. 166 Nevertheless, despite the
fact that he was therefore barred from reviewing the application, the District Judge,
C.L. Pratt, did not hesitate to indicate that "the extensive evidence" supplied to him
"could certainly amount to 'grave breaches."' 167 This was a clear signal that
applications against former officials would be welcomed by the British judiciary,
which led pro-Palestinian groups to compile extensive evidence files against top
Israeli generals and former leaders.' 
68
B. International Legal Ambush
In August 2005, the PCHR 169 handed over evidence to the Metropolitan
Police relating to alleged "grave breaches" of the Fourth Geneva Convention
supposedly committed by Major General Doron Almog, former General of the
Southern Command of the IDF.' 7°  Following an application to the Bow
Magistrates' Court, an arrest warrant against Almog was issued in September by a
Senior District Judge in relation to "The demolition of 59 houses in Rafah, Gaza
strip, on 10 January 2002." 171 Due to leaked information, Almog, who was
scheduled to speak at a synagogue in Birmingham on the day after the arrest
warrant was issued, did not disembark from the plane, but instead flew straight
back to Israel, escaping the police awaiting him at Heathrow airport. 72 Israeli
162. Application for Arrest Warrant against General Shaul Mofaz, supra note 32.
163. Id. at 1 1-2.
164. Id. at 111.
165. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant, supra note 7, at 11 51.
166. Applicationfor Arrest Warrant against General Shaul Mofaz, supra note 32, at 11[ 10-15.
167. Id. at 113.
168. Nicolaou Garcia, supra note 46.
169. Id. (in collaboration with Daniel Machover and Kate Maynard from Hickman and Rose
Solicitors (UK)).
170. Id.; Recent Legislation, supra note 46 at 1555.
171. Nicolaou Garcia, supra note 46; Langer, supra note 1, at 17.
172. Nicolaou Garcia, supra note 46. Ali Abunimah, Israeli War Crimes Suspect Cancels London
Visit, ELECTRONIC INTIFADA (July 2013), http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-abunimah/israeli-war-
crimes-suspect-cancels-london-visit (it was reported that Almog had decided to cancel another visit to
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generals, as well as top officials and politicians, were subsequently advised to
refrain from visiting the United Kingdom. 1
73
In December 2009, a British magistrate issued another arrest warrant against
former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni upon pro-Palestinian activist groups'
allegations that she had commissioned "war crimes" in Gaza. 7 4 Livni, then leader
of Israel's opposition, cancelled her planned visit to the United Kingdom.175 The
diplomatic rift between Israel and the United Kingdom was mounting, as Israel
retaliated by halting its routine, high-level "Strategic Dialogue" with the British
government 176 and by cancelling Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor's visit to
Britain. 177
C. Djhi Dejte Vu
Livini's near-arrest marked a turning-point in dealing with the abuse of
British proceedings,' 78 leading to intense political and academic debate,
domestically and abroad. Both Labour and Conservative leaders, having realized
the high costs of maintaining the system of "private prosecution" in universal
jurisdiction proceedings and fearing their further implementation by low-level
judges against U.S. and other foreign officials, vowed to change the law.' 79 U.K.
officials admitted that exploitation of the criminal procedure could "bring [the
U.K.] legal system into disrepute."' 80 The Legal Task Force of the Scholars for
the UK in June 2013, despite an assurance of immunity by British authorities, following an action by
PCHR lawyers challenging the decision of the U.K. government to grant Almog's visit the status of
"special mission" that in effect put Almog beyond the reach of the law). The PCHR challenged the
decision "given the fact that it was made by the UK government despite the existence of a warrant for
Almog's arrest on war crimes charges."
173. In September 2005, a complaint against Moshe Ya'alon and Dan Chalutz was filed in the U.K.
by the human rights group Yesh Gvul for their involvement in the Shehadeh targeted killing operation.
Ya'alon, who was invited to London in 2009, was advised to cancel his trip. Such was the case with
Minister of Defense Ehud Barak, and Minister of Public Security, Avi Dichter. Maj. Gen. Aviv
Kochavi, Military Intelligence Director, and Maj. Gen. Yohanan Locker, Military Secretary to the
Prime Minister, also canceled their visits to the U.K. See Chris McGreal, Israeli Ex-Military Chief
Cancels Trip to UK over Threat of War Crimes Arrest, GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2005, 6:56 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/sep/I 6/israelandthepalestinians.warcrimes.
174. See Recent Legislation, supra note 46, at 1555 n. 15.
175. /d. at n.16.
176. Id. at 1555-56.
177. Bennatan, supra note 41.
178. Reydams, supra note 9, at 26; Recent Legislation, supra note 46 at 1555.
179. See John Bellinger, Britain Amends Universal Jurisdiction Law, LAWFARE BLOG (Sep. 19,
2011), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/09/britain-amends-universal-jurisdiction-law/; Langer, supra
note I at 18-19. John Chapin, Universal Jurisdiction is Abused and Leads to International Friction, say
Legal Scholars, THE CUTTING EDGE NEWS, (Apr. 12, 2010),
http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article = 12101 (in March 2010, the British government
declared that "the Crown Prosecution Service will take over responsibility for prosecuting war crimes
and other violations of international law, ending the current system in which magistrates are obliged to
consider a case for an arrest warrant presented by any individual.").
180. See Recent Legislation, supra note 46, at 1555 (quoting House of Commons Fourth Sitting, 20
Jan. 2011, Parl. Deb., H.C. (2011) 126 (UK)).
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Peace in the Middle East also released a statement condemning the misuse of
universal jurisdiction in the United Kingdom and elsewhere "in light of recent
harassment of Israeli officials" and insisted upon reform. 181
On the other hand, extensive lobbying by pro-Palestinian advocacy groups
and politicians, 8 2 backed by various INGOs and human rights groups, such as the
London-based Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International
Federation for Human Rights, 183 prolonged the political debates surrounding the
passage of amendments to the law.
Nevertheless, in September 2011, the U.K. Parliament accepted the Police
Reform and Social Responsibility Act, requiring approval by the U.K. Director of
Public Prosecutions-the head of the U.K.'s Crown Prosecution Service-before a
British court could issue a privately-sought arrest warrant for universal jurisdiction
offences. 184  This practically meant that the issuance of a warrant required
consultation with the Attorney General-the chief legal advisor to the Crown-as
well as the Cabinet Ministers, for their views on "such an arrest and the impact that
that might have on the U.K.'s national interest. ' ' 85 With this reform, the United
Kingdom joined Belgium and Spain, both which, within less than a decade,
drastically changed the scope of their laws on universal jurisdiction. Evidently,
even the United Kingdom-a country that had not enacted too permissive a law in
the first place-still could not resist the abuse of its legal system by politically
interested groups, as well as the selectivity of interested judges.
VII. THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF MANIPULATION: LESSONS AND FUTURE
PROSPECTS
A. Universal Jurisdiction-A Simple Concept?
"Universal jurisdiction is a simple concept;' 8 6 it "constitutes an essential,
long established component of international law"18 7  so goes the message
181. Chapin, supra note 179.
182. See Bennatan, supra note 41; see also Oliver Miles, How International Law Affects the
Palestine 'Peace Process', THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2010, 6:59 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/201 0/nov/22/intemational-law-palestine-peace-process.
183. Universal Jurisdiction, LIBERAL DEMOCRAT FRIENDS OF PALESTINE (Feb. 16 2011),
http://ldfp.eu/universal-jurisdiction/. These organizations, as well as Liberty, Redress, Global Witness,
and Justice (the British section of the International Commission of Jurists) issued a joint brief on
Universal Jurisdiction in the U.K., expressing their grave concern that "any changes to existing law...
will undermine the capacity of victims of serious international crimes to hold accountable alleged
perpetrators ... by making all arrest decisions in such cases subject to political considerations rather
than being based on the legal merits." See also Richard Irvine, UK Rewrites War Crimes Law at
Israel's Request, ELECTRONIC INTIFADA, (Oct. 1, 2011), http://electronicintifada.net/content/uk-
rewrites-war-crimes-law-ismels-request/10446.
184. Recent Legislation, supra note 46, at 1554. (thus separating universal jurisdiction proceedings
from the arrest warrant procedures for domestic crime).
185. Id. at 1557. See also Principle of 'Universal Jurisdiction' Again Divides Assembly's Legal
Committee; Further Guidance Sought from International Law Commission, supra note 20 (statement of
Douglas Wilson, U.K.).
186. Irvine, supra note 183.
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delivered by the PCHR, echoing some prominent INGOs. S8 Nothing is more
remote from the truth,'8 9 as a quick look into the discussions on universal
jurisdiction, which were held at the U.N. Sixth Committee (Legal) within the last
few years, demonstrates. Across the board, delegates note "the divergent views
and practices, the evolving nature of the principle, and new substance being given
to it," and the need for a "cautious approach [to] be taken" in dealing with the
complex issues involved.190 They warn that the "limitless application" of universal
jurisdiction might lead to "conflicts of jurisdiction between States, to subjecting
individuals to procedural abuses, or to politically motivated judicial
prosecutions."' t9' They call for an "unbiased application" of the principle in order
to "prevent its selective application or exploitation . . . for settling political
scores"'192 and note the need for "[f]urther clarification and consensus-building" to
"strengthen the application of universal jurisdiction" and "give legitimacy and
credibility to its usage. ' 193  Paradoxically, it has been the particularly extensive
activity of pro-Palestinian interest groups that has exposed just how complex and
unsettled the principle of universal jurisdiction is; this activity has been highly
instrumental in demonstrating to all and sundry within the international
community-legislators, politicians, judges and the general public-the dangers of
its unrestrained application, as well as the lack of consensus surrounding its
implementation.
187. Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, supra note 114, at 9.
188. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FIDH POSITION PAPER TO THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS 64TH SESSION 10 (2009), available at
http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/FIDH PositionPaper to the GA -_64.pdf (claiming that universal
jurisdiction is 'firmly enshrined in international treaty and customary law") (emphasis added); see also
Reydams, supra note 9, at 28; Basic Facts on Universal Jurisdiction, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 19,
2009), http://www.hrw.org/print/news/2009/10/19/basic-facts-universal-jurisdiction ("[T]he vast
majority of states recognize the validity of the concept of universal jurisdiction, as they are parties to
conventions that provide for it.") (emphasis added); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION: STRENGTHENING THIS ESSENTIAL TOOL OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 8 (Oct. 2012)
(Amnesty International calls upon states to "uphold their commitment to universal jurisdiction, a long-
established rule of international law, and reaffirm the duty of every state to exercise its jurisdiction over
crimes under international law ... regardless where they have been committed and the nationality of
the suspects and victims.") (emphasis added).
189. See Reydams, supra note 9, at 10-24.
190. Meetings Coverage, General Assembly, Delegations Urge Clear Rules to Avoid Abuse of
Universal Jurisdiction Principle, U.N. Doc. GA/L/3441 (Oct. 17, 2012) (statement of Anniken Enersen,
Norway); see also Principle of 'Universal Jurisdiction' Again Divides Assembly's Legal Committee;
Further Guidance Sought from International Law Commission, supra note 20 (statements by
representatives of Brazil, Tunisia, and the U.S.) (noting the "ambiguity surrounding the concept");
Legal Committee is Told 'Principle of Universal Jurisdiction' Needs to be Refined, to Avoid Possible
Abuses, Politicization, U.N. Doc. GA1JU3372 (Oct. 21, 2009) (statement of Hossein Sadat Meidani,
Iran).
191. Delegations Urge Clear Rules to Avoid Abuse of Universal Jurisdiction Principle, supra note
190 (statement of Femanda Millicay, Argentina).
192. Id. (statement of Grace Eyoma, Nigeria).
193. Id.
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B. The High Price of Manipulation
Within a very short period of time, the three leading states that had adopted
different modules of laws which allowed their courts to establish universal
jurisdiction proceedings had to amend their legislation. Due to political
manipulation, mostly against Israel, and later against the United States, all three
came to realize that such proceedings could be a double-edged sword. 94 They
consequently limited the scope of their laws in a way that either altogether barred
foreign individuals and groups from bringing lawsuits which bore no link to the
forum state or provided for substantial executive scrutiny of judicial decision-
making. Unfortunately, some of these far-reaching amendments might eventually
undermine the original notion of universal jurisdiction and thereby defy the
interests of international justice by preventing the application of the principle, even
in appropriate cases of exceptional character, where the prosecution of
international crimes and mass atrocities is truly warranted and justified. 195  In
particular, the requirement of a certain link to the forum state-that is, beyond the
mere presence of the accused-seems to be irrelevant to the original concept of
universal jurisdiction, thus undermining its fundamental idea of prosecution on the
basis of the universally acknowledged heinousness of the criminal conduct.
Manipulation of universal jurisdiction has thus created a backlash against
human rights organizations and activists, which provided broad, unqualified
support to pro-Palestinian groups' abuse of proceedings in their "lawfare"
campaigns against Israel.196 In the words of Reydams, such activity thus showed,
"[U]niversal jurisdiction was anything but universal in practice. As an almost
exclusively European affair [it] represented a curious mixture of mission
civilisatrice and resistance against United States Hegemony and Israeli
exceptionalism.' 197 Supporting-or downright manufacturing-headline-making
"virtual cases"' 98 against former senior officials, rather than strengthening
international criminal law, made a mockery of it.' 99 Instead of promoting a
transnational worldview and upholding global victimhood principles, it facilitated
the introduction of state-centric mechanisms and domestically-centered valuation
of international claims.2 00  West-European "universal jurisdiction campaigns"
should therefore serve as a resounding lesson for groups seeking either to promote
one-sided political agendas and gain publicity under the guise of promotion of
194. See, e.g., Bennatan, supra note 41.
195. See, e.g., Esp6sito, supra note 152.
196. See Basic Facts on Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 188 (some leading INGOs still insist
that there is no abuse and manipulation of the doctrine in the case of Israel).
197. Reydams, supra note 9, at 27. Cf Langer, supra note 1, at 46 (suggesting that although
"politics necessarily plays a role in universal jurisdiction ... universal jurisdiction criminal proceedings
... have tended to be true adjudicatory processes").
198. Reydams, supra note 9, at 24. A term coined by Reydams to describe headline-making NGO-
driven cases against a host of (former) senior officials, which, with the exception of Pinochet,
"produced little more than headlines and diplomatic headaches (and fame for a Spanish judge)."
199. Id. at 28.
200. Recent Legislation, supra note 46, at 1557.
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human-rights and a global rule of law or to push too hard towards the "end of
nationhood" by undermining the sovereignty of certain states.
2 0 1
C. Unsettled Doctrine
In 2001, in their Joint Separate Opinion in the Arrest Warrant case, 20 2 ICI
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal presented a very supportive position
regarding the evolving right of national jurisdictions to exercise universal
jurisdiction in absentia. In their opinion-probably the most powerful formal
statement in favor of universal jurisdiction coming from prominent international
lawyers-the Judges in fact suggested that, according to contemporary customary
international law, a state may choose to assert jurisdiction over particular offences
committed elsewhere by persons having no relationship or connection with that
state.20 3
This observation, stated in the course of reviewing the legality of the Belgian
law before it was amended, was remarkable in view of the fact that-as the Judges
noted-there was no established practice at the time, in which states exercised
universal jurisdiction.20 4 The Judges thus admitted that "virtually all national
legislation envisaged links of some sort to the forum State" and that "no case law
exist[ed] in which pure universal jurisdiction had formed the basis of
jurisdiction."20 5 This, however, did not necessarily indicate, in the eyes of the
Judges, that such an exercise would be unlawful, since "a State is not required to
legislate up to the full scope of the jurisdiction allowed by international law." 206
Further relying on "contemporary trends, reflecting international relations as
they stand at the beginning of the new century, ' 2 °7 the Judges jointly determined
that:
[W]hile none of the national case law to which we have referred happens to be
based on the exercise of a universal jurisdiction properly so called, there is equally
nothing in this case law which evidences an opiniojuris on the illegality of such a
jurisdiction. In short, national legislation and case law-that is, State practice-is
neutral as to exercise of universal jurisdiction. 20
8
In view of the developments that followed, such an assertion would be
impossible to sustain today. It would amount to a proposition that customary law-
201. See, e.g., Kern, supra note 100; see also Mallat, supra note 44, at 189-90 (who framed his
petition in Belgium in the context of the fight for a so-called Kantian "cosmopolitan justice" in the face
of economic forces that "wreak havoc with peoples' lives.").
202. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant, supra note 7, at 63 (joint separate opinion of Judges
Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal).
203. Id. at 80, 59.
204. Id. at 76, 45.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 76, 47. According to the Judges, "contemporary trends" outline a "movement towards
bases of jurisdiction other than territoriality."
208. Id. 45.
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or in the words of the Judges, "the full scope of jurisdiction allowed by
international law"-develops in complete detachment from evolving state practice.
Furthermore, the fact that the main-and only-jurisdictions that allowed for the
exercise of universal jurisdiction "in its pure form," or close to that, later revised
their legislation to require a certain link to the forum state is a clear indication
regarding the evolving opiniojuris on the matter. It thus became clear that state
practice is no longer neutral regarding the possibility of exercising universal
jurisdiction in absentia, without even some connection to the forum state. This has
now become obvious not only as a matter of legal doctrine, but also as a matter of
political reality, in a way that indicates an evident change in "contemporary trends
reflecting international relations."
20 9
It is also important to note that even Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and
Buergenthal required certain safeguards that were essential in their view to prevent
abuse of universal jurisdiction-based proceedings. These included the protection
of international immunities, as well as giving the national state of the prospective
accused the first opportunity to act upon the charges concerned.2" ° More
significantly, the Judges determined that "such charges may only be laid by a
prosecutor orjuge d'instruction who acts in full independence," without links to or
control by the government of the forum state. 2 1 Reality, however, proved that
reliance on the independence of the judiciary-although logical as a matter of legal
theory-was one of the main causes for manipulation and abuse of universal
jurisdiction. This led most national legislators to require the strict review and
approval by relevant government or prosecution officials as a pre-condition for the
exercise ofjurisdiction by national authorities.
Altogether, it is obvious today that, although the general concept of universal
jurisdiction is generally recognized under international customary law, its meaning
and application cannot be left to evolve customarily. Rather, it requires an explicit,
meticulous determination within a comprehensive international effort, most likely
in the form of a draft international treaty that would, first and foremost, settle in
detail the issue of jurisdictional priorities that have proved to be highly sensitive
and delicate. This would most likely impact other controversial matters that
remain largely unresolved, such as the authority to exercise jurisdiction-or even
to initiate a criminal investigation-in absentia, as well as the scope of sovereign
immunity that restricts national proceedings. Such an international instrument may
also provide some guidance regarding the level of national authority-whether
judicial, political, or both-that should be vested with the discretion to decide on
national proceedings.21 2  Evidently, despite what was advocated by certain
209. See text accompanying supra note 207.
210. Id. at 80, 11 59-60 (they also considered it necessary that universal criminal jurisdiction be
exercised only over those crimes regarded as the most heinous by the international community).
211. 1d. 159.
212. See, e.g., Langer, supra note 1, at 46-47 (considering the issue of the desirable level of
prosecutorial discretion and control by the executive branch over prosecutors to be critical; it is
particularly crucial in view of the fact that "selectivity is such a structural feature of universal
jurisdiction.").
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publicists, 2 13 decisions regarding these and related issues, that bear a tremendous
impact on inter-state relations, cannot be left to national legislators to make.
D. Asymmetric Application and Political Agendas
Most of the complaints brought against Israeli (and United States) senior
officials were intentionally framed in the context of, and as a means for
undermining, the fight against terrorism. They consequently exposed the
normative paradoxes involved in the asymmetric application of international
criminal arrangements. The fact that universal jurisdiction typically deals with so-
called "crimes of state" and the liability of state officials, 21 4 not with offences
committed by non-state actors and terrorists, still presents a significant challenge
that shadows the lofty goals underlying the doctrine. This is all the more true in a
world where the fight against the malignant phenomenon of global terrorism is not
shared evenly by states, and where there is still no broadly accepted definition-let
alone political consensus-regarding terrorist activity.215  It also raises deep
213. See, e.g., SHAW, supra note 11, at 672 (regarding the requirement of the presence of the
accused in the forum state). Since in the case of universal jurisdiction, the national authority to initiate
proceedings derives from international law, all issues that bear a direct impact on the extent of such
authority-and therefore on the rights of the defendant-must be settled and determined under
international law, and cannot be left to the discretion of the national authorities (unless mitigating
factors are concerned). See, e.g., Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the
Ntirnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal with Commentaries, Rep. of the Int'l L.
Comm'n, 2nd Sess., Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, 1950, Vol. 11, at 374-75, [ 99, 102, 104, 106.
214. Much like the ICC in this regard. Paradoxically, as Schabas notes, one of the strongest
arguments for excluding crimes such as terrorism from the jurisdiction of the ICC is that they "do not
suffer from a problem of impunity in a manner similar to that of other categories," such as genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression, being typically "state crimes," perpetrated by
governments themselves or with their complicity, and therefore went unpunished. SCHABAS, supra
note 15, at 98. Universal jurisdiction, on the other hand, was originally predicted on the ground that
certain crimes (such as piracy, slave-trade and traffic in children and women) were often committed by
non-state actors and in terra nullius, where no state could exercise territorial jurisdiction. Id. at 64.
215. See BRYNJAR LIA, GLOBALIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM: PATTERNS AND
PREDICTIONS 9-15 (2005). Lia acknowledges that terrorism has long been a controversial term and that,
although "there has been a considerable resurgence in terrorism studies during the 1990s, and especially
after 9/11," as well as a growing consensus in academia on the definitional issue, "[s]till basic
conceptual and methodological questions remain unresolved" and no generally accepted definition of
terrorism exists. Id. at 10-11. He further acknowledges the "strong tendency to label anti-Western and
anti-Israeli violence, including attacks on military targets, as terrorism." Id. at 11. According to Lia,
the most widely used definition of terrorism is the one used by the U.S. Department of State in its
annual report, Patterns of Global Terrorism, where terrorism is defined as "premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine
agents, usually intended to influence an audience." Id. at 11 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS
OF GLOBAL TERRORISM xii (2003)). He also notes that, "[g]iven the definitional and conceptual
problems of studying terrorism generically, one has argued that it is better to use a political definition of
terrorism, namely illegal violent activities practiced by groups listed as outlawed terrorist organizations
by the USA and more recently by the European Union." Id. at 14. Schabas notes that, proposals at the
Rome Conference to include terrorism as a category of international crimes under the jurisdiction of the
ICC did not meet with sufficient consensus. SCHABAS, supra note 15, at 96. He foresees that, since it
becomes increasingly evident that the ICC will only be able to deal with a very limited number of cases,
it is "entirely unrealistic to think that new criminal law paradigms, such as ... terrorism could be added
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concerns regarding the future application of universal jurisdiction in the context of
other controversial "state crimes," such as that of aggression.
216
Furthermore, in this regard, some commentators wanted to use universal
jurisdiction-based petitions against Israeli officials abroad as an incentive for the
conduct of "genuine and effective" domestic legal proceedings that would
allegedly defend officials from foreign claims. 217 There is surely no doubt that
prompt, objective, and effective domestic proceedings and investigations into
alleged violations of human rights and humanitarian law are of crucial importance,
a national interest indeed. Nevertheless, if anything, the short but highly dense
history of proceedings against Israelis abroad suggests that domestic proceedings
are not an effective barrier against the abuse of foreign proceedings. 21 8  Once
lawsuits abroad are motivated, first and foremost, by political and propaganda
considerations, anything less than maximal prosecution will always leave room for
the argument that domestic proceedings are conducted "unwillingly" and
"ineffectively," or designed to get the defendant "off." In this way, as Kontorovich
observed, "while a prosecution" by the home state "cannot be undone by others,
decisions to not prosecute can be nullified by other states' decisions to prosecute,"
and extra-judicial settlements can easily be ignored.21 9 Consequently, a state
showing the slightest sign of being inclined to conduct domestic proceedings due
to fear of foreign lawsuits will most probably be inviting even more complaints
from abroad, risking foreign scrutiny of, and even possible intervention in the
conduct of domestic proceedings. 220 Such a development is particularly dangerous
in the context of the fight against terrorism, due to the "limited appreciation of the
unique dilemmas posed by terrorism and counter-terrorism.'
221
E. Controversial Involvement of INGOs and Interest Groups
The conduct of "universal jurisdiction campaigns" against Israelis abroad also
demonstrates the potential risks involved in the participation of certain INGOs and
interest groups in the conduct of future domestic proceedings and investigations.
to the jurisdiction." Id. at 97. Schabas further acknowledges that the problem with a distinct crime of
terrorism lies in definition, explaining that "[tierrorism seems to have more to do with motive than with
either the mental or physical elements of a crime, and this is something that is not generally part of the
definitions of offences." Id. Some argue that terrorist acts may fall within the scope of crimes against
humanity or even war crimes, but there is no consensus on this point. Id, at 15.; See also CASSESE,
supra note 11, at 162-64, 171-77.
216. See generally Michael P. Scharf, Universal Jurisdiction and the Crime of Aggression, 53
HARV. INT'L L.J. 357 (2012).
217. Rosenzweig & Shany, Spanish Supreme Court Affirms Decision, supra note 151.
218. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Against Universal Jurisdiction, I J. OF INT'L CRIM. JUST. 580,
582-83 (2003).
219. Kontorovich, supra note 34, at 404 (on the problematic application of the principle of non bis
in idem ("double jeopardy") in the context of universal jurisdiction).
220. This is all the more so today, once there is no international agreement on the complex issue of
competing proceedings, and probably until a comprehensive multilateral treaty on universal jurisdiction
is concluded. See, e.g., Esposito, supra note 152; REYDAMS, supra note 18, at 16.
221. See Rosenzweig & Shany, Spanish Court's Inquiry, supra note 107.
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Undoubtedly, these actors benefitted greatly from their intense involvement in
universal jurisdiction high-profile, politically controversial cases, gaining
publicity, funds and membership. 2  Today, when most of the relevant countries
have effectively closed their doors before foreign private litigants,223 the
motivation of interest groups to find and apply alternative channels of prosecution,
such as the ICC and home-state domestic legislation, is probably high. This means
that any consideration of new domestic investigation and prosecution proceedings
will certainly require serious evaluation of the proper procedural mechanisms and
legal safety valves required to ensure that such proceedings are not easily abused
and manipulated. Such an endeavor will probably require consideration of
complementary legislation regarding, inter alia, interest groups' sources of funding
and support for terrorism. At the same time, international judicial institutions,
such as the ICC, should be highly aware of not letting themselves be manipulated




Despite the enduring controversy regarding its content, limits, and modus
operandi, universal jurisdiction is an important concept and is here to stay. It
could-and should-evolve into a cornerstone of the multilateral endeavor to end
impunity and to bring justice to victims of the most atrocious of crimes. It is
therefore all the more unfortunate that "lawfare" in the form of universal
jurisdiction campaigns has set back the cause of international global justice in this
regard. Indeed, some commentators argue that universal jurisdiction had become a
mere "self-feeding hype generated by NGOs, activist lawyers and judges,
academic conferences and papers, and mass-media." 22 5  This may go too far.
Nevertheless, it is a powerful reaction in the face of the unbearable lightness of
political manipulation. If universal jurisdiction is to be meaningful in the future,
the lessons regarding the ease with which international law can be exploited and
222. See Byers, supra note 3, at 439-40.
223. Still, the amended Belgian law, for example, can be easily abused by litigants who are Belgian
nationals or residents, although this is not considered anymore a universal jurisdiction case due to the
link of the alleged victims to Belgium. Such was the case with the two Belgian activists who were
reported to file a war crimes complaint over the "flytilla" incident, against Prime Minister Binyamin
Netanyahu, former Minister of Interior, Eli Yishai, former Minister of Defense, Ehud Barak, and former
Chief-of-Staff, Gabi Ashkenazi, in January 2012. See Ali Abunimah, Two Belgians File War Crimes
Complaint against Israeli Leaders over 'Flytilla' Abuse, ELECTRONIC INTIFADA (Jan. 18, 2012, 1:57
PM), http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-abunimah/two-belgians-file-war-crimes-complaint-against-
israeli-leaders-over-flytilla-abuse/.
224. See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, Israel/Palestine-the ICC's Uncharted Territory, I1 J. OF
INT'L CRIM. JUST, 979 (2013); David Kaye, Who's Afraid of the International Criminal Court? Finding
the Prosecutor Who Can Set it Straight, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May/Jun. 2011,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67768/david-kaye/whos-afraid-of-the-international-criminal-
court.
225. Reydams, supra note 9, at 27. See also Langer, supra note 1, at 5.
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diverted from its true objectives, turning it into an "international lynch-law, '227
must resound.
226. See, e.g, Hirsch & Kumps, supra note 40, at 24.
227. Jouet, supra note 18, at 537 (quoting the former British Prime Minister, the late Margaret
Thatcher); see also Kissinger, supra note 2.
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Is THERE A PLACE FOR US?: PROTECTING FAN FICTION IN THE
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
Samantha S. Peaslee*
I. INTRODUCTION
Susan sits down at her computer, a stack of her favorite books next to her, and
begins to write. Dumbledore' and Gandalf2 are sitting calmly in the Leaky
Cauldron, 3 wondering about the mysterious stranger that called them there. As
they wait, Captain Kirk,4 Professor X, 5 and George Clooney 6 join them at the table,
. Samantha Peaslee is a J.D. Candidate at the University of Denver's Sturm College of Law and M.A. in
International Studies Candidate at the University of Denver's Josef Korbel School of International
Studies. She would like to thank Professor Alan Blakley, Alex Jennings, Cheyenne Moore, and Alicia
Guber for their editorial assistance and Professor K.K. DuVivier for her support and mentoring. She
would also like to thank Andy, her friends, and her family for putting up with her prattling about fan
fiction as well as for helping her "research."
1. Dumbledore is a character in J.K. Rowling's Harry Potter series. This series is the most
popular to turn into fan fiction on Fanfiction.net, with 676,000 stories. Books Harry Potter,
FANFICTION.NET, https://www.fanfiction.net/book/Hany-Potter/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2014).
2. Gandalf is a character created by J.R.R. Tolkien. He appears in the Lord of the Rings series
and the Hobbit. These two have a combined 57,200 fan fictions on Fanfiction.net. Books Lord of the
Rings, FANFICTIONNET, https://www.fanfiction.net/book/Lord-of-the-Rings/ (last visited Nov. 8,
2014); Books Hobbit, FANFICTION.NET, https;//www.fanfiction.net/book/Hobbit/ (last visited Nov. 8,
2014).
3. The Leaky Cauldron is a pub in J.K. Rowling's Harry Potter series.
4. Captain Kirk is a character in the Star Trek series. He appears in both new Star Trek films, as
well as many of the series. The Star Trek universe has a combined 56,200 fan fictions on
Fanfiction.net. Movies Star Trek: 2009, FANFiCTION.NET, https://www.fanfiction.net/movie/Star-Trek-
2009/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2014); TV Shows StarTrek: Deep Space Nine, FANFICTIONNET,
https://www.fanfiction.net/tv/StarTrek-Deep-Space-Nine/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2014); TV Shows
StarTrek: Enterprise, FANFICTION.NET, https://www.fanfiction.net/tv/StarTrek-Enterprise/ (last visited
Nov. 8, 2014); TV Shows StarTrek: Other, FANFiCTIONNET, https://www.fanfiction.net/tv/StarTrek-
Other/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2014); TV Shows StarTrek: The Next Generation, FANFICTION.NET,
https://www.fanfiction.net/tv/StarTrek-The-Next-Generation/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2014); TV Shows
StarTrek: The Original Series, FANIFICTIONNET, https://www.fanfiction.net/tv/StarTrek-The-Original-
Series/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2014); TV Shows StarTrek: Voyager, FANFICTION.NET,
https://www. fanfiction.net/tv/StarTrek-Voyager/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2014).
5. Professor X is a character in Marvel's X-Men series. X-Men has a total of 27,800 fan fictions
between the comics and the movies on Fanfiction.net. Comics X-Men, FANFICTION.NET,
https://www.fanfiction.net/comic/X-men/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2014); Movies X-Men: The Movie,
FANFICTIONNET, https://www.fanfiction/net/movie/X-Men-The-Movie/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2014);
Movies X-Men, FANFICTIONNET, https://www.fanfiction.net/movie/x-men (last visited Nov. 8, 2014).
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all with the same mysterious note, calling them together to ask them for help.
Suddenly, a tall, beautiful woman walks into the Leaky Cauldron with a more
normal-looking girl next to her, looking distraught. The beautiful woman
introduces herself as Mary Sue, and then announces dramatically that she and her
friend need the help of these men to save the world.
Hypothetical Susan is one of thousands of fans who write fan fiction.
Although fan fiction is not a new phenomenon,7 the Internet has made writing and
reading fan fiction more accessible and popular. 8 Now, certain databases are
devoted exclusively to fan-written works that reimagine books, movies, television
shows, comics, and even real people.
9
With the overwhelming number of fan fiction written and posted on the
Internet, the owners of the original works cannot help but take notice. With the
rise of Internet fan fiction came the simultaneous rise of cease and desist letters to
fans and website operators.10 A small minority of owners, such as Anne Rice,
6. George Clooney is an actor, director, and producer. He is the subject of 17 stories on
Fanfiction.net. Story George Clooney, FANFICTION.NET,
https://www.fanfiction.net/search.php?keywords=george+clooney&ready=I&type=story (last visited
Nov. 8, 2014).
7. Wide Sargasso Sea was a 1966 novel that retold Jane Eyre from the viewpoint of Rochester's
mad wife Bertha. See Wide Sargasso Sea (Penguin Modern Classics), AMAZON.CO.UK,
http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/product/0141182857/ref-as li ss tl?ie UTF8&camp-I 634&creative= 19
450&creativeASIN 0141182857&linkCode as2&tag-thesolipsocia-21 (last visited Sept. 21, 2014)
(describing Wide Sargasso Sea as Jean Rhys's "grand attempt to tell what she felt was the story of Jane
Eyre's 'madwoman in the attic,' Bertha Rochester"). Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead is a play
based on Shakespeare's Hamlet from the viewpoint of two minor characters. See Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern are Dead, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/Rosencrantz-Guildenstem-Are-Dead-
Stoppard/dp/0802132758/refr'srll ?ie=UTF8&qid 1411357706&sr-8-
1&keywords-rosencrantz+and+guildenstem+are+dead (last visited Sept. 21, 2014) (describing
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead as "the fabulously inventive tale of Hamlet as told from the
worm's-eye view of the bewildered Rosencrantz and Guildenstem, two minor characters in
Shakespeare's play"). Star Trek fanzines were common throughout the 1990s, providing a place for
Trekkies to disseminate their fan fiction. See FanZines: Introduction, STAR TREK FANZINES,
http://www.sttos.net/sttos/eng/zines.php (last visited Sept. 21, 2014). See also Michelle Chatelain,
Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Copyright Law: Fan Fiction, Derivative Works, and the Fair Use
Doctrine, 15 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 199, 199-200 (2012); Meredith McCardle, Fan Fiction,
Fandom, and Fanfare: What's all the Fuss?, 9 B.U. J. SCi. & TECH. L. 433, 441 (2003).
8. Chatelain, supra note 7, at 200; Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Everyone's a
Superhero: A Cultural Theory of 'Mary Sue' Fanfiction as Fair Use, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 597, 600 (2007);
Ernest Chua, Fan Fiction and Copyright: Mutually Exclusive, Coexistable or Something Else?
Considering Fan Fiction in Relation to the Economic/Utilitarian Theory of Copyright, 14 MURDOCH U.
E LAW J. 215, 215 (2007).
9. Chatelain, supra note 7, at 200 (providing the example of Fanfiction as one of the databases).
See FANFICTION, http://www.fanfiction.net (last visited May 12, 2014) (linking to millions of fan
fiction stories in nine categories). See generally, HARRY POTTER FANFICTION,
www.harrypotterfanfiction.com (last visited May. 12, 2014) (providing fan fiction that is exclusively
for Harry Potter fan fiction and contains over 80,000 stories); ONE DIRECTION FANFICTION,
http://onedirectionfanfiction.com (last visited May 12, 2014) (providing a site devoted to fan fiction
about the pop band One Direction; it contains over 48,000 stories).
10. McCardle, supra note 7, at 441.
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expressly forbids fiction based on their works, going to the extent of sending
regular cease-and-desist letters to the managers of fan fiction databases as well as
authors." Overall, these cease and desist letters do not seem to curb the increased
popularity of fan fiction, nor have they led to any court cases.12 Some owners
choose to forbid only select fan fiction, such as homosexual depictions of
heterosexual characters, commercial fan fiction, or fan fiction that strictly copies
large portions of works.' 3 Other owners of original works have either explicitly or
implicitly approved fan fiction.'4  J.K. Rowling, for example, has generally
tolerated non-commercial and web-based fan fiction based on her characters.
15
Paramount, which owns the Star Trek franchise, ultimately decided not to pursue
legal action against fan-writers, even when it does not approve of the fan fiction.' 
6
Owners of original novels, television stories, or movies ("rights owners" or
"owners") are adamant against fan fiction because it is almost certainly a violation
of an owner's intellectual property rights. However, Internet fan fiction raises
unique issues for these owners. Despite most intellectual property rights being
territorially bound, activities on the Internet generally are not. When the original
work is from one country, the fan-writer in another, and the fan fiction is on the
Internet, it creates a unique conundrum for both the rights owners and the fan-
writers in attempting to determine the legality of the fan-writers' actions and each
party's respective rights. This difference is made especially poignant when the
countries involved are civil and common law nations.'
7
This paper will take the hypothetical case from the first paragraph of this
paper and attempt to determine what would happen if any of the rights owners sued
Susan under either U.S. or Japanese intellectual property law. As the two countries
11. Chander & Sunder, supra note 8, at 618; Chatelain, supra note 7, at 201. Anne Rice's site
includes an "important message" on fan fiction: "I do not allow fan fiction. The characters are
copyrighted. It upsets me terribly to even think about fan fiction with my characters. I advise my
readers to write your own original stories with your own characters. It is absolutely essential that you
respect my wishes." Anne's Messages to Fans, ANNERICE.cOM, http://annerice.com/ReaderInteraction-
MessagesToFans.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2014).
12. Chander & Sunder, supra note 8, at 618; Chatelain, supra note 9, at 201.
13. Tiffany Lee, Fan Activities from P2P File Sharing to Fansubs and Fan Fiction: Motivations,
Policy Concerns and Recommendations, 14 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 181, 183, 185 (2013)
(providing the example that Paramount does not allow strict copying of its works). See also Paramount
Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ'g. Grp.,Il F. Supp. 2d 329, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). See also McCardle,
supra note 7, at 441 (explaining Lucasfilms is well known for having sent a cease-and-desist letter to a
fanzine that published pornographic fan fiction of Star Wars.).
14. McCardle, supra note 7, at 449-50; Lee, supra note 13, at 184.
15. Chander & Sunder, supra note 8, at 611; Darren Waters, Rowling Backs Potter Fan Fiction,
BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/3753001.stm (last updated May 27, 2004, 12:11
PM).
16. Chander & Sunder, supra note 8, at 611. The first clash between fan fiction authors and
copyright owners occurred in June 1977 when Paramount sent a cease and desist letter to a Star Trek
fanzine, but then dropped the case when it learned the fanzine was not a professional publication.
McCardle, supra note 7, at 441.
17. Robert C. Bird & Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Moral Rights in the United States and the
United Kingdom: Challenges and Opportunities under the U.K. 's New Performances Regulations, 24
B.U. INT'L L.J. 213, 213 (2006).
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that are arguably the largest producers of fan fiction, 18 as well as two examples of
different cultural and legal mentalities in regards to intellectual property,
examining the reactions of these two states may have very real impacts on fans and
rights owners in the future.
Part II will define types of fan fiction before Part III discusses the choice of
law analysis in which rights owners must engage before determining whether to
apply U.S. or Japanese intellectual property law. The next three sections will go
through the intellectual property laws in both the United States and Japan as they
apply to potential issues raised by fan fiction: Part IV will discuss copyright law,
Part V will discuss trademark law, and Part VI will discuss moral rights. The
conclusion will suggest the best ways for each country to legally address fan
fiction.
II. WHAT IS FAN FICTION?
Fan fiction cannot be considered one cohesive category. Meredith McCardle
points out that "the various forms fan fiction can take are wildly different and do
not lend themselves to orderly classification."' 9 Even within sub-classifications of
fan fiction, individual characteristics may distinguish one particular story from
another, making it more or less infringing. This section will outline the basics of
fan fiction that are necessary to understand the legal distinctions throughout this
paper.
A. Basic Fan Fiction
Fan works are a general category that includes any creation of a fan based
upon an identifiable segment of popular culture. 20  These include fan art (fan
depictions of original characters or settings),2' fan videos (as simple as music video
montages or as complicated as full reenactments of popular movies or stories),22
and fan subs (fan-translated videos that were originally in a language different
from that of the target fan audience).23
Professor Rebecca Tushnet has defined fan fiction as "any kind of written
creativity that is based on an identifiable segment of popular culture, such as a
18. Actual statistics of how much fan fiction each country produces are currently unavailable.
19. McCardle, supra note 7, at 437. Meredith McCardle is a particularly intriguing source on the
legal aspects of fan fiction as she is a former attorney who is now a young adult fiction author.
20. Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction and a New Common Law, 17 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L. J. 651, 655 (1997).
21. See, e.g., DEVrANTART, http://www.deviantart.com/browse/all/fanart/ (last visited May 14,
2014).
22. See, e.g., A New Hope: Uncut, STAR WARS UNCUT, http://www.starwarsuncut.com/newhope
(last visited Sept. 21, 2014) (a compilation of fan videos of Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope).
23. See, e.g., DOKI FANSUBS, doki.co (last visited Sept. 21, 2014). See generally Sean
Kirkpatrick, Like Holding a Bird: What the Prevalence of Fansubbing can Teach us about the use of
Strategic Selective Copyright Enforcement, 21 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 131 (2003).
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television show, and not produced as 'professional' writing." 24  Others have
defined fan fiction as "fiction written by a fan for the Internet about a person,
fictional character, or universe of which the person is a fan." 25 The Oxford English
Dictionary ("OED") defines it as "fiction written by a fan of, and featuring
characters from, a particular TV series, movie, etc." 26 This paper will use the OED
definition, as it includes both commercial and non-commercial aspects, while
Professor Tushnet's definition limits fan fiction to those works written only for
non-commercial reasons.
All fan fiction builds some sort of new story from the original.27 Some of the
simplest fan fiction fills in narrative gaps in the source material or conveys the
source material from the viewpoint of a different character. 28 A Harry Potter novel
told from Hermione's perspective would fit into this category. Other times, the fan
fiction will act as a prequel or sequel. 29 Fan fiction about James Potter (Harry's
father) or Harry's children would fall into this category. Alternate universe fan
fiction is another popular category. In alternate universe fan fiction, the characters
from canon are presented in an environment very different to the original, such as
moving Harry Potter to the United States or India. 30 Crossover fan fiction is also
very popular; Susan's story in the introduction is an example of crossover fiction.
Crossover fiction is when the characters, storylines, or settings from multiple
canons are combined in a single fan work.31
One popular reason for creating fan fiction is to create relationships (called
"shipping") between characters. When the fan work involves a heterosexual
relationship between two characters that may or may not be romantically linked in
the original, the work is called gen/het (generalheterosexual) fan fiction. 32  If
Harry and Hermione fall in love in a fan fiction story, that is gen/het fiction. All of
these genres of fan fiction are generally inoffensive to owners (as long as the
works are not for profit).
24. Tushnet, supra note 20, at 655. Professor Tushnet has written a number of works on fan
fiction and the law, but also on intellectual properly law in general. See also McCardle, supra note 7, at
434; Chua, supra note 8, at 216.
25. Christina Z. Ranon, Honor Among Thieves: Copyright Infringement in Internet Fandom, 8
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 421,422 (2006).
26. Fan fiction, OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american english/fan-fiction (last visited May 14,
2014).
27. Chatelain, supra note 7, at 200-01.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 201.
30. McCardle, supra note 7, at 436. See also'Potter in Calcutta' Banned, BBC NEWS (Apr. 30,
2003), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south asia/2988673.stm.
31. Chatelain, supra note 7, at 201. See, e.g., Book Crossovers FanFiction, FANFICTION.NET,
http://www.fanfiction.net/crossovers/book/ (last visited May 12, 2014).
32. McCardle, supra note 7, at 436.
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B. Slash Fiction
The other type of relationship-based fan fiction is "slash" fiction. Slash
fiction features two characters that are usually heterosexual in canon engaged in a
homosexual relationship. 33 This type of fan fiction is responsible for most of the
ire from otherwise tolerant intellectual property owners. Part of this is because
slash fiction carries with it "a slough of misconceptions." 34 The key misconception
is that slash fiction is pornography under another name.35 Most slash fiction,
however, centers on the relationship itself, not the sexual relationship between the
two characters. 3 6 One example of slash fiction would be if, in Susan's story,
Gandalf and Dumbledore fell in love and got married. While many rights owners




Original character fan fiction is common as well. Original character fan
fiction involves inserting a new, fan-invented character into the owner's plot.
Susan's fan fiction has two original characters: Mary Sue and her friend. But
while the friend is a generic original character, generally considered harmless and
occasionally necessary to the plot, Mary Sue is "the much loathed and widely
ridiculed 'Mary Sue.'
38
Mary Sue originally referred to a character created by Trekkie Paula Smith in
her fan fiction-the first woman to control a Star Trek spaceship. 39 While some
scholars view Mary Sue as a social commentary character, fans often view her with
more scorn. Mary Sue has come to stand for an author inserting oneself into a
story, but as a character who is "typically perfect in nearly every way imaginable.
Beautiful, intelligent, and quick-witted, these characters usually come equipped
with a certain disregard for rules and normally wind up stealing the heart of a main
canon character." 41 In Susan's fan fiction, "Mary Sue" likely represents Susan's
perception of what she would like to be, while the friend may be a more realistic
version of Susan herself or just a necessary extra. Most of fandom is scornful of
the Mary Sue, yet she is still the most easily identifiable character in fan fiction.42
33. Id.
34. Id. at 443.
35. Id. Another misconception is common in China, where the belief reins that writing and
reading slash fiction "promotes homosexuality." Aja Romano, For Young Women in China, Slash
Fanfction is a Dangerous Hobby, DAILY DOT (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.dailydot.com/geek/in-china-
20-people-women-arrested-for-writing-slash/(explaining that as a result of this belief, authorities have
arrested some young twenty-year-olds for writing slash fiction).
36. McCardle, supra note 7, at 443.
37. Id. at 464.
38. Id. at 436.
39. Chander & Sunder, supra note 8, at 597.
40. Id. at 608.
41. McCardle, supra note 7, at 436.
42. Id. at 437.
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D. Doujinshi
While some might believe that doujinshi (sometimes transliterated as
dojinshi) is merely the Japanese word for fan fiction, it has developed into its own
category. Doujinshi "traditionally refers to works such as poetry or short stories
for distribution within a specific association or society," 4 but currently is
understood to mean "manga or anime featuring characters not originally created by
the author.",44  The distinguishing feature of doujinshi, besides it now being
specific to manga and anime, is that fans typically sell their doujinshi at special
conventions.45 While regular fan fiction is not necessarily non-profit, very little
fan fiction is as inherently commercial as doujinshi.
E. Real Person Fiction
Real person fiction is a relatively new phenomenon. Now some fan fiction
databases have sections for "Celebrities & Real People" or "Music & Bands."
46
While the volume of these databases is not as substantial as the fan fiction
databases, some fan fiction sites designed for single bands or actors are just as
extensive as regular fan fiction.4 7  While many of these works would not
traditionally infringe intellectual property, the broadening scope of trademark law
may protect the people who are subjects of these fictions. This article will not
discuss real person fiction in depth, nor will it discuss the fate of George Clooney
in Susan's fan fiction, but it is important to note this rising phenomenon in the
discussion of fan fiction.
Regardless of the type of fan fiction, all of it could potentially infringe
intellectual property rights. Determining whose rights are infringed, how much
infringement occurred, the type of infringement, and potential defenses, might be
dependent on the type of fan fiction.
III. CHOICE OF LAW IN FAN FICTION DISPUTES
If an owner of an original work, such as J.K. Rowling, Paramount, or Marvel,
discovers Susan's fan fiction on the Internet and chooses to sue her, the owner
would need to first determine the law under which it had a claim. The choice of
law can be crucial-it may make a difference as to whether Susan has infringed
any rights in the first place or whether she has any defenses under that law.
Although some international tactics do govern intellectual property, intellectual
43. Mariko A. Foster, Parody's Precarious Place: The Need to Legally Recognize Parody as
Japan's Cultural Property, 23 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 313, 315 (2013); Salil Mehra,
Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain Why All the Cartoons My Kid Watches are
Japanese Imports?, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 155, 164 (2002).
44. Foster, supra note 43, at 315. See also Mehra, supra note 43, at 164; Kirkpatrick, supra note
23, at 147.
45. Kirkpatrick, supra note 23, at 147.
46. See, e.g., ARCHIVE OF OUR OWN, archiveofourown.org (go to "Fandoms" drop down menu;
then "Celebrities & Real People" and "Music & Bands" hyperlinks) (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
47. See, e.g., ONE DIRECTION FAN FICTION, http://onedirectionfanfiction.com (last visited May
15, 2014) (containing almost 50,000 fan fictions based solely on the band).
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property is still a domestic issue, so even if infringement takes place in multiple
countries, individual national laws must be used, not international laws.
Choice of law for Internet activities such as fan fiction is more difficult in this
territorial system. The Internet allows "[a]cts that potentially violate exclusive
copyrights [and other intellectual property rights to] instantaneously and
simultaneously occur in several countries., 48 If the use of a work protected by
intellectual property implicates laws of multiple jurisdictions, choice of law
determines which rules apply.
49
Whether a right to be infringed exists is often the easy determination in a case
such as Susan's. The law that applies to the existence of a right is the one under
which the intellectual property is registered.50 If the Harry Potter series, Star Trek
series, and X-Men series are protected by registered copyright or trademark, the
applicable law is any (or all) of the intellectual property laws of the state in which
it is protected. The Berne Convention-the international convention on
intellectual property-also extends protection to works registered in one signatory
state under the laws of other signatories.
5 1
The more difficult choice of law issue is what law is applicable to the
infringing act. Typically, intellectual property choice of law follows a strictly
terriorial52territorial approach, meaning the courts must look to the location of where the
alleged acts occurred to decide questions relating to infringement. 53 The Internet
makes this strict territorial application difficult. 54 Often, the infringement occurs in
multiple places, by way of the Internet, requiring a court to apply the copyright
laws of each country in which infringement occurred.55
In our example, assume Susan is in Japan. The owners of the protected
portions of her work have existing rights wherever their intellectual property is
registered-so probably both the United States and Japan. Therefore, either law
could apply in determining the existence of intellectual property rights. The next
question is which law is applicable to Susan's infringing acts. Writing fan fiction
in Japan potentially infringes the owners' reproduction and derivative works rights
in Japan. Then Susan uploads her fan fiction onto Fanfiction.net. This could
infringe upon the authors' distribution rights-but where? Susan is in Japan, the
servers for Fanfiction.net are at an unknown location in the United States, 56 and the
48. Andreas P. Reindl, Choosing Law in Cyberspace: Copyright Conflicts on Global Networks, 19
MICH. J. INT'L L. 799, 800 (1998).
49. id. at 802.
50. litar-tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1998);
AMERICAN LAW INST., INTELLECTUAL PROP.: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW,
AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES §301(1)(a) (2008).
51. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 2(6), Sept. 9,1886, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 223 (amended Sept. 28, 1979) [hereinafter Berne Conv.].
52. Reindl, supra note 48, at 803.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 800.
55. Id. at 806.
56. Terms of Service, FANFICTION.NET, http://www.fanfiction.net/tos/ (last updated Mar. 5, 2009).
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people who read Susan's fan fiction are in various locations throughout the world.
Distribution probably occurs in the location of the server, but an argument could be
made that distribution occurs wherever the readers are located. The protected
works are then protected wherever they are registered (probably both Japan and the
United States), but infringement definitely occurred in Japan, probably occurred in
the United States, and may have occurred in even more countries.
Based on this, it is easy to understand why "applying strictly territorial choice
of law rules to global digital networks creates formidable problems."
57
Unfortunately, this is still the first hurdle that those seeking to prosecute fan
fiction-and possibly even those seeking to protect it-must pass.
Assuming the rights owners have determined the choice of law and find they
have multiple options, they may want to consider the cultural implications of the
laws under which they would like to sue, as well as the venue in which they would
like to bring suit. Comparing the United States and Japan as societies, the United
States is generally more litigious. 58 The United States also has extensive discovery
processes and strong remedies for rights owners who prove infringement.
59
Moreover, the U.S. legal system emphasizes the economic purposes of intellectual
property law which are designed to provide an incentive for people to create.
60
Japan, on the other hand, is a more communicative, less litigious society. The
Japanese prefer not to go straight to court, but instead to "first go through the
process of conciliation and apology . ..6 Once a suit is filed, no discovery is
available and the process is very slow, often resulting in limited or ineffectual
damages.62  Additionally, Japan's intellectual property law emphasizes the
importance of intellectual property as cultural property and the creative rights of
authors rather than the economic bases for protection.63 These factors make it
more likely that rights owners-who typically want strong remedies and extensive
discovery-are more likely to want U.S. law to apply and U.S. courts to hear their
claims based on cultural-legal differences alone. Whether the law makes that the
better option is a different question.
IV. COPYRIGHT AND FAN FICTION
When one thinks of fan fiction, the first category of intellectual property that
comes to mind is copyright. The Beme Convention protects "literary and artistic
57. Reindl, supra note 48, at 807.
58. See generally Geoffrey R. Scott, A Comparative View of Copyright as Cultural Property in
Japan and the United States, 20 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 283 (2006).
59. Id. at 359.
60. Bird & Ponte, supra note 17, at 247; Michael B. Gunlicks, A Balance of Interests: The
Concordance of Copyright Law and Moral Rights in the Worldwide Economy, 11 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 601, 603 (2001).
61. Kirkpatrick, supra note 24, at 149; Lee, supra note 13, at 186; Richard V. Burgujian,
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Japan, in Robert Bae, Intellectual Property in the
Pacific Rim Countries: Rights and Remedies, 91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 395, 397 (1997).
62. Burgujian, supra note 61, at 395-97; Kirkpatrick, supra note 23, at 149.
63. Foster, supra note 43, at 332; Scott, supra note 58, at 312.
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works ' 64 by authors who are nationals of one of the signatories to the Berne
Convention. 65 As this category includes books and other writings, dramatic works,
and cinematographic works,6 6 it encompasses the majority of works on which fan
fiction is based. Since both the United States and Japan are signatories to the
Berme Convention, 6 7 they are both bound to provide protection to works that fall
within these categories.
The Beme Convention sets forth the minimum standards that each signatory
must provide to protected works. These include the right of reproduction of
protected works, 68 the right of authorizing adaptations, arrangements, or alterations
of works (called the derivative right in the United States), 69 and the right to control
distribution of protected works.70 The Berne Convention generally provides these
rights for the duration of the life of the author plus fifty years. 71 It also allows
states to provide some exceptions to these protections through fair or free use.
72
Ultimately, however, copyright protection is a matter of domestic legislation.
So it is important to look at the protections within the United States and Japan
itself to determine whether fan fiction generally infringes copyright in either of
these states.
A. United States
Determining whether a work infringes an owner's copyright requires a two-
part inquiry.73
The first question is always whether the original work is copyrightable subject
matter.74 If it is, the second question is whether the fan work infringes the owner's
rights.
75
1. Is the Original Work Copyrightable Subject Matter?
In the United States, copyright protection is available to "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression., 76 While some categories
64. Berne Conv., supra note 51, art. I.
65. Id. art. 3(l)(a).
66. Id. art. 2(1).
67. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, WIPO-ADMINISTERED
TREATIEs, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/ (follow "Contracting Parties" hyperlink) (last
visited May 14, 2014).
68. Berne Conv., supra note 52, art. 9(1).
69. Id. art. 12.
70. Id. art. 14(l).
71. Berne Conv., supra note 51, art. 7(1). Note that certain works have different durations. Id.
art. 7(2), (3).
72. Berne Conv., supra note 51, arts. 9(2), 10, 1 Obis.
73. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1292 (C.D. Cal.
1995); Kathryn M. Foley, Protection Fictional Characters: Defining the Elusive Trademark-Copyright
Divide, 41 CONN. L. REV. 921, 926 (2009).
74. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 900 F. Supp. at 1296; Foley, supra note 73, at 927.
75. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 900 F. Supp. at 1297; Foley, supra note 73, at 927.
76. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2014).
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of protection are enumerated, such as literary works, dramatic works, motion
pictures, and other audiovisual works, 77 works that meet the first criteria that do
not otherwise fit within categories may also be included. The main limitation of
copyright is that it will only protect expressions, not ideas.78 The original works
from which Susan took her story were the Harry Potter series, The Lord of the
Rings trilogy, Star Trek, and X-Men. As a whole, all of these are protected as
literary or audiovisual works, and are therefore protected subject matter.
Fan fiction considers another issue in copyrightable subject matter. While full
original works can be copied in fan fiction, fans more commonly take only the
characters or settings and build their own works from those elements. For
example, the only aspect of The Lord of the Rings in Susan's story is Gandalf.
Therefore, another issue is whether characters are independently copyrightable 79 -
if so, owners may have an easier time showing infringement.
Fictional characters have entered the intellectual property spotlight lately as
they have become such valuable assets for rights owners. 80 The case law regarding
characters, unfortunately, remains rather confusing. 8' Two tests have emerged to
determine whether characters are copyrightable: the "story being told" test and the
sufficient delineation test.
The "story being told" test emerged in the famous "Sam Spade case" in the
Ninth Circuit.82 In that case, the Ninth Circuit claimed that Detective Sam Spade
was not subject to copyright protection independent of his story, the Maltese
Falcon, because he was "only the chessman in the game of telling the story." 83 If,
however, Sam Spade had truly constituted the "story being told" rather than
serving as a pawn in the story, he would have been entitled to independent
protection. 84 Since the "Sam Spade case," the "story being told" test has not been
used effectively. Courts have criticized the test, 85 refused to adopt the test,8 6 or
distorted the test to support the desired result.87 Therefore, the second test, the
sufficient delineation test, should apply when determining whether a character is
copyrightable.
The sufficient delineation test was articulated by Judge Hand in Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp.88 In that case, Judge Hand decided that a fictional
77. Id. § 102(a)(1), (3), (6) (2014).
78. Id. § 102(b) (2014).
79. See McCardle, supra note 7, at 445-47.
80. See Foley, supra note 73, at 923, 937 ("[L]icensing of Walt Disney characters alone generates
nearly $20 billion a year in retail sales."); Michael Todd Helfand, When Mickey Mouse is as Strong as
Superman. The Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional Literary and Pictorial
Characters, 44 STAN. L. REV. 623, 623, 626 (1992).
81. Tushnet, supra note 20, at 659.
82. Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954).
83. Id. at 950.
84. Id. See also Foley, supra note 73, at 929.
85. Foley, supra note 73, at 929.
86. Id. at 930.
87. Id.
88. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
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character could be protected "independently of the plot" in limited situations.
89
The situations in which he determined characters could be protected were when the
characters were sufficiently delineated or developed to qualify as protectable
expression rather than a mere compilation of ideas. 90 Further cases have used the
sufficient delineation standard to determine that the more highly detailed the
characters are, the more protection they deserve. 9'
While pictorial representations of characters were previously considered
easier to delineate sufficiently than literary characters, 92 literary characters that are
more than "mere delineation[s]" of basic ideas have been granted protection. 93
Judge Posner even determined that "no more is required for a character copyright"
than a specific name and appearance.
94
Based on the "story being told" test, none of the characters in Susan's fan
fiction would be entitled to independent copyright protection, because none of
them constitute the story being told. Under the sufficient delineation test, on the
other hand, Gandalf, Dumbledore, Captain Kirk, and Professor X would all be
entitled to copyright protection, as all four of them are very detailed, in-depth
characters. 95 As courts are more likely to apply the sufficient delineation test,
Susan uses copyright protected characters in her fan fiction.
2. Do the Fan Works Infringe upon the Copyright Owners' Rights?
Once a work or character is copyrighted, owners have certain rights relating
to the copyrighted work. Fan fiction potentially infringes upon three of these: the
right to reproduction, 96 the right to distribution, 97 and the right to authorize
derivative works. 98
Violating the right of reproduction means that the infringing work copies
protected elements from the original work. When taking a character's name,
image, and personality, infringement based upon reproduction can be assumed. In
89. Id.; Foley, supra note 73, at 927.
90. Helfand, supra note 80, at 631; Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 ("[T]he less developed the characters,
the less they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too
indistinctly.").
91. Anderson v. Stallone, II U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1989). See also Chatelain, supra
note 7, at 205.
92. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
93. Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ'ns., Ill F.2d 432, 433-34 (2d Cir. 1940) (deciding that
when "the pictorial representations and verbal descriptions of Superman are not a mere delineation of a
benevolent Hercules, but embody an arrangement of incidents and literary expressions original with the
author, they are proper subjects of copyright and susceptible of infringement .... ).
94. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660 (7th Cir. 2004). See also Foley, supra note 73, at
932.
95. Additionally, as inanimate objects such as the Batmobile have been considered to be
copyrightable, locations such as the Leaky Cauldron can also be assumed to be copyrightable if they are
sufficiently delineated.
96. 17 U.S.C. § 106(l)(2012).
97. Id. § 106(3).
98. Id. § 106(2).
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many fan fiction cases, fans admit to copying the characters and therefore violating
the reproduction right; they then allege a defense to immunize themselves from
liability for that copying.
Fan authors also typically concede infringements upon the owner's right to
authorize derivative works. Creating a derivative work is using elements of a
protected work to create a new work-essentially the definition of fan fiction.99 In
Nichols, the Court said that copying a character in this way, by moving it out of the
original plot, would likely be sufficient to establish copyright infringement.100 As
with infringements of the reproduction right, most fans concede this and justify it
by using defenses to infringement.
Finally, "when [a] fan fiction author ... uploads his story onto the Internet
and allows the public to access it, [he] has violated the owner's third exclusive
right in distribution."' 0' A fan infringes upon the distribution right merely by
distributing copies of an owner's work without obtaining consent. By distributing
works that already infringe the reproduction or derivative rights, it is assumed that
the owner has not consented to that distribution.
Therefore, fan fiction is a prima facie infringement on an owner's copyright
rights. Susan's fan fiction, which copies Dumbledore, Gandalf, and the others,
creates a derivative work with them, then is distributed on the internet, is also
infringing. However, Susan may be able to allege that she is protected by various
defenses that immunizes her from liability for these violations.
3. Do Fans have any Defenses from Liability for Copyright
Infringements?
In U.S. Copyright Law, some uses of copyrighted materials are permitted. 102
Fan fiction writers can use copyrighted characters in their stories if: (1) the
copyright owner explicitly or implicitly permits fan fiction or (2) "the fan fiction
constitutes fair use of the copyrighted work."'0 3  While very few authors have
explicitly consented to fan fiction, implied consent is a very strong defense in
certain fandoms.' °4 If rights owners know about the fan fiction and allow it to
continue, in all likelihood, the fan can show that the owner impliedly consented.
10 5
However, impliedly consenting to some types of fan fiction does not protect all
possible versions of fan fiction. For example, J.K. Rowling is unopposed to most
fan fiction, but she has brought suit before when the fan in question sells his or her
work. 
0 6
99. See Chatelain, supra note 7, at 205-06; McCardle, supra note 7, at 449.
100. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121; Foley, supra note 73, at 933-34.
101. McCardle, supra note 7, at 448-49.
102. Chua, supra note 8, at 219.
103. Chander & Sunder, supra note 8, at 612.
104. McCardle, supra note 7, at 449-50.
105. Id. at 449.
106. Chander & Sunder, supra note 8, at 611.
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Fair use is another viable defense for most fan fiction authors. Four factors
interact to determine whether a fan can take advantage of the fair use defense:
(1) the purpose and character of the use...,
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion [of the copyrighted work]
used [in the infringing work] in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. 
07
Generally, the more transformative the fan work is, the more likely it is fair
use under the first factor.'0 8 Fan fiction is often not only transformative, but also
non-commercial in nature. When fans create work without any desire to profit, the
first factor weighs very heavily for fair use. 10 9 When, on the other hand, fans
attempt to sell their fan fiction rather than merely posting it online, as doujinshi
writers do, this may weigh against fair use.' 10
As to the second factor, creative works are typically more strongly protected
than factual works and published works are afforded less protection than
unpublished ones.'" While most original works that fan fictions take from are
published, they are also very creative, so this factor will almost always weigh in
favor of the rights owner.
The third factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion of the
copyrighted work used in the infringing work, is why the question of whether
characters can be copyrighted is so important. If characters are a mere portion of a
copyrighted work, they are a less substantial amount of the copyrighted work than
if they are independently copyrightable subject matter. For example, when Susan
used Dumbledore in her work, if Dumbledore is copyrightable, she copied the
entirety of Dumbledore and, depending on how important of a role he plays in her
fan fiction, possibly a very substantial portion of him. If, however, Dumbledore is
not copyrightable, Susan copied a very small, probably less substantial, portion of
the Harry Potter series in copying Dumbledore. Therefore, the determination on
whether characters are independently copyrightable will ultimately decide the third
fair use factor.
The fourth factor, the effect of the infringing work on the potential market of
the original work, will be the hardest for a rights owner to move in his or her favor.
The key here is "whether the infringing work 'usurps' the market of the original by
serving as a substitute for the original author's work.' 12 Being non-commercial
helps the fan, as does the fact that fan fiction also almost never substitutes for the
original. 13 In fact, fan fiction often does quite the opposite-it usually helps
107. 17 U.S.C. § 107; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
108. Chatelain, supra note 7, at 208.
109. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 578; Chatelain, supra note 7, at 208.
110. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 585; Chatelain, supra note 7, at 208.
1I1. Chatelain, supra note 7, at 209 (citing Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 256 (2d Cir. 2006)).
112. Id. at 211.
113. Chua, supra note 8, at 223.
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encourage readers to return to the original works. 14 Fan authors are rarely, if ever,
attempting to replace the existing work about which they care so much. Owners
that attempt to argue for this factor may find themselves up against the
uncomfortable reality that fan fiction can actually help their original work remain
popular and relevant.
While no court has dealt with fan fiction yet, it is likely that fans will prevail
on a fair use defense-which is one possible reason that no owners have brought
suit against fan fiction writers in the United States. However, Japanese Copyright
Law may result in a different outcome, giving owners a different venue in which
they could attempt to uphold their rights.
B. Japan
Copyright regulations in Japan and the United States closely resemble each
other, but there are some key differences that could prove important for rights
owners and fans when dealing with fan fiction." 1
5
1. Is the Original Work Copyrightable Subject Matter?
Similarly to U.S. Copyright Law, Japan's Copyright Law protects
"production[s] in which thoughts or sentiments are expressed in a creative way and
which falls within the literary, scientific, artistic or musical domain[,] ' 16 including
novels and cinematographic works. 1 17 As in the United States, the original works
upon which Susan based her fan fiction would be protected in Japan. Because
Japan is a civil law country, the statute embodying its Copyright Law is the full
extent of the law; however, court cases can still be informative as to how the
statute is interpreted. For example, the Japanese Supreme Court decision in K.K.
Matsudera v. King Features Syndiate, Inc., in which the court determined that
fictional characters could receive copyright protection, indicates that characters
may also be protected in Japan.' 8 However, as the courts provided no test, the
extent to which characters receive protection in Japan is uncertain. " 9 Additionally,
since K.K. Matsudera only involved graphic characters, 20 literary characters may
receive less independent copyright protection in Japan than in the United States.
Therefore, while the Harry Potter series, The Lord of the Rings trilogy, Star Trek,
and X-Men receive copyright protection in Japan, the characters within them may
not get their own protection.
114. See Lee, supra note 13, at 187; Tushnet, supra note 20, at 669.
115. Mehra, supra note 43, at 166.
116. Chosakukenho [Copyright Law of Japan], Law No. 43 of 2012, art. 2, para. l(i) (Japan)
(translated by Yukifusa Oyama et al. 2013) [hereinafter Japanese Copyright Law].
117. Japanese Copyright Law, art. 10(l)(i), (vii).
118. Mehra, supra note 43, at 173; K.K. Matsudera v. King Features Syndicate, Inc., Saikb
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 17, 1997, 1992 (o) no. 1443, translated at
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei en/detailid=317 (Japan).
119. See K.K. Matsudera, 1992 (o) no. 1443.
120. Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 17, 1997, 1992 (0) no. 1443,
http://www.softic.or.jp/en/cases/popeye.html (Japan).
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2. Do the Fan Works Infringe upon the Copyright Owners' Rights?
The Japanese Copyright Law provides rights to owners of copyrightable
works similar to those in the U.S. Copyright Act. In Japan, the owner is entitled to
the right of reproduction,' 2 1 the right of distribution, 122 and the right of derivative
works. 2 3  Despite the right of distribution being limited to cinematographic
works,' 24 these works function in the same way as copyright infringements in the
United States, so fans (and Susan) would still be liable for prima facie copyright
infringement in Japan.
3. Do Fans have any Defenses from Liability for Copyright
Infringements?
The defenses for fans in Japan are different from those in the United States.
As a practical matter, rights owners do not crack down on fan works in Japan.
Most animation studios are "small tightly woven families functioning on extremely
tight budgets" 25 that do not have the resources to engage in legal disputes.
126
Additionally, fan works in Japan "make up an enormous and visible industry that
has matured alongside the industry of original content production," making
fandom more acceptable to owners. 127  Therefore, approval by authors is a
particularly strong and often used defense in Japan.
Non-Japanese owners bringing suit in Japan may encounter other defenses
that prevent them from proving infringement. Japan does not have an explicit fair
use provision like the United States, but it does contain a "laundry list" of
permitted use of copyrighted material. 28 Surprisingly, doujinshi is not included as
a permitted use, but non-profit uses are included. 129 Not only does the Japanese
Copyright Law allow for a limited amount of private use copying, '30 but it also has
an exception that allows non-profit organizations to present a work already made
public if that organization does not charge fees to view the work.' 3' While neither
of these fits fan fiction perfectly, as fan works are disseminated on the Internet and
change aspects of the original rather than merely perform it, Japanese courts could
choose to determine that the free posting of fan fiction on the Internet falls into
these exceptions.
Based on this, rights owners may decide to bring copyright infringement cases
against fans in Japan when possible, despite the cultural difficulties, because the
121. Japanese Copyright Law, art. 21.
122. Id. art. 26.
123. Id. arts. 27-28.
124. Id. art. 26.
125. Kirkpatrick, supra note 23, at 146 (citing ANTONIO LEVI, NEW MYTHS FOR THE MILLENNIUM:
JAPANESE ANIMATION, ANIMATION IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (John A. Lent, ed. 2001)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 146-47; Lee, supra note 13, at 185.
128. Mehra, supra note 43, at 175-76.
129. Japanese Copyright Law, arts. 30, 38.
130. Id. art. 30.
131. Id. art. 38.
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law is more likely to find for the owners. While infringement would occur in both
countries, the United States' strong fair use defense would probably impede
finding infringement, while no such explicit defense exists in Japanese law.
V. TRADEMARK AND FAN FICTION
An entire story may not be covered by trademark, but that is part of what
makes trademark ideal for owners looking to protect their characters if copyright
claims fail. While some courts have commingled trademark and copyright
analyses recently, trademark can provide strong protections for rights owners
looking to protect characters used in fan fictions. Unlike copyright, which can be
protected in a country as long as both that country and the original country are
Berne Convention signatories, trademark often requires registration of the
particular mark in the country in which protection is sought.' 32 For this section,
the paper will assume that all of the rights owners in Susan's story have registered
the elements in question in both the United States and Japan.
A. United States
The trademark issue in relation to fan fiction is becoming increasingly
important, particularly due to slash fiction.' 33  Many character owners have
expressed concern about slash fiction ruining the reputation of their characters, a
claim that is irrelevant in copyright considerations.' 34 Since owners that sleep on
their rights by not acting when others use their characters can lose the right to
bring future cases, an increasing number of rights owners are bringing trademark
claims to defend their characters. 135  As with copyright, one must first look at
whether elements in fan fiction are protected by trademark, then at whether the
fan's use of those elements infringes on the owner's rights.
132. In the United States, an owner can obtain a common law trademark through use only, but most
countries require registration. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Frequently Asked Questions about
Trademarks, http://www.uspto.gov/faq/trademarks.jsp#_Toc275426680 (last modified Apr. 23, 2013).
International applications are now available through the Madrid Protocol, but owners still have to
choose in which countries their marks are valid-they do not have a "global" registration. Protocol
Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, June 27, 1989,
World Intellectual Property Organization, available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/wipo treaties/text.jsp?file id=283484. See Natalie Hanlon-Leh,
Kathleen S. Herbert & Adam Lindquist Scoville, A Brand New World: International Trademark
Registration and the Madrid Protocol, 32 COLO. LAW. 89 (2003).
133. McCardle, supra note 7, at 464.
134. Id.
135. Helfand, supra note 80, at 626-27. See, e.g., Conan Props., Inc. v. Conans Pizza, Inc., 752
F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1985) (regarding the owner of trademark of fictional character "Conan the
Barbarian" who brought an action against restaurant alleging infringement of its trademark); Fleischer
Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A. Inc., 772 F. Supp.2d 1155 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (bringing of an action by a
studio against licensor over use of "Betty Boop" cartoon character); DC Comics v. Kryptonite Corp.,
336 F.Supp.2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (regarding the comic book publisher suit against manufacturer of
bicycle locks, claiming trademark ownership of the term "kryptonite").
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1. Is the Element Protected by Trademark?
The Lanham Act, the federal trademark statute in the United States, defines a
trademark as "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof-..
. used .. . to identify and distinguish" the goods or services of one person from
those of another, even if the source is unknown.136  Therefore, the story from
which a fan writer copies is not protected by trademark, but elements within the
story, such as characters, phrases, titles, or places can be. 37
If elements are inherently distinctive, they can become a trademark.
Inherently distinctive marks make consumers regard those particular symbols as an
indication of the producer.138 To date, no court has found a fictional character to
be inherently distinctive and the case law indicates that no character ever could
be.' 39 Therefore, rights owners must show acquired distinctiveness or secondary
distinctiveness to receive trademark protection for elements of their works. 140
Unlike inherent distinctiveness, secondary distinctiveness "requires actual use of
the mark for a period of time sufficient to create public recognition."' 14 1 For the
characters in Susan's story-Dumbledore, Gandalf, Captain Kirk, and Professor
X-continuous actual use by their owners as well as their fame likely fulfill this
first requirement of trademark protection.
However, being famous and used is not enough to receive trademark
protection. The element also must serve "as an indicator of source."' 142 Courts
have generally stated that a mark must indicate only a single source of goods.
143
However, this is a practical impossibility for fictional characters. 144  Take
Dumbledore as an example-while many would attribute Dumbledore to J.K.
Rowling, he is also the intellectual property of Warner Brothers, Bloomsbury
Publishing, and Scholastic. 145  This is not an unusual situation for fictional
characters. While initial court cases determined this prevented characters from
being valid trademarks,' 46 modem courts have recognized that the identification of
136. 15U.S.C.§ 1127 (2014).
137. Id.; Helfand, supra note 80, at 627.
138. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211-13 (2000); Foley, supra note
73, at 940-41.
139. Foley, supra note 73, at 942.
140. Id. at 940.
141. Id. at 941.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 1127; Foley, supra note 73, at 942. See also Exparte Carter Publ'ns, 92 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 251 (Dec. Comm'r Pat. 1952); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1016
(N.D. Ga. 1981); Helfand, supra note 80, at 636.
143. Foley, supra note 73, at 942. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d
112 (2d Cir. 1984).
144. Foley, supra note 73, at 942-43.
145. Daniel Goldblatt, Warner Bros. and J.K. Rowling Team Up for New 'Harry Potter'-Themed
Film Series, VARIETY (Sept. 12, 2013), http://vaiety.com/2013/film/news/harry-potter-jk-rowling-
warner-bros-1200608921/; Harry Potter, BLOOMSBURY, http://harrypotter.bloomsbury.com (last visited
May 15, 2014); Harry Potter, SCHOLASTIC, http://harrypotter.scholastic.com (last visited May 15,
2014).
146. Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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a single source is "often no more than a convenient fiction"'147 and allow trademark
protection of characters anyway.148
Based on these elements, most characters and even some locations, such as
the Leaky Cauldron or the Starship Enterprise, are protected by trademark.
Therefore, Susan has used trademarks in her story.
2. Does the Fan's Use of the Trademarked Element Infringe the
Owner's Rights?
Trademark guarantees rights owners a "limited monopoly" over the use of a
properly trademarked element.149 However, this monopoly does not guarantee an
owner control over every instance in which its image is affected negatively. 150 It
does protect owners from situations in which the use of a mark is likely to cause
confusion as to the "origin, sponsorship, or approval of... goods, services, or
commercial activities.'' l To determine whether consumers are likely to be
confused or misled by the fan use, courts typically balance a number of factors.' 
52
In character trademark cases, many courts ignored the balancing of factors entirely
and just looked at the fame of the character.' 53  The assumption courts use to
justify this method is that with famous characters, "consumers are likely to believe
that the creators of the first work created, or at the very least, authorized the second
work." 54  In cases with less well-known characters, courts are unlikely to find
trademark infringement. 155 Courts have justified this dichotomy by explaining that
rampant licensing of well-known fictional characters has created a public
expectation that by displaying elements of a fictional character, the person using
the character has at least received permission from the owner.'
56
Therefore, even though most consumers of fan fiction would understand that
the owners of the characters or locations did not concede to the fan's use of their
intellectual property, the current case law implies that courts might find fan fiction
infringes trademark anyway, simply because the characters used are well-known.
147. Foley, supra note 73, at 942-43 (citing Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of
Fictional Characters, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 429,485 (1986)).
148. Foley, supra note 73, at 944; Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional
Characters, 1986 WiS. L. REV. 429, 443-44. See, e.g., Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Theatres,
195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 159, 162 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
149. Foley, supra note 73, at 939.
150. Lee, supra note 13, at 184.
151. 15 U.S.C. § 11 25(a)(l)(A) (2014); Foley, supra note 73, at 940.
152. Helfand, supra note 80, at 636-37.
153. Foley, supra note 73, at 947 (citing Prouty v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 26 F. Supp. 265, 265-66 (D.
Mass. 1939)).
154. Id.; Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 Wis. L. REV.
429, 489 (1986). See Lone Ranger Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650, 652 (4th Cir. 1942); DC Comics, Inc. v.
Unlimited Monkey Bus., 598 F. Supp. 110, 115-16 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
155. Foley, supra note 73, at 947. See DeCosta v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 514-
15 (lst Cir. 1975).
156. Foley, supra note 73, at 949. See Conan Props., Inc. v. Conans Pizza, Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 150
(5th Cir. 1985); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1981).
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If courts follow this process, Susan is unquestionably liable for trademark
infringement for all of the characters and protectable elements in her story.
Even when courts do not find trademark infringement, owners may still have
a dilution claim. Dilution claims "can lie even where copyright law would allow a
depiction of a character under fair use and no trademark violation exists because
consumers are not confused as to source,"'1 57 making it the ideal tool for owners
who would like to stop particular "offensive" types of fan fiction. A dilution claim
can take one of two forms: "[t]he first is a 'blurring' or 'whittling down' of the
distinctiveness of the mark" and "[t]he second is a "tarnishment" of the mark."'' 58
The second, tarnishment, is most likely to be claimed by owners in fan fiction
cases. Tarnishment occurs "when a defendant uses the mark in a way that 'creates
an undesirable, unwholesome or unsavory mental association' with the mark."'
159
In fan fiction, owners claiming tarnishment are most likely to target slash fiction or
pornographic fan fiction.
However, "[a] court will entertain a claim for tarnishment or dilution only
when the defendant's use of the mark is in a commercial setting."' 60 This would
mean that doujinshi is considered unfavorable to the original artist and might be
liable for a dilution claim, but most free fan fiction would not. Even though this
claim initially seems ideal for owners, it is ultimately a legal dead end for most
owners seeking to pursue a suit against fan-writers.
3. Are there any Defenses to a Trademark Claim that Fans can Use?
While trademark does have fair use defenses, they are not applicable to fan
fiction. 16  However, the First Amendment also allows individuals to claim it as a
defense to unauthorized trademark use when the use is not purely commercial.
The test for this defense (the Rogers test) determines whether (1) there is some
artistic relevance to the use of the trademark and (2) the use of the trademark is
explicitly misleading as to the source of the work. 162 Art and parodies often fall
into these categories, 63 as would non-commercial fan fictions. Commercial fan
fiction would not meet the threshold requirement for this defense of a work that is
"not purely commercial."
157. Helfand, supra note 80, at 639.
158. McCardle, supra note 7, at 465 (citing Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1039 (N.D. Ga. 1986)).
159. Id.
160. Id. (citing L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1987)).
161. Statutory fair use, defined in Lanham Act § 33(b)(4), is when one uses a mark only in its
descriptive sense and not as a trademark (e.g. John is a super man.). Nominative fair use is a common
law defense that allows people to use a mark when talking about someone else's product (e.g.
"Superman grosses $1 billion" as a newspaper headline). See New Kids on the Block v. News Am.
Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992). Both of these are complete defenses to trademark, but
neither is really applicable to fan fiction, as it relates to the fan's new product.
162. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2nd Cir. 1989); E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, Inc. v.
Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008).
163. See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490
(2nd Cir. 1989); Mattel Inc., v. Walking Mtn. Productions, 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
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In fan fiction, it should be easy for fan authors to argue that they meet the first
part of the Rogers test. Using trademarked characters in a piece of fan fiction that
reimagines the original work or critiques the original work does have artistic
relevance. The second part of the test may be more difficult. While works on a site
such as fanfiction.net are unlikely to make anyone think that they were written by
the original author, stand-alone works of fan fiction might explicitly mislead
others. If a short story describing Dumbledore's exploits before the days of Harry
Potter were to be sold on a website, or even made available without being attached
to a fan fiction site, eager readers may be misled to believe that J.K. Rowling
herself wrote this work. In this instance, the First Amendment defense would be
unavailable to the fan author.
To avoid explicitly misleading their audience, many fan authors include a
disclaimer at the beginning of their fan fiction that their work is purely fan work
and was neither written nor authorized by the owner. 164 While these disclaimers
are not legally binding, they would negate consumer confusion, making an
infringement claim more difficult for owners. This may not help if courts continue
to assume that any use of a famous character infringes upon an owner's trademark,
but it cannot hurt fans to continue to use such disclaimers.
The only other real defense to a trademark claim is abandonment. Trademark
owners can perpetually renew trademarks as long as they are used.165 However,
once use of the trademark stops, trademark law no longer protects the element. 166
This is generally an unhelpful defense in fan fiction, though-most fan fiction is
about current popular culture in which the owner renews its trademark rights.
Moreover, as a practical matter, an owner that has abandoned its trademark is
unlikely to bring an infringement claim.
B. Japan
As in the United States, the Japanese Trademark Act protects elements
registered in the country. However, the existing law is fairly unclear on what
would happen in a fan fiction trademark case.
1. Is the Element Protected by Trademark?
In Japan, "any character(s), figure(s), sign(s) or three-dimensional shape(s), or
any combination thereof, or any combination thereof with colors" may be a valid
mark if it is "used in connection with the goods [or services] of a person who
produces, certifies or assigns the goods [or services] as a business."' 167  These
marks may be registered based on use or, with otherwise generic marks, when
"consumers are able to recognize the goods and services as those pertaining to a
164. Lee, supra note 13, at 184.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (2012); Foley, supra note 73, at 939.
166. Helfand, supra note 80, at 646-47.
167. Shdhy6-h6, [Trademark Act], Act No. 127 of 1959, art. 2(1) (Japan).
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business of a particular person."' 68 In that sense, obtaining a trademark in Japan is
easier than in the United States.
Whether characters can be trademarked in Japan remains unclear (the word
"character" in the trademark act is understood to refer to Japanese characters, such
as Kanji, not animated characters from fictional works). It appears that no cases
have been decided on the matter and no articles have discussed it. However, based
on the language of the Trademark Act and its similarity to the U.S. Trademark Act,
as well as the extensive use and popularity of manga and anime characters, it
seems unlikely that Japan would forbid the trademark of fictional characters. The
only potential complication is that the Trademark Act does not list "words" or
"names" as protected marks, but those could be included as "characters" or
"signs." Therefore, animated characters or pictorial representations of characters
may be capable of being trademarked, but descriptions, names, and other literary
representations might not be protected by trademark. This may pose a key
problem to obtaining trademark protection in Japan for owners.
2. Does the Fan's Use of the Trademarked Element Infringe the
Owners' Rights?
The effective registration of a trademark in Japan gives owners the same
rights as holding a trademark in the United States-the owner can prevent
infringement and dilution. An owner has the exclusive right to use that mark in
connection with the designated goods or services. 169 That exclusive right includes
the request to affix an indication to marks that would cause confusion. 70 This
"request" provision is a reflection of the non-litigious Japanese society and
reiterates the idea that adding a disclaimer to fan fiction may prevent trademark
liability for the fan in Japan.
Acts that constitute infringement of the trademark are enumerated in Article
37 of the Japanese Trademark Act. The infringing uses most applicable to fan
fiction are:
the possession of products indicating the registered trademark ... for the purpose
of using the registered trademark ... in connection with the designated goods or
designated services, or goods or services similar thereto [and] the manufacture or
importation of products indicating the registered trademark ... for the purpose of
using or causing to be used the registered trademark ... in connection with the
designated goods or designated services or goods or services similar thereto.171
If fan fiction itself were a "product," downloading or writing fan fiction with
someone else's trademarked elements would infringe the owner's trademark rights
without needing to show fame or indication of source. Based on these articles, it
168. Id. art. 3(2).
169. Id. art. 25.
170. Id. art, 24-4.
171. Id. art, 37(v), (vii).
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would be much easier for an owner to show trademark infringement under
Japanese law than U.S. law.
Dilution in Japanese trademark law is more complicated. Currently, the
Japanese judiciary and legislature are at odds with each other; so despite Japanese
statutes not recognizing dilution per se, Japanese courts have found dilution to be
present, essentially making judge-made law in a civil law country where that
should not be possible.' 
72
One other possibility for an owner seeking a remedy in Japan is an unfair
competition claim. Fame is a key aspect in Japan's unfair competition law. The
Unfair Competition Prevention Act determines that 'unfair competition' means:
the act of using the Goods or other Appellations . . . which is identical with, or
similar to, another party's Goods or Other Appellation that is well-known among
the consumers, . . . and causes confusion with the goods or business of that other
party's [or] the act of using Goods or Other Appellations of another that are
identical with, or similar to, another person's famous Goods or Other
Appellations .... 173
"Goods or Other Appellations" are "name[s] connected with a person's
business, trade name, trademark, mark, the container or package of goods, or any
other appellation of goods or businesses."' 74 This provision looks similar to how
the U.S. courts have dealt with trademark infringement of characters-if the owner
can show fame, the fan is liable for unfair competition. Fame here generally
requires nationwide fame,' 75 but that would be simple to prove for characters such
as Dumbledore and Gandalf. Therefore, fans like Susan may be liable for unfair
competition in Japan simply by using an owner's trademarked character in their
stories.
With trademark, then, it would be more difficult for owners to decide where
to bring suit. While the United States boasts greater protection for famous
characters and while Japan has no discernable protection for characters, non-
commercial uses would be more difficult to recover from in the United States,
while simple use could be used to find a fan liable in Japan. Owners might simply
decide to pursue the case in the United States, with a friendlier court system for
rights owners, than risk not having a protectable character in Japan. Of course,
since marks must be registered to bring suit, the protectability of characters is
something an owner would know long before fan fiction cases come to pass.
172. Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Dilution in Japan, 4 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 228, 230
(2006).
173. Port, supra note 172, at 229 (citing Fusei kyoso boshibo [Unfair Competition Prevention Act],
Law No. 47 of 1993, art. 2-1).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 235.
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VI. MORAL RIGHTS AND FAN FICTION
If copyright and trademark are an owner's economic protections, moral rights
are an author's artistic protections. Moral rights do not protect all of the owners in
the same way that other intellectual property rights do; instead, moral rights only
protect the original author of the work. Therefore, J.K. Rowling can bring a moral
rights claim against Susan for her use of Dumbledore, but Warner Brothers or
Bloomberg cannot.
Moral rights exist because of the idea that "[t]he creation of an artistic work is
not merely a product that can be bought or sold but, rather, is a direct embodiment
of the author's personality, identity, and even her 'creative soul.""176 Practically
speaking, moral rights allow authors to object to how their works are used once the
works leave their hands.
Moral rights are internationally recognized and protected. The Berne
Convention recognizes the right of the author "to claim authorship of the work and
to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory
action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation."'177 These rights, typically called the right of attribution and the right of
integrity respectively, remain with the author even after the transfer of economic
rights and persist after his death.1
7 8
Theoretically, all members of the World Trade Organization and all
signatories to the Berne Convention should abide by these moral rights. However,
the United States managed to draft the final version of TRIPs to exclude Article
6bis from the adherence requirement,179 so U.S. law still does not recognize moral
rights, despite most nations going above and beyond TRIPs.180 The United States
claims it still protects moral rights in various ways,' 81 but likely not to the
satisfaction of authors who are not pleased by fan fiction.
A. United States
The moral rights provision of the Berne Convention contributed to the United
States' long avoidance of becoming a member.' 82 Once the United States became
a member, its Congress determined that it would require specific legislative
enactments to become law, thereby avoiding establishing formal moral rights
obligations. 18 3 Yet the United States claims that it still recognizes moral rights
176. Bird & Ponte, supra note 17, at 217 (citing Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in
Copyright, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795, 801 (2001)).
177. Berne Conv., supra note 51, art. 6bis(1).
178. Id. art. 6bis(2); Bird & Ponte, supra note 17, at 224.
179. Monica Kilian, A Hollow Victory for the Common Law? Trips and the Moral Rights
Exclusion, 2 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 321, 321 (2003) (citing Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex I C, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154).
180. Kilian, supra note 179, at 321-22.
181. Bird & Ponte, supra note 17, at 252 (citing 134 CONG. REC. S10320-10326, 10323 (daily ed.
May 10, 1988) (statement of Sen. Kastenmeier), 142 Cong Rec S 10320, at *S10,323 (LEXIS)).
182. Id. at 248.
183. Id. at 251.
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under other property and economic rights or under state tort law.' 84  However,
"[e]fforts to address moral rights issues through statutes, such as the Lanham Act,
and alternative legal theories, such as defamation, unfair competition, and invasion
of privacy, were often shot down in the courts, blocking meaningful judicial
recognition and protection of moral rights."18
5
Some courts recognize moral rights through "American analogues."' 86 Often,
this depends on state law. At least fourteen states have some sort of moral rights
protection, often those of integrity and attribution that are included in the Berne
Convention. 187 State property and contract law also include some implicit moral
rights. Gunlicks points out that an author has an absolute property right until he or
she chooses to part with it.' 88 While this is true, it undermines the basic tenets of
U.S. intellectual property law-that creative works should be encouraged so that
they may be available to the public. 8 9 If authors choose not to publish works out
of fear of mutilation or misattribution, the intellectual property laws are not
fulfilling their function.
Arguably, contract law is the ideal place to preserve an author's moral rights.
However, the inalienability of moral rights generally contradicts the notions
supporting freedom of contract.'90 Yet freedom of contract also allows authors to
preserve their moral rights; "'there exists an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing"' in every contract, meaning that a party must refrain from actions that
harm or destroy the other party, and that unreasonable or unfair use of an author's
work would violate the contract in which the author consented to use of the
work.' 9' Additionally, authors are expected to reserve rights to themselves in
contracts if they do not wish for the publisher to have them. 192 While this would
theoretically preserve an author's moral rights, not only is this often untrue in
practice, where the author is in an inferior bargaining position, it also does not bind
the fan, only the publisher. Therefore, in the United States, the fan can create fan
184. Id. at 252 (citing 134 CONG. REC. S10320-10326, 10323 (daily ed. May 10, 1988) (statement
of Sen. Kastenmeier), 142 Cong Rec S 10320, at *SI0, 323 (LEXIS)).
185. Id. at 253-54 (internal citations omitted). See also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and
the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 25-27 (1985).
186. Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH & LEE L. REV. 795,
805-06 (2001).
187. Bird & Ponte, supra note 17, at 254-55 (providing the corresponding state statutes as: Cal.
Civ. Code §§ 980-90 (2014); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-116 (2014); 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 320/1-8 (2014); La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:2151-56 (2014); Me. Rev. Stat. Am. Tit. 27. §§ 303(l)-(5) (2014); Mass Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 231, § 85S (West 2006); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 597.720-60 (2014); N.J Stat. Ann. §
2A:24A1-8 (West 2006); N.M Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4BI to -3 (2006); NY Arts & Cult. Aff. Law §§ 11.01-
14, 13.01-13.19 (Consol. 2006); 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 2101-10 (2014); RI Gen. Laws §§ 5-62-2 to -12
(2014); S.D. Codified Laws § 1-22-16 (2014); Utah Code Ann. § 9-6-409 (2014)).
188. Gunlicks, supra note 60, at 619.
189. Bird & Ponte, supra note 17, at 248.
190. Kilian, supra note 179, at 325.
191. Gunlicks, supra note 60, at 618 (quoting Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E.
163, 167 (N.Y. 1933)).
192. Kilian, supra note 179, at 328 (quoting Lee, supra note 184, at 813); Gunlicks, supra note 60,
at 634.
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fiction that alters the author's work, sometimes directly contrary to the author's
wishes, and if no copyright or trademark exists, the author is out of luck.
B. Japan
Civil law nations typically protect both economic intellectual property rights
and moral or personal rights.' 93 Japan is no exception. Japan protects three rights:
the right of divulgence, the right of authorship, and the right of integrity. 
194
The right of divulgence encompasses "the right to control if and when a work
is made public."' 95 It encompasses the idea "that only the creator of the work
knows when the work is complete and therefore ready to be . . .reviewed by the
public.' 96 This helps protect authors from publishers pushing publication before
the author is ready. While important, it has less applicability to fan fiction.
The right of authorship is similar to the right of attribution in the Berne
Convention. It is "[t]he right to determine whether to disclose the name of the
author, to include an author's name on his work, to exclude the name of one not an
author, and to determine whether any name disclosed should be a true name or a
pseudonym."' 197 The right of authorship also requires that derivative works must
indicate the name of the original author. 198 Authors could have a claim against
fans when they write fan fiction that does not appropriately attribute the characters
to the author, but most fan fictions are very explicit about giving the authors credit,
so this claim is unlikely to arise.
The right of integrity is the most applicable to fan fiction. The right of
integrity includes "[t]he right to control distortions, mutilations and modifications
of the work."'199 This has been read to mean "that any unauthorized change to an
author's work is an infringement of the author's right to integrity."200 As Japan
does not have fair use protections, this means that any sort of transformation of a
work, even if for non-commercial or parody purposes, would violate the author's
right to integrity.
193. Bird & Ponte, supra note 17, at 213-14 (citing Monica E. Antezana, Note, The European
Union Internet Copyright Directive as Even More than it Envisions: Toward a Supra-EU
Harmonization of Copyright Policy and Theory, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 415, 421-22 (2003)).
194. Japanese Copyright Law, supra note 116, arts. 18-20.
195. Scott, supra note 58, at 340 (citing Japanese Copyright Law, supra note 116, art. 18).
196. Bird & Ponte, supra note 17, at 220.
197. Scott, supra note 58, at 340 (citing Japanese Copyright Law, supra note 116, art. 19).
198. Foster, supra note 43, at 337 (citing JAPANESE COPYRIGHT LAW: WRITINGS IN HONOUR OF
GERHARD SCHRICKER 45 (Peter Ganca, Christopher Heath & Hiroshi Sait6 eds., 2005)).
199. Scott, supra note 58, at 340 (citing Japanese Copyright Law, supra note 117, art. 20).
200. Foster, supra note 43, at 337-38 (citing JAPANESE COPYRIGHT LAW: WRITINGS IN HONOUR OF
GERHARD SCHRICKER 46 (Peter Ganea, Christopher Heath & Hiroshi Sait6 eds., 2005)).
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The Japanese Supreme Court in the Mad Amano case has supported this
conclusion. 20 ' In that case, an artist called Mad Amano used another artist's
photograph of skiers on an alpine slope to create a parody of the work.20 2 The
Supreme Court decided that Mad Amano's work was a modification of the original
photograph, infringing the author's moral right of integrity. 20 3 The Court clarified
that if Mad Amano had merely "quoted" the artist's photo, where his new work
was the major part and the original work was only a minor part, it might be
permitted, but in this case, change was not enough as the photo was the major part
and its "essential characteristics" were still evident.
204
Based on the Mad Amano case, if authors wanted to sue fan writers for fan
fiction, they could do so under the right of integrity and likely prevail. Susan's
work might be considered a "quote" by the Japanese Supreme Court, with her
borrowed characters only a minor part of her overall work. If this were the case,
she would be free from liability under the Mad Amano case. However, the more
likely outcome is that a Court would decide that because she used the "essential
characteristics" of each of the characters, her fan fiction is a violation of the right
of integrity under Japanese law.
Therefore, if an author wanted to sue fans for their fan fiction, Japan would be
the preferable venue, if only for the ability to find infringement of the author's
moral rights.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
If J.K. Rowling wanted to sue Susan, where could and should she go? As
mentioned in Section III, she must first have an existing right in the applicable law.
If she has registered copyrights and trademarks in both Japan and the United
States, either is appropriate. Next, it gets complicated, as Susan is in Japan, but
published her fan fiction on fanfiction.net, where it has been read in both the
United States and Japan. In this case, Rowling is free to choose between the two
countries because infringement has taken place in both.
Now that Rowling must make a decision, the cultural and legal comparisons
between the two countries play an important role. Culturally, Rowling would
probably prefer to bring suit in the United States, where she could recover more
money or get a more assured injunction and where the stigma against litigation
would not be present. However, if suing for copyright infringement, Rowling
201. Id. at 333-35 (citing Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 28, 1980, Sho 54 (o) no. 923, 415 Hanrei
Tainmuzu [Hanta] 100, available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/js 20100319121451062181 .pdf
(Japan) [hereinafter The Mad Amano Case]; Tokyo Koto Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] May 19, 1976,
Sho 47 (ne) no. 2816, 226 Hanrei Taimuzu [Hanta] 194, available at
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/1BA4D7DCDOAC151CE49256A76002F89AE.pdf (Japan); Tokyo
Chiho Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Nov. 20, 1972, Sho 46 (wa) no. 273, 289 Hanrei Taimuzu [Hanta]
77, available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/7805A1DABO5D83AC49256A76002F8A63.pdf
(Japan)).
202. Foster, supra note 43, at 333 (citing The Mad Arnano Case, supra note 198).
203. Id. at 335 (citing The Mad Amano Case, supra note 198).
204. Id. at 335 (quoting The Mad Amano Case, supra note 198).
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would prefer Japan, where a fair use defense would not prevent her from winning
the suit. On the other hand, if suing for trademark infringement (assuming she had
a registered trademark for Dumbledore and the Leaky Cauldron in both countries),
she may have no preference, as character infringement in the United States is as
easy to find as unfair competition in Japan. Finally, if wanting to allege an
infringement of her moral rights, Rowling would also prefer to bring the suit in
Japan, where moral rights not only exist, but also are strong enough that any
alteration is sufficient to find infringement. Perhaps it is this set of contradictory
circumstances and the lack of guarantee as to where infringement has taken place
over the internet that helps contribute to a lack of fan fiction lawsuits.
Practically, fan fiction puts owners and fans alike in a difficult situation.
While many owners would prefer not to alienate their fans and appreciate the
publicity, they would also like to control the images of their characters, deciding
with whom they are in relationships, whether they drink or smoke, and even the
types of clothes they wear. Various solutions could make this situation easier on
both parties.
First, the U.S. Congress and Japanese Diet could amend their intellectual
property acts to clarify their national legal positions on fan fiction. Professor
Tushnet recommends that the law draw lines that resemble current norms, 20 5 but
even law that would clarify small issues such as whether characters receive
protection, the extent of moral rights, or whether non-commercial fan fiction or
doujinshi are permitted uses would help.
Second, TRIPs or the Berne Convention could deal with fan fiction. While
this is a much heavier burden and much more difficult to coordinate, an
international agreement might be the best way to coordinate between fair use
protections on one hand and strong moral rights on the other. States like the
United States and Japan, which have one but not the other, are unlikely to
effectively make a decision about the appropriate way to balance these two
concepts.
Third, owners could coordinate to authorize particular types of fan fictions but
not others. The Japanese anime and manga industries already support doujinshi,
and many American studios, such as Paramount, allow inoffensive fan works.
While many owners are moving in this direction, it seems unlikely to get the
consent of some of the stricter holdouts, such as Anne Rice. Additionally,
different owners may have different ideas about what is "inoffensive"-while all
owners are likely in agreement that commercial fan fiction is undesirable, different
owners probably have different perceptions about slash fiction or pornographic fan
fiction.
Based on all of this, the ultimate question should be whether it matters.
Should Susan stop writing her fan stories if Rowling can sue her and win in either
the United States or Japan under certain laws? No. The practical matter is, as long
as Susan is not trying to sell her works, Rowling likely will not do that. Should
205. Tushnet, supra note 20, at 654.
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Rowling start going after fans that write distasteful stories about her characters?
No-she does not want to isolate her fans. Will existing suits move over to Japan,
as the laws are more favorable to intellectual property rights owners there? That
depends. If owners move over to Japan, there is a chance that the culture
surrounding lawsuits will change. On the other hand, the culture may dissuade
owners from doing so, meaning no lawsuits will occur.
Ultimately, intellectual property is becoming less territorial and more
international. Fan fiction and similar fan works are only increasing and it would
be best for the law to move with them rather than fight against them. To do this,
international conversations need to be had in order to create international solutions,
so fans can continue to elaborate on the characters they love without hurting the
ones who created them.

